An Eritrean national submitted an asylum application on 15 July 2026. The Minister for Asylum and Migration requested Italy to take charge of her on 5 August 2026, following Eurodac information indicating that she had irregularly entered the territory of the Member States through Italy on 22 June 2026, within the 20 months preceding her asylum application. Italy accepted the request on 17 August 2026, pursuant to Article 33(1) of the AMMR. By decision of 31 August 2026, the minister decided not to examine her application as it determined that Italy was the responsible Member State. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision on the ground that the principle of mutual trust cannot be relied upon due to the reception situation in Italy.

The District Court of the Hague, seated in Haarlem, firstly noted that the application and the contested decision dated after the entry into application of the Pact, and that the decision was taken in accordance with the AMMR, and not the Dublin II Regulation.

With reference to the CJEU ruling of  Jawo (C-163/17, 19 March 2019), the court held that, when determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, the authority may rely on the principle of mutual trust, under which it is presumed that the requested Member State complies with the EU Charter, the Refugee Convention and the ECHR. It noted that this presumption is rebuttable, and the applicant may challenge it by submitting objective information on systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure or reception conditions, as well as evidence of their own experiences.

In accordance  with the CJEU ruling in C.K. (C-578/16, 16 February 2017), where the applicant submits objective information calling the presumption into question, the authority must take it into account and provide a reasoned explanation as to why the presumption remains applicable. Additionally, the court noted that it follows from the ECtHR ruling in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (21 January 2011), that if the authority cannot successfully substantiate maintaining the presumption and does not intend to examine the asylum application itself, it must conduct further investigations in the requested Member State. Similarly, the court noted that the reviewing court must assess, on the basis of objective, reliable, precise and up-to-date information, whether deficiencies are structural or fundamental, or affect particular groups of applicants. The court also recalled the CJEU's ruling in X v State Secretary for Justice and Security (C-392/22, 29 February 2024), where it held that irrespective of whether the information provided by the applicant has been taken into account, Member States must also refrain from transferring applicants when they are aware of serious, fact-based grounds for believing that structural deficiencies in the asylum procedure or reception conditions would expose applicants to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 4 of the EU Charter. It follows that Member States may need to take into account relevant information on their own initiative.

The court further referred to the CJEU judgment in Tudmur (joined cases C-185/24 and C-189/24, 19 December 2024), according to which a transfer is precluded only when persistent and particularly serious systemic deficiencies expose the applicant to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter.

The court held that the unilateral suspension by a Member State of the take-charge and take-back of asylum applicants does not, in itself, satisfy these cumulative conditions. It stated that in the absence of other evidence of systemic deficiencies resulting in such a risk, the determining Member State is not required to continue examining the responsibility criteria under Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation, nor does it automatically become responsible under Article 3(2) third subparagraph. The court considered the aforementioned CJEU case law, developed under the Dublin III Regulation, to be equally applicable under the AMMR.

Following this, the court found that the principle of mutual trust is upheld with respect to transfers to Italy. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the applicant failed to submit objective information evidencing systemic deficiencies in the reception conditions in Italy. The fact that Italy did not reserve places in its reception centres specifically for applicants transferred under the AMMR, including for unaccompanied minors, was not considered to be a systemic flaw. Based on available data from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it also found that, as of September 2026, there was no shortage of reception capacity as the number of available reception places was more than the number of residents, and the available reception places was expanding yearly. It also referred to the findings of the European commission report of 15 July 2026 which found that the organisation of the national reception system seems to be sufficient to accommodate persons transferred under the AMMR.

Additionally, the court found that the mere fact that recent transfers have been refused by Italy is not in itself sufficient to conclude that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a transfer, within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter. It noted hereto that no other elements have been found by the court to evidence that there are systemic deficiencies that result in such a real risk.

Finally, as regards the applicants claim that she has a brother living in the Netherlands, the court upheld the position of the minister that the applicant had not substantiated the alleged family relationship, and held that the AMMR is not a means of obtaining family reunification.

In light of the above, the appeal was declared unfounded