A Syrian national requested the Regional Administrative Court of Düsseldorf to order the suspensive effect of his appeal lodged against the return order contained in the BAMF negative decision on asylum of 15 October 2025. The court reiterated that a request for suspensive effect of appeal can be allowed only when there are serious doubts concerning the legality of the contested act or violation of the applicant’s rights. The court found that the conditions were not met in this case because the asylum application was correctly rejected as inadmissible and the threat to deportation was lawful.

First, the court noted that the applicant unsuccessfully applied for international asylum in Austria and then he sought asylum in Germany. The court affirmed that if, after the unsuccessful conclusion of an asylum procedure in a safe third country (Section 26a of the Asylum Act), a third country national submits an asylum application (subsequent application) in Germany, a further asylum procedure is only to be carried out if the Germany is responsible for conducting the asylum procedure and the requirements of Section 51 (1-3) of the Administrative Procedure Act are met.

The court noted that Section 71a of the Asylum Act is in line with EU law, especially the ground for inadmissibility concerning the rejection of subsequent applications, as laid down in Article 33(2)(d) in conjunction with Article 2(q) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive. Citing the CJEU judgment N.A.K. and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (joined Cases C-123/23 and C-202/23, 19 December 2024), the court held that an application can be rejected as inadmissible when, after receiving a final negative decision on a previous application in a first Member State, the person applies again for international protection in a different Member State.

Also, a subsequent application can only be rejected as inadmissible under Sections 29(1)(5) and 71a of the Asylum Act if the asylum procedure previously conducted in the other Member State was carried out in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Since the applicant did not argue deficiencies in the procedure conducted in Austria, then this requirement was not met.

The court further noted that Section 51 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires the authority, upon application by the person concerned, to reopen the proceedings if the factual or legal situation in the administrative act has subsequently changed in favour of the applicant, if new available evidence would have led to a more favourable outcome, or grounds for reopening exist in accordance with Section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition, the application is only admissible if the applicant was unable, through no gross negligence, to assert the grounds for reopening in the earlier proceedings, particularly through an appeal.

The court asserted that the prerequisites for reopening the proceedings were not met because there was no change in the situation since the negative decision issued by the Austrian authorities on 19 October 2023.

In the absence of new grounds concerning Syria, the court noted that a repetition of the grounds already asserted and assessed by the Austrian Federal Office were not capable of triggering a new procedure in Germany or a reopening as no new elements were raised and no change in the situation was substantiated in order to support, with a high degree of probability, a more favourable decision. The court also cited the CJEU judgment A.A. v Federal Republic of Germany (C-216/22, 8 February 2024) on new elements or findings to support a subsequent application.

The court further assessed that the conditions for being granted were not met in the case and referenced the CJEU case EZ v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) (C-238/19, 19 November 2020) as well as national jurisprudence to rule that the applicant did not demonstrate a well founded fear of persecutions on grounds of military service because the applicant’s allegations related more to the Assad regime which no longer exercises power in Syrian since 8 December 2024.

After reviewing updated country of origin information, also by referencing EUAA, Syria: Country Focus, July 2025, the court concluded that there were no indications of a risk of serious harm or a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment upon return since it could not be established that every Syrian, in the event of return, is at considerable risk of facing a situation of distress. It stated that there were no reasons to believe, with a considerable degree of probability, that the applicant would be at risk of a serious individual threat to life or physical integrity in Syria because of indiscriminate violence in the context of an international or internal armed conflict, pursuant to Section 4(1) sentence 1, 2 no. 3 of the Asylum Act. The court noted that if the applicant lived either in Damascus or in the province of Latakia since 2020, the level of arbitrary violence that region and its province, is not so high that he would be exposed to a serious individual threat to his life or physical integrity solely by virtue of his presence there.

The court also rejected the applicant’s argument related to interim measures adopted by the ECtHR in a case he submitted before this court against Austria. It noted that although the ECtHR initially accepted the request for interim measure ordering the Austrian authorities not to remove the applicant, however on 23 September 2025 the ECtHR decided not to extend the measure. The ECtHR stated in A.F. v Austria (24394/25, 23 September 2025) that in view of the general security situation in Syria and the individual circumstances of the case, it could not be proven that the applicant would face a real and imminent risk of irreparable harm if returned.

With regard to allegations of impediments to return due to health condition of the applicant, the court reiterated the ECtHR principles established in N. v United Kingdom (No 26565/05, 27 May 2008), Paposhvili v Belgium (No 41738/10, 13 December 2016) namely that a significant deterioration of health cannot be assumed in every anticipated adverse development, but only in cases of exceptionally severe physical or mental conditions. The high threshold of Article 3 presupposes that a deterioration is severe, rapid, and irreversible, resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy. The court rejected the applicant’s allegations, found that he previously received medical treatment in Syria for 4 years and reiterated that third country nationals are not entitled to a right to remain in order to continue using medical or other social services in the host country. Also, Section 60 (7) of the Residence Act does not require an equivalent medical system to German one in the country of destination and an asylum applicant must accept the level of medical treatment in the country or origin/destination irrespecti8ve of whether similar or not to the one in Germany

On minors and family life, the court referenced the CJEU judgment in Federal Republic of Germany v G.S. (C-484/22, 15 February 2023) when concluding that there was no obstacle to deportation derived from the residence of his family members because his son and spouse had a temporary residence limited to the processing of their asylum application. Relying on the ECtHR cases Solomon v. The Netherlands (44328/98, 5 September 2000), M.A. v Denmark, No 6697/18, 9 July 2021, Pormes v. The Netherlands (No 25402/14, 28 July 2020), the court concluded that the family have never had a legitimate expectation to continue their family life in Germany, on the contrary it found that continuing their family life in Syria was possible and reasonable.

Based on the abovementioned reasons, the court rejected the request for suspensive effect of the negative decision and return.