An Iranian woman and her two adult daughters were granted a temporary asylum residence permit on 7 August 2017 as it was considered credible that they had converted religion. The father later followed his family and was similarly granted asylum on 29 March 2018. In a judgment of 7 December 2023, the Court of Appeal of 's-Hertogenbosch sentenced a legal advisor for human smuggling, and for offering fictitious asylum account for payments and helping foreign nationals to study such an account. The minister set up the so-called Ambrose project to determine which foreign nationals made use of these services and obtained status fraudulently. This case falls under this project.

The asylum residence permits of the Iranian family were withdrawn by decision of 6 May 2022, as the minister took the position that they had submitted false statements with the help of the legal advisor. The minister also reassessed whether the persons concerned were nevertheless eligible for an asylum permit on the basis of all the credible elements and findings available at that time, but concluded that this was not the case.

The minister held that even though the family had stuck to their original claim of conversion, it is no longer possible to find out which statements are authentic given that it has emerged they made false statements at the time with the help of the legal advisory. He therefore did not consider the alleged conversions to be credible.

The Council of State noted that the law applied to this case is that which was in force prior to the entry into application of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum on 12 June 2026.

The family appealed the withdrawal of their status before the District Court of the Hague, which ruled that requirements for the revocation of the asylum residence permits, as laid down in Article 32(1)(a) of the Vw 2000, have been met in light of their coordination with the legal advisor, and the fact that they admitted that a raid on their house in Iran was fabricated. However, the court ruled that the minister failed to substantiate the fact that they do not have a well-founded fear of persecution or run a real risk of serious harm, as the interviews were not conducted correctly. The court found that the minister did not question them about all elements indicated in national guidance in such cases, and did not provide them with the opportunity to elaborate on the statements made earlier.

The minister appealed this decision before the Council of State.

The family argued that the district court had wrongly concluded that they provided incorrect information about their apostasy and conversion, claiming that the minister had failed to substantiate precisely which statements were false and had effectively reversed the burden of proof. The council rejected this argument. It held that the minister had sufficiently demonstrated, through intercepted telephone conversations and interrogation records, that the family had received detailed instructions from their legal adviser on how to present and reconcile their accounts of their conversion, including the timing of the conversion, the alleged raid on their home, and their personal experiences of oppression. The family themselves also acknowledged that the adviser had provided them with information, documents and notes to prepare for their asylum interviews. The council emphasised that applicants are responsible for providing an authentic and personal account and that it was irrelevant whether they had merely exaggerated certain aspects or had not repeated everything the adviser had told them. Given that their statements had been coordinated and rehearsed with the adviser and concerned essential elements of their claimed conversion, the minister was entitled to conclude that incorrect information had been provided and that the applicants could no longer be regarded as broadly credible or be given the benefit of the doubt. The burden of proof had therefore not been reversed, and the family had failed to raise sufficient doubt about the minister's findings. The complaint was consequently dismissed.

The applicants argued that the minister should have carried out an additional proportionality assessment and that the withdrawal of their permits breached the principle of equality. The council rejected both arguments. It found that the minister had already assessed their individual circumstances, including under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 64 of the Vw 2000, and that the family had not identified any relevant factors that had been overlooked. An additional proportionality assessment could therefore not have altered the outcome, making a preliminary reference to the CJEU unnecessary. The council also found no breach of the principle of equality, as the minister assessed each case under the Ambrose project on its individual facts and circumstances. While genuine subsequent conversions had been considered credible in some other cases, the minister had not found the families' claimed conversions credible; therefore, the cases were not comparable.

As an interim conclusion, the council found that the District Court rightly ruled that the revocation of the asylum residence permits 2000 was lawful.

The council then turned to the appeal of the minister.

The minister argued that the district court had wrongly found that he had failed to substantiate, during the reassessment following revocation of the applicants' asylum residence permits, that they no longer had a well-founded fear of persecution or faced a real risk of serious harm. The council clarified that the assessment framework developed in its 2022 case law on subsequent asylum applications involving alleged conversion or apostasy also applies by analogy to reassessments. The minister must therefore assess new statements together with the applicant's previous account through an overarching credibility assessment, applying the relevant guidance on credibility and the specific assessment method for converts and apostates. During the revocation interview, the minister must consider the motives and process of conversion or apostasy, the applicant's knowledge of the new faith, and their activities within the faith and the effects of any changes, as shortcomings in one element may be compensated by convincing evidence concerning the others. Where previous statements that led to the granting of protection have subsequently been found to be false and inauthentic, the burden of proof on the applicant is increased. The applicant may be required to explain why they should nevertheless qualify for protection, including by reflecting on their conduct in the original asylum procedure, explaining developments since the permit was granted and demonstrating why newly presented elements should lead to a positive outcome. Referring to the CJEU judgment of 29 June 2023 in X v International Protection Appeals Tribunal, The Minister for Justice and Equality, Ireland, The Attorney General (C-756/21), paragraphs 91–93, the council confirmed that a false statement made in previous proceedings is a relevant factor in assessing whether an applicant can be regarded as broadly credible, although such a statement does not in itself preclude overall credibility. In the present case, however, there were no circumstances justifying departure from the starting point that applicants whose incorrect statements led to the granting of a permit are, in principle, no longer entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The council further held that, in the reassessment, the minister may attach greater weight to documents concerning the applicant's conversion or apostasy, including objective evidence as well as subjective evidence such as the applicant's own statements, third-party statements, social media messages and photographs.

The council thus found that the district court rightly ruled that WI 2022/3 applies and that the withdrawal interviews with those involved were not conducted correctly. The appeals were declared unfounded, and the council confirmed the district court's judgment with correction of grounds.