The President of the Republic requested a preventive review of the constitutionality of several amendments introduced by Decree No 105/XVII of the Assembly of the Republic into the Detention Act ("Lei n.º 34/94, de 14 de setembro, que define o regime de acolhimento de estrangeiros ou apátridas em centros de instalação temporária"), the Foreigners Act ("Lei n.º 23/2007, de 4 de julho, que aprova o regime jurídico de entrada, permanência, saída e afastamento de estrangeiros do território nacional"), and the Asylum Act ("Lei n.º 27/2008, de 30 de junho, que estabelece as condições e procedimentos de concessão de asilo ou proteção subsidiária e os estatutos de requerente de asilo, de refugiado e de proteção subsidiária"), incorporating the provisions of the Pact on Migration and Asylum. The EU law instruments cited in that respect are the Return Border Procedure Regulation, the Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), the Screening Regulation, the Qualification Regulation, the Resettlement Regulation, the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation, the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) and the 2024 Reception Conditions Directive (2024 RCD), as well as the Single Permit Directive.

The Constitutional Court (hereafter also referred as “the court”) reviewed the below 11 points of law and upheld all the related amendments as constitutional, based on the following reasoning:

i) Amended Article 135(2) of the Foreigners Act provides for the removal, on national security grounds, of third-country nationals (TCNs) even if they have Portuguese minor children in their care and residing in Portugal.

The Constitutional Court recalled that Article 135(1)(b) of the Foreigners Act establishes, as a rule, protection against coercive removal or expulsion for TCNs who have Portuguese minor children effectively in their care and residing in Portugal, with Article 135(2) being an exception to the general rule. This provision, which requires an assessment of the circumstances of the specific case, applies in the case of TCNs convicted to 5 or more years for a criminal offence provided for in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (containing offences that allow for a European Arrest Warrant); or in respect of whom there is a conviction or a well-founded suspicion of the commission of crimes of terrorism, sabotage, or offences against State security; or who pose a threat to national security or public order.

Drawing on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) General Comments 14 (2013) and 23 (2017) and decisions in O.M. v Denmark (CRC/C/94/D/145/2021) and M.F. and L.B. v Switzerland (CRC/C/98/D/148/2021), the court recalled that, while the disruption of family unity resulting from the expulsion of a parent may prove disproportionate in relation to the State's interest in enforcing migration rules, Articles 3, 9(1), and 9(4) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) do not establish an absolute prohibition on the removal or expulsion of a foreign parent, especially when criminality is at issue, with particular weight being attached to the proportionality of the removal and to the impact of the separation on the child, with due regard also to their views.

The Constitutional Court also considered that those children are European citizens pursuant to Article 20(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and are entitled to the right to respect for private and family life under Article 7 of the EU Charter and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing on case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), namely cases Rendón Marín (C-165/14) and CS (C-304/14), both decided on 13 September 2016, the court held that the protection arising from Article 20 TFEU does not determine an absolute prohibition of removal of the TCN parent either but that, likewise, it does not allow automatic expulsion as a consequence of a criminal conviction and requires a proportionality assessment and consideration of family life and of the best interests of the child.

Thirdly, the court considered the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, citing, among others, Üner v The Netherlands (46410/99, 18 October 2006) and Jeunesse v The Netherlands (12738/10, 3 October 2014), requiring the proportionality assessment to consider the offence committed and the time elapsed since it was committed, the social, cultural, and family ties of the TCN with both the Member State (MS) and the State of destination, and the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the difficulties which they are likely to encounter and the specific conditions in which family life could continue in the destination State. The Constitutional Court noted that Article 8(2) ECHR includes national security, public safety, and the prevention of disorder among the legitimate aims capable of justifying interference with the right to respect for family life, always requiring the measure to be proportionate to the aims pursued.

Lastly, the court considered the protection of the family and childhood under Articles 67 and 69 of the Portuguese Constitution, as well as Article 36(6), which prohibits the separation of children from their parents, except by judicial decision in cases where the parents fail to fulfil their fundamental duties. The court noted that the prohibition of expulsion of Portuguese citizens, the protection of the relationship between parents and children, the parental duties of education and maintenance, the constitutional protection of the family, and the child's own legal position are all simultaneously engaged. It noted that the requirement to have minor children effectively in their care does not simply refer to the existence of a parental link, but to the effective exercise of parental duties, not necessarily requiring cohabitation. In examining the above, the Constitutional Court considered its case law concerning the above rights, including another recent preventive review of constitutionality in the latest amendment of the nationality law (1133/2025, 5 January 2026), and held that, in order to be lawful, such an expulsion measure requires an assessment examining the material connection between the nature of the offence and the public interest pursued, excluding any purely automatic application to TCNs convicted of the listed offences or against whom well-founded suspicions of terrorism, sabotage, or offences against State security exist, or who pose a threat to national security or public order, as well as the concrete consequences that removal would produce for the child, to whom the conviction is not attributable. Accordingly, it upheld the amendment as constitutional.

ii) Article 135(1)(a) of the Foreigners Act as amended adds the requirement of having lived in Portugal for at least 5 years to the general prohibition on the expulsion of foreign children born in Portugal, in practice allowing the expulsion of all foreign children under the age of 5, regardless of their birth in Portugal.

Drawing on Articles 3 (best interests of the child), 7 (birth registration), 8 (identity), and 12 (right to be heard) of the CRC and UN CRC Committee General Comments 6, 12, 14, and 22, the court held that it does not follow from the CRC that the mere fact of birth in the territory of a State gives a foreign child an absolute right to remain there or constitutes an obstacle to his or her removal. However, birth and prolonged stay in the signatory State are legally relevant circumstances in assessing the migration situation of a family with children under the CRC. It further added that Articles 7, 19(2), and 24(2) of the EU Charter and Article 5 of the Return Directive oblige MS to take due account of the best interests of the child, family life, and their state of health, and must also respect the principle of non-refoulement; while Article 10 of the Directive guarantees safeguards for the expulsion of unaccompanied children (UAC).

In this regard, the court cited the CJEU judgments linked to the application of Article 5 of the Return Directive in TQ (Case C-441/19, 14 January 2021), where Dutch authorities had unduly not considered the reception conditions of the State of return for UACs over 15 years of age, and M.A. v Belgium (Case C-112/20, 11 March 2021), where the CJEU reaffirmed that best-interest assessments were required even when the return decision is not directly addressed to the child but affects him or her.

The Constitutional Court also considered the right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR and recalled that the ECtHR requires States to take into account the length of stay in the host country, family life, the existence of children and their age, situation and best interests, as well as potential difficulties in the destination country (see Üner v The Netherlands). The court cited the ECtHR ruling in Maslov v Austria (1638/03, 23 June 2008), where the applicant had spent in Austria the formative years of childhood and youth, spoke German, and had close family there, whereas no strong ties with his State of nationality had been demonstrated, and rejected expulsion as disproportionate. The Constitutional Court noted that Article 8 ECHR does not establish an absolute prevalence of the preservation of the family over the interests that may justify removal, but it does require that the family consequences of the measure form part of the proportionality assessment. Nonetheless, it also noted that the reviewed amendment of the Portuguese Foreigners Act does not remove the protection arising from Article 8 ECHR and that, whenever a specific measure interferes with the child's private or family life, the proportionality assessment must take account of the relevant circumstances of the case.

The court held that neither of the above-mentioned international and European instruments recognises absolute immunity from expulsion for all foreign children born in the host State, while the Portuguese Constitution reserves that absolute prohibition to Portuguese citizens only. It further reasoned that the 5-year residence requirement for protection against expulsion is consistent with the requirement under Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/109/EC for entitlement to long-term residence, as upheld in several cited CJEU rulings, and it also coincides with examples in comparative law, such as the Spanish Foreigners Act, which also requires 5 years of residence for TCNs born in Spain to be protected from expulsion.

Noting that the amendment does not itself establish a ground for removal and merely withdraws from them the categorical protection previously associated with birth and residence in Portugal, it upheld it as constitutional, since any expulsion of a TCN born in Portugal would still remain dependent on fulfilment of a legal ground, observance of the applicable procedure, and compliance with constitutional guarantees.

iii) Articles 35(c)(3) and (6) of the Asylum Act, as amended, provide for the detention, only in exceptional circumstances and as a measure of last resort, of accompanied children when the adults responsible for them are also detained, and of UACs when the detention measure protects them.

The Constitutional Court considered Articles 3 (best interests of the child), 22 (measures to ensure protection of asylum-seeking children), and 37(b) (detention of children) of the CRC, as well as CRC Committee General Comment 23, which clarifies that the detention of children for migration purposes is not allowed under Article 37(b) of the Convention.

At the EU level, the court acknowledged that Articles 10(1), 13(2), and 26 of the 2024 RCD correspond almost entirely with the Portuguese Asylum Act provisions under review, noting that EU law does not absolutely prohibit the detention of child applicants for international protection but would allow MS to establish more favourable provisions in this respect.

Thirdly, the Constitutional Court considered the detention of children under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the ECHR, citing the ECtHR cases in Mubilanzila Mayeka (13178/03, 12 October 2006), Muskhadzhiyeva (41442/07, 19 January 2010), Rahimi (8687/08, 5 July 2011), Popov v France (39472/07 and 39474/07, 19 January 2012), A.B. (11593/12, 12 July 2016), S.F. (8138/16, 7 December 2017), M.H. (15670/18 and 43115/18, 18 November 2021), Nikoghosyan (14743/17, 3 March 2022) and Minasian (26879/17, 17 January 2023). It noted that, while the ECtHR has not established an absolute prohibition on the detention of minors for migratory purposes, it has subjected it to particularly stringent requirements given the child's vulnerability, which it regards as a decisive factor prevailing over considerations relating to their migration status. It noted that the ECtHR has typically addressed under Article 3 the suitability of facilities for the detention of children, taking into account the child's age and length of detention. Under Article 5, the ECtHR has examined the last-resort nature of detention, noting that authorities must seek solutions to preserve family unity that do not entail deprivation of liberty, finding that detention of the parent does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient legal basis for detaining the children, a consideration also examined under Article 8 of the ECHR.

Lastly, the Constitutional Court examined the detention of asylum-seeking children under the right to liberty (Article 27 of the Portuguese Constitution), and the right to family and protection of family unity (Articles 36, 67, and 69).

Taking the above provisions into account, the court held that the application of the provision for accompanied minors must follow the following sequence: first, determine whether detention of the adult is warranted; next, verify whether a non-custodial alternative can be applied to the family unit as a whole; and only if that solution is impossible, consider joint detention, autonomously assessing its effects on the child. Although preservation of family unity constitutes a relevant element of the assessment, it does not replace balancing the physical, psychological, and emotional impact of detention on the child, whose best interests must be independently assessed from those of the adult responsible for them. With regard to UACs, the court stressed its last-resort nature, as an exception to accommodation with adult relatives, in a foster family, or in age-appropriate reception premises, and the requirement that detention must only be adopted where it protects the child. In this context, the court cited risks such as trafficking, exploitation, disappearance, or violence, while noting that a detention decision must identify the specific aim of the measure and explain why the risk justifies deprivation of liberty.

Based on the above reasoning, the Constitutional Court upheld the provisions as constitutional.

iv) Article 146(3) of the Foreigners Act provides for the detention of a TCN for the period strictly necessary to decide on his/her removal, with a maximum of 180 days, extendable for an additional 180 days if the TCN is uncooperative or there are delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries.

With regard to the detention measure established in Article 146(3) of the Foreigners Act for up to 180 days, extendable for an additional 180 days, the Constitutional Court recalled that Article 27(3)(c) of the Portuguese Constitution allows administrative detention of persons who unlawfully entered the country, who remain irregularly therein, or who are subject to extradition or expulsion proceedings. It further held that detention must be subject to judicial review and is subject to the principles of statutory reservation and proportionality established in Article 18(2) of the Constitution.

With regard to the specific detention measure in Article 146(3) of the Foreigners Act, the court noted that placement in a detention centre must be authorised by a judge, is subject to the principle of subsidiarity, and that the 180-day period is the statutory limit, while the period of confinement must be reduced to the minimum indispensable for the conclusion of the administrative proceedings where a standard of diligence and efficiency is observed. Thus, during judicial review, detention can be ended when the judge concludes that the proceedings could have been completed and that continued detention is therefore no longer justified.

The court clarified that detention itself must be justified as necessary to decide on the TCN's removal, while the 180-day extension needs to be grounded either on the TCN being uncooperative or on delays in obtaining the information. Therefore, even where the applicant is uncooperative, detention cannot continue if the information with which he or she is not cooperating is irrelevant, redundant, or the administration can obtain it through other means.

Lastly, the court drew a comparison between the contested Article and Articles 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive, as well as CJEU case law in the judgments Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (C-357/09 PPU, 30 November 2009) and Mahdi (C-146/14 PPU, 5 June 2014), noting that EU law likewise only requires detention to be applied as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence, and requires States to fix an absolute time limit not exceeding 180 days, extendable by 360 additional days on the same grounds laid down in the Foreigners Act. The court held that the provision was aligned with EU law and established stricter limits, and found it not to constitute a disproportionate interference with the right to liberty.

v) Detention of applicants for international protection for up to 12 weeks under Article 35(b)(1) of the Asylum Act, extendable under Article 35(b)(10) and (11) in case of appeal.

The Constitutional Court considered the detention of applicants for international protection for up to 12 weeks while a decision on the admissibility of their application is being considered pursuant to Article 35(b)(1) of the Asylum Act. If a negative admissibility decision is appealed, Article 35(b)(10) and (11) provide that the 12-week period (84 days) may be extended to a total of 180 days, extendable for an additional 180 days pending the outcome of the appeal. This period must be taken into account for the purposes of Article 146(3) of the Foreigners Act, which provides for the detention of TCNs for the purpose of removal.

The court recalled that the possibility of detention of applicants was introduced in Article 35(b) of the Asylum Act by Law No 26/2014, then for a maximum period of 60 days and without the possibility of extension. As with the previous point of law, the Constitutional Court recalled that detention of applicants is subject to the principle of subsidiarity and the requirement of proportionality, meaning that it can only be applied where it is indispensable to fulfil the aims of the measure, that is, a danger to national security, public health, or a risk of absconding, as well as the grounds laid down in Article 35(a)(3), as amended. With regard to the possibility of extending the detention measure pending the appeal, the court clarified that the logic of the provision, that is, to enable judicial review while at the same time ensuring the aims of the measure, was akin to other detention measures, such as preventive detention pending criminal proceedings.

The Constitutional Court noted that the absolute maximum of deprivation of liberty of 12 weeks plus 180 days (sic) cannot be regarded as excessive in light of the ECtHR case law in Saadi (13229/03, 29 January 2008), Kanagaratnam (15297/09, 13 December 2011), or Suso Musa v Malta (42337/12, 23 July 2013), where the ECtHR upheld detention periods of approximately 5 months. A fortiori, the court cited the CJEU's ruling in FMS (C-924/19 and C-925/19, 14 May 2020), which found that the Reception Directive did not require a maximum detention time limit to be set in national law, provided that MS ensure that detention lasts only as long as the ground justifying it continues to apply and the administrative procedures relating to that ground are carried out with due diligence. The Constitutional Court noted that other relevant safeguards applied to the detention of applicants in Portugal, notably the requirement of a judge deciding on the measure or reviewing it within 48 hours, and the possibility of judicial review if new relevant elements arise, and upheld the amendment as constitutional.

vi) The review of detention of applicants pursuant to Articles 35(b)(1), (10), and (11) of the amended Asylum Act.

Concerning judicial review of the detention of applicants, Articles 35(b)(1), (10), and (11) of the Asylum Act subject it to the requirement of relevant new circumstances arising. The court upheld the new provisions as constitutional, noting that this review, which can be conducted ex officio or at the applicant's request, operates in addition to the general monthly review regime laid down in Article 3(2) of the Detention Act (Law No 34/94). Furthermore, the court found that the periodic regime may lead to routine decisions, whereas the possibility to challenge detention in light of new developments better ensures the possibility of withdrawing the detention measure as soon as it is no longer warranted, and satisfies the standard of guarantees required by the 2024 RCD.

vii) Articles 40(c)(1), 40(d)(1) and (2), and 40(f) of the Foreigners Act providing for the permanence of TCNs subject to the border procedure for up to 12 weeks in the international zone of a port or airport, in a temporary detention centre or equivalent facility, or in another place duly designated for that purpose, extendable for up to an additional 6 weeks as provided for in the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation.

One of the arguments raised in the preventive review was that placement in the international zone of a port or airport or in a detention facility, following a negative decision on an application in a border procedure, for a 12-week period counted from the cessation of an applicant's right to remain in the country, and extendable for a further 6 weeks, amounts to a custodial measure. The appeal ground submitted that, if construed as detention, since the decision on and execution of the measure is not entrusted to a judge but to the Public Security Police, it would breach the requirement of detention measures to be ordered or immediately reviewed by the judicial authority pursuant to Articles 18, 20(1), 27(1), 33(8), 67, and 69 of the Constitution.

The court reasoned that, although on a theoretical level, following the refusal of an asylum application at the border, the applicant is simply refused entry into Portugal, the effects of such a decision in practice, that is, placement in a facility from which the TCN cannot leave, mean that the person concerned is confined in a circumscribed space under the authority of the State for up to 12 weeks or even 18 weeks pursuant to Articles 1(4)(a) and (b) of the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation, thus amounting to a custodial measure or detention, and not merely a restriction of movement. The court noted that such a detention measure falls within those envisaged in Article 27(3) of the Constitution, thereby requiring judicial review, which would indeed mean that the provision would be unconstitutional if no such mechanism were provided by the applicable framework.

The Constitutional Court found that the absence of an explicit requirement for judicial review in the challenged provisions would be a “deficit of transposition” (non-transposition or imperfect transposition) of the provisions set forth in Article 4(3) of the Border Procedure Regulation and Article 15(2)(a) and (b), and 15(3) of the Return Directive, which would be binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the national legal order, without any need for incorporation in national law pursuant to Article 288(2) of the TFEU. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court held that Article 35(a)(6) of the Asylum Act is applicable to the detention measures in the border procedure, and that the Public Security Police is therefore obliged to communicate the detention to the competent judge within 48 hours, with the review of the detention measure being conducted at regular intervals and also ex officio or at the request of the applicant, pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Detention Act, which by extension also applies to other detention arrangements such as placement in the international zone of ports and airports.

As for the detention periods established in the Foreigners Act as amended, that is, an initial period of 12 weeks following a negative decision in the border asylum procedure, the period was not deemed excessive by the Constitutional Court. The up to 6-week extensions in situations of mass arrivals or instrumentalisation of TCNs contemplated in Article 1(4)(a) and (b) of the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation was likewise considered by the court as respecting the principle of proportionality, given their exceptional character and their necessity in crisis situations when the administration may be overburdened.

The Constitutional Court made a last observation concerning Article 4(2) of the Border Procedures Regulation, which provides that placement must comply with the material reception conditions and healthcare standards laid out in Articles 19 and 20 of the 2024 RCD, interpreted as an obligation for the administration to ensure a standard of living adequate for applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and their physical and mental health and respects their rights enshrined in Article 19(2) of the EU Charter, requiring special attention to applicants with specific needs, such as minors. The court noted that, where an airport zone is concerned, only a very short detention period would be compatible with that standard, which is why the law provides for placement of applicants in proper detention centres or other designated spaces where appropriate detention conditions can be ensured in a manner respecting human dignity.

Considering all the above, the Constitutional Court upheld the placement of TCN in the international zone of a port or airport or in a detention facility during return border procedures as constitutional.

viii) Articles 40(i)(1), (3), (4), and (5), Article 40(k), and Article 40(m)(1) of the Foreigners Act providing that TCNs, including children, must remain in certain premises at the disposal of the authorities for up to 7 days in screenings at the border and 3 days in screenings carried out elsewhere, which can be extended in exceptional cases subject to judicial review.

Concerning the screening procedure, the Constitutional Court reasoned that Article 40(i)(4) of the Foreigners Act requires TCNs to remain at the disposal of the authorities for the carrying out of the steps necessary for completion of the procedure, implicitly meaning that they may not move away and may need to organise their daily life during the screening so that they are available to the authorities, but noting that no custodial measure is necessarily imposed on them, and that only where a risk of absconding is assessed may an actual restriction of movement be imposed pursuant to Article 40(i)(5) of the same Act.

Based on the above, the court concluded that the reception arrangements during the screening procedure do not fall under detention for migration purposes within the meaning of Article 27(3)(c) of the Constitution, and that the interference with the right to freedom was within the limits of the proportionality principle established in Article 18(2) of the Constitution, given that screening procedures are limited to the minimum indispensable for carrying out the steps of data collection and assessing health status. Moreover, the court noted additional safeguards such as special precautions relating to children and young persons, notably accompaniment by a family member and/or representation, as well as the primacy of their best interests throughout the screening procedure, and the supervision by the Ombudsperson of respect for the fundamental rights of persons subject to screening as an independent monitoring mechanism pursuant to Article 40(n) of the Foreigners Act and Article 10(2) of the Screening Regulation.

ix) Lack of automatic suspensive effect in appeals against international protection decisions, AMMR transfer decisions and revocations pursuant to Articles 22(1), 25(1), 30(1), 37(6), and 44(1) of the Asylum Act as amended.

The amended Articles 22(1), 25(1), 30(1), 37(6), and 44(1) of the Asylum Act no longer attach suspensive effect to the judicial challenge of administrative decisions holding an application inadmissible, not accepting an application lodged at a border post, refusing international protection, considering another MS responsible for an application, or revoking international protection.

The above-mentioned Articles as amended no longer include the indication that judicial appeals against the decisions therein have automatic suspensive effect, and the Constitutional Court assessed whether that would constitute a breach of the principle of non-refoulement through the lens of Articles 3 and 13 of the ECHR and Articles 18, 19(2), and 47 of the EU Charter. Citing the ECtHR judgments in Gebremedhin v France (25389/05, 26 April 2007), M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (30696/09, 21 January 2011) and Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (27765/09, 23 February 2012), and several CJEU cases, including X and Y (C-180/17, 26 September 2018), the Constitutional Court noted that both courts align in requiring the availability of an effective judicial remedy to substantiate a full and ex nunc review of international protection and return decisions.

However, the court further reasoned that Article 68(1) of the APR no longer attaches suspensive effect to appeals against decisions on international protection, but to return decisions. The court held that it is the expulsion that must be stayed, which does not necessarily mean that the decision rejecting the application for protection cannot produce effects in other respects while proceedings in which its validity is debated are pending. Citing the CJEU judgments in Tall (C-239/14, 17 December 2015), Gnandi (C-181/16, 19 June 2018) and Moussa Abdida (C-562/13, 18 December 2014), the court held that the principle of non-refoulement is not breached by not attaching suspensive effect to appeals against international protection decisions, but by the fact that a return measure may be enforced pending the appeal on international protection.

With regard to AMMR transfer decisions, the court noted that Article 43(3) of the AMMR establishes that the decision shall be immediately enforceable, but that the applicant must be ensured the possibility of asking the court to suspend enforcement of the transfer decision.

x) Amended Articles 146(5) and (8) of the Foreigners Act allowing the removal of rejected applicants to be enforced following the administrative decision while the judicial review is still pending.

The Constitutional Court noted that the amended Article 12(1) of the Asylum Act now establishes that an application for international protection does not suspend the progress of administrative proceedings for irregular entry, and that the amended Article 146 of the Foreigners Act now allows the enforcement of return decisions following the administrative rejection of the international protection application. The court noted that, under the new provisions, the administrative authority may carry out a removal procedure while an application for international protection is pending and, importantly, may issue an expulsion decision as soon as the administrative decision rejecting that asylum request is issued, regardless of any potential appeals.

However, the Constitutional Court noted that, pursuant to Article 150 of the Foreigners Act, the removal decision itself can be appealed and, while it does not have automatic suspensive effect, this can be requested through urgent interim measures, which were deemed sufficient by the Constitutional Court to guarantee the principle of non-refoulement.

xi) Article 44(1) of the Asylum Act, as amended, allowing coercive expulsion or removal of beneficiaries of international protection before the judicial review of the revocation decision.

As in the previous section, drawing on the CJEU judgments in Tall (C-239/14, 17 December 2015) and in Gnandi (C-181/16, 19 June 2018), the Constitutional Court held that the CJEU findings concerning decisions rejecting international protection were equally valid for decisions revoking international protection, namely, that the absence of suspensive effect of an appeal brought solely against a decision rejecting an application for international protection is, in principle, consistent with the principle of non-refoulement and with Article 47 of the EU Charter, since the revocation decision itself does not lead to the removal of the TCN concerned.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Constitutional Court found the challenged amendments made by Decree No. 105/XVII of the Assembly of the Republic into the Detention Act, the Foreigners Act, and the Asylum Act to be constitutional.