On 26 April 2024, the Minister for Asylum and Migration decided not to process an application of an Afghan national because Belgium was deemed the responsible Member State under the Dublin III Regulation. The applicant's appeal was upheld by the District Court of the Hague on 4 July 2024. The court considered that the Council of State had ruled on 13 March 2024, in State Secretary for Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid) v Applicant (202304212/1/V3), that the principle of mutual trust may be relied upon with respect to Dublin transfer decisions to Belgium as there was no total stop to reception despite the finding that single male applicants were being placed on a waiting list. However, on appeal, the district court ruled that the minister had not properly substantiated that the principle of mutual trust may still be relied upon, in light of decreasing availability of shelter highlighted by the 2023 Update AIDA Country report: Belgium, the Dashboard on non-reception policy and information on the Fedasil webpage. The case was returned to the minister who appealed the decision before the Council of State.

With reference to the CJEU Judgment in Abubacarr Jawo v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C163/17, 19 March 2019), the council firstly noted that the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation is based on the principle of mutual trust which presumes that the treatment of an applicant in the requested Member State is in accordance with the provisions of the EU Charter, the ECHR and the Refugee Convention. Based on the assessment framework for assessing whether the minister may rely on the principle of mutual trust, it noted that it must assess whether there are structural shortcoming in the asylum procedure and reception conditions of Belgium for non-vulnerable single men which would lead to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. Hereto, the court referred to the CJEU judgment in X v State Secretary for Justice and Security (C-392/22, 29 February 2024).

The council ruled that the district court was correct in its assessment that the circumstances in the reception system in Belgium had changed substantially since the council's previous decision. The council held that although the exact figures regarding Belgium's capacity to receive asylum seekers are unclear and fluctuate, the available information showed that the Belgian authorities have failed to create the number of new reception places that were mentioned in the previous ruling and that seemingly, there were no longer any realistic plans to open additional reception facilities. Additionally, the council noted that it remained uncertain whether non-vulnerable single men had access to emergency or homeless shelters. As a result, it concluded that, despite earlier assurances to improve reception conditions, significant deficiencies persisted, no longer of a temporary nature, but structural.

The council also assessed the access of applicants to an effective remedy in Belgium, finding that since 2021, Belgian courts have ruled in thousands of cases that the authorities violated asylum seekers' right to reception, rejecting the government's argument of force majeure. Courts have ordered immediate access to reception and imposed penalties for non-compliance, which had not been paid. The ECtHR also issued interim measures and found Belgium in violation of Article 6 of the ECHR for failing to enforce final judgments on the reception of applicants for international protection in Camara v Belgium (49255/22, 31 October 2022). The council concluded that, due to the authorities' non-compliance with judicial decisions, asylum seekers, particularly non-vulnerable single men, lacked effective legal protection of their right to reception, indicating structural deficiencies in the field of legal protection.

Furthermore, the council found that the Belgian authorities showed indifference toward the ongoing deficiencies in reception conditions and the lack of effective legal remedies. In this regard, it considered that there was no longer a visible commitment to expanding reception capacity, and indications suggested an intention to reduce it, including through a public campaign discouraging asylum applications. The council also noted that the authorities had not used available alternatives, such as providing living allowances or implementing a dispersal plan, despite having the legal basis to do so. Additionally, it stated that the continued refusal to enforce court decisions and pay imposed penalties further supported the finding of indifference.

Considering the above, the council ruled that the minister may no longer assume that the treatment of the person concerned in Belgium was in accordance with the provisions of the EU Charter, the ECHR and the Refugee Convention due to structural shortcomings in reception conditions and in the area of legal protection in Belgium. It ruled further that the applicant would run a real risk of being in a situation contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3 of the ECHR, of very far-reaching material deprivation that would not allow him to meet his most basic needs. It concluded that the minister may no longer rely on the principle of mutual trust with respect to the decision to transfer non-vulnerable single men to Belgium. The appeal was declared unfounded.