An Afghan applicant applied for international protection in Finland on grounds that he feared persecution. The Finnish Immigration Service (FIS) rejected the application by decision of 25 February 2022 and excluded the applicant on the basis of Section 87(2)(1) of the Aliens Act due to his participation in war crimes, although he was a minor at the time of the acts. The applicant unsuccessfully appealed before the Administrative Court and further appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court arguing that he was not personally responsible for his participation in war crimes, and that in any event he acted under duress. The applicant alleged that he was forced to join the Taliban at the age of 15 or 16, when he participated in a training where he experienced violence, use of drugs in the group and psychological pressure to commit the acts in question. The applicant alleged that he was traumatised by the events and was not sufficiently mentally mature at the time of the events to have understood his actions and their consequences since he risked being shot in case of refusal to shoot. He mentioned that in the first shooting incident, a young man who was unable to hold a gun was shot. Following this incident, he did not think of refusing the task and he claimed that he was not asked during the personal interview in Finland about the consequences of refusing the tasks given by the Taliban.
The Supreme Administrative Court had to decide whether the applicant, who reached the age of 15 which is the age of criminal responsibility in Finland, can be held liable for his actions and whether he acted under duress. The court found that the applicant was excluded from international protection under Section 87 (2)(1) of the Aliens Act which corresponds to the ground provided under Article 1 F of the Geneva Convention and that the applicant invoked duress as ground for criminal immunity. The court looked into the definition of duress pursuant to Article 31 (1)(d) of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court and jurisprudence of this court, namely the case Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen and Prosecutor v. Al Hassan, to state that a threat must be immediate and specific to constitute duress, whereas general threats or abstract fears were insufficient. The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to the UK case in AB v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, (22 July 2016) where the Tribunal stated, regarding the burden of proof, that a person who claims duress must demonstrate that there are circumstances which constitute a ground for exemption, and in such a case the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds to indicate that the person did not act under duress.
By referring to the UNHCR guidelines on International Protection no. 5: Application of the exclusion clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, September 2003, and the UNHCR background note, the Supreme Administrative Court pointed to the fact that ‘when an individual who has been acting under the command of other members of an organisation invokes duress, it must be assessed whether it can reasonably be assumed that he should have renounced his membership of the organisation and whether that renunciation should have taken place as soon as it became apparent that membership of the organisation would lead to the situation in question'. Also, specifically for exclusion of children, the court referenced the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees which mentioned that the assessment must take into account not only the general principles but also the provisions and principles related to the special status, rights and protection of children in relation to the asylum procedure as well as the best interests of the child, their mental capacities and their ability to understand the acts they are requested or ordered to perform.
The Supreme Administrative Court referenced the CJEU judgment in Germany v B and D, (C-57/09 and C-101/09, 9 November 2010), where the latter mentioned that exclusion must be interpreted strictly and that the assessment must include any circumstances that may eliminate or reduce responsibility. The Supreme Administrative Court stated that circumstances that eliminate personal responsibility must be assessed objectively and cannot be based solely on the person's own perception of the reasons for his actions. As such, it noted that the appellant, as a member of the Taliban, participated in the internal armed conflict as a perpetrator, including three times in the executions of prisoners and in the killing of a total of seven people, and that those acts fall under war crimes within the meaning of Section 87(2)(1) of the Aliens Act. The court considered that the assessment must look into whether the appellant was to be held personally liable for his actions, considering in particular his claim that he acted under duress and he was a minor at the time of the events.
The Supreme Administrative Court noted that the applicant joined the Taliban when he was a minor and was subject to many violations of his rights, that he was trained in combat roles and learned to believe in its doctrine and actions, as he stayed there for one year and was aware of the unlawfulness of their executions. He believed that he would be shot if he refused to shoot but he mentioned only after several years that during the first execution one trained persons was killed for refusing to execute the order. Also, he did not mention in any of interviews that he was under the influence of drug, but only during the proceedings at the Supreme Court, thus his credibility was affected.
The court found him criminally liable for his acts while he was a member of the Taliban forces, despite his minor age, by taking into account his mental maturity and mental health.
The Supreme Administrative Court found that, although the circumstances under which he worked while being in the organisation were oppressive and potentially posed a threat to his life or health, it took into consideration that the applicant stayed in the organisation for approximately one year, he had not attempted to flee, and had not refused subsequent orders following his initial participation. The applicant had repeatedly committed extremely serious crimes, resulting in the loss of seven lives. By considering the circumstances as a whole, the applicant's life or health could not be considered to have been under an imminent threat within the meaning of the internationally defined concept of a state of emergency.
The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the applicant was personally responsible for war crimes, thus it confirmed his exclusion from refugee protection.