The judgment concerned the interpretation of Article 4(1) and (5)(e) of the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004) in a case between X, a Pakistani national, whose request for international protection was dismissed, and the International Protection Appeals Tribunal of Ireland (IPAT), the Minister for Justice and Equality and the Attorney General.

X lodged a request for international protection in Ireland on 2 July 2015, and based his application on a statement which he later retracted. He claimed that he was afraid to live in Pakistan and that he suffered anxiety, depression and sleep disorder as a result of the fact that he witnessed a terrorist bomb explosion near him during a funeral in Pakistan, which killed around 40 persons, including two people that he knew. The application was rejected on 14 November 2016. X appealed and he subsequently lodged another request for subsidiary protection on 13 March 2017, which was also rejected. Both appeals were rejected by the IPAT on 7 February 2019. X further appealed before the High Court, arguing that the IPAT had used incomplete and outdated country of origin information, that the reasonable time to decide on the case was not respected and that IPAT was aware of the applicant’s mental state but did not order a medical report and did not give him the benefit of the doubt.

The High Court stayed the proceedings and referred questions to the CJEU for preliminary ruling on the following:

‘(1)      In circumstances where there has been a complete breach of the duty of cooperation as described at paragraph 66 of the judgment [of 22 November 2012, M. (C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744)], in an applicant’s application for subsidiary protection, has the consideration of that application been rendered “totally ineffective” in the sense considered in [the judgment of 15 October 2015, Commission v Germany (C‑137/14, EU:C:2015:683)]?

(2)      If the answer to [the first question] is positive, should the aforesaid breach of the duty of cooperation, without more, entitle an applicant to annulment of the decision?

(3)      If the answer to [the second question] is in the negative, then and if applicable, on whom does the onus lie to establish that the refusal decision might have been different had there been proper cooperation by the decision maker?

(4)      Should the failure to provide a decision on an applicant’s application for international protection within a reasonable time entitle an applicant to annulment of a decision when issued?

(5)      Does the time taken in effecting change to the applicable asylum protection framework within a Member State operate to excuse that Member State from operating an international protection scheme, which would have provided a decision on such protection application within a reasonable time?

(6)      Where insufficient evidence is before a protection decision maker as to the state of an applicant’s mental health but where some evidence of the possibility of an applicant suffering from such difficulties is present, is the international protection decision maker, in accordance with the duty of cooperation mentioned in [the judgment of 22 November 2012, M. (C‑277/11, EU:C:2012:744, paragraph 66)], or otherwise, under a duty to make further enquiry, or any other duty, prior to arriving at a final decision?

(7)      Where a Member State is carrying out its duty pursuant to Article 4(1) of [Directive 2004/83] to assess the relevant elements of an application is it permissible to declare the general credibility of an applicant not to have been established by reason of one lie, explained and withdrawn at the first reasonably available opportunity thereafter, without more?’

The CJEU ruled that:

“1.      Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted must be interpreted as meaning that:

–        the duty of cooperation laid down in that provision requires the determining authority to obtain (i) up-to-date information concerning all the relevant facts as regards the general situation prevailing in the country of origin of an applicant for asylum and international protection and (ii) a medico-legal report on his or her mental health, where there is evidence of mental health problems resulting potentially from a traumatic event which occurred in that country of origin and the use of such a report is necessary or relevant in order to assess the applicant’s genuine need for international protection, provided that the modalities of the use of such a report comply, inter alia, with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

–        the finding – in the context of a second level of judicial scrutiny provided for by national law – of a breach of the duty of cooperation laid down in that provision need not necessarily entail, by itself, the annulment of the decision dismissing an appeal brought against a decision rejecting an application for international protection, since the applicant for international protection may be required to demonstrate that the decision dismissing the appeal might have been different in the absence of that breach.

2.      EU law, in particular Article 23(2) and Article 39(4) of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, must be interpreted as meaning that:

–        the periods which have elapsed between, on the one hand, the lodging of the application for asylum and, on the other, the adoption of the decisions of the determining authority and of the competent court or tribunal of first instance, cannot be justified by national legislative amendments made during those periods, and

–        the unreasonableness of one or other of those periods cannot, by itself and in the absence of any evidence that the excessive duration of the administrative or judicial proceedings affected the outcome of the dispute, justify setting aside the decision of the competent court or tribunal of first instance.

3.      Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 must be interpreted as meaning that a false statement, contained in the initial application for international protection, which was explained and withdrawn by the applicant for asylum at the first available opportunity, is not capable, by itself, of preventing the establishment of the applicant’s general credibility, for the purposes of that provision.”