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22/07/2016
UK: The Upper Tribunal confirmed negative decision on exclusion ground by applying Article 1F(a)
22/07/2016
UK: The Upper Tribunal confirmed negative decision on exclusion ground by applying Article 1F(a)

ECLI
Input Provided By
EUAA Courts and Tribunals Network
Other Source/Information
Type
Decision
Original Documents
Relevant Legislative Provisions
Recast Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as BIP for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection)(recast QD)/or QD 2004/83/EC; UN International Covenants / UN Conventions
Reference
United Kingdom, Upper Tribunal - Immigration and Asylum Chamber , AB v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2016] UKUT 00376 (IAC), 22 July 2016. Link redirects to the English summary in the EUAA Case Law Database.
Permanent link to the case
https://caselaw.euaa.europa.eu/pages/viewcaselaw.aspx?CaseLawID=2101
Case history
Other information
Abstract

According to the EASO Courts and Tribunals Compilation of jurisprudence on Exclusion Articles 12 and 17 Qualification Directive, second edition 2020:


The appellant, an Iranian citizen, held a senior role in a women's prison under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in which political prisoners were detained and tortured. In 2009 she, her husband and her young child left Iran clandestinely with the help of an agent. Having become separated from her husband, the appellant arrived in the United Kingdom with her child in 2009 and claimed asylum. It transpired that her husband had made his way to Turkey but had been forcibly returned from there to Iran, where he was detained and tortured over a period of months. On his release he subsequently made his way to the United Kingdom, arriving in 2010, when he too claimed asylum. The respondent refused each of the applications, giving reasons for doing so, explaining that the appellant was to be excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention upon the grounds set out in Article 1F(a), namely that there were serious grounds for considering that she had committed a crime against humanity, and her consequential certification under section 55 of the Immigration Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 that she was not entitled to the protection of Article 33 paragraph 1 of the Refugee Convention. For the same reasons she concluded that the appellant did not qualify for protection under the QD. The appellant, her child and her husband all appealed against the respondent's decisions and their linked cases were heard together before the First-tier Tribunal. The First-tier Tribunal upheld the respondent's decision to exclude the appellant from protection under the Refugee Convention and the QD and in doing so rejected the appellant's claim that she was excluded from criminal responsibility on account of having acted under duress. However, by concession it allowed the appellant's appeal on human rights grounds on the basis that she would be at real risk of ill treatment on return to Iran. The appeals of the appellant's husband and her child were each allowed on both asylum and human rights grounds. After permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was refused, the appellant sought Judicial Review which was granted. It was held that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law, as its finding that the appellant could have left the prison service ‘without serious difficulty' was inadequately reasoned and not supported by evidence before it. The decision on the appellant's appeal was ordered to be remade with the original findings and decision in relation to exclusion from protection under the Refugee Convention and the QD being set aside. The remaining findings and decisions of the First-tier Tribunal were preserved.


The first question to be addressed is whether an individual could avoid exclusion from the protection of the Refugee Convention under Article 1F(a) upon the basis that whilst he or she might appear to have engaged in conduct which would fit the definition of crimes against humanity, he or she was acting under duress. The appellant is an intelligent, articulate and qualified woman. She is also resourceful. The account which she gives of her escape from Iran is illuminating. The reality of the appellant's account of acting under duress is that for a period of many years she took no steps whatsoever to avoid compliance with her duties in the prison, despite her knowledge of the consequence for those taken to the torture facility. Even despite being off work after the birth of her child for a lengthy period of time, she chose not to explore any other option but to return to her duties in the prison. She continued in those duties accepting promotion along the way. The immediacy of her reaction on learning of her relative's detention and the combined manner of the transfer to hospital and subsequent escape is evidence of a cunning and resourceful nature, along with an ability and willingness to take appropriate steps when she chose to do so. We are perfectly satisfied that the defence of duress cannot be engaged on the basis of the evidence which the appellant has adduced. It is untenable on the basis of the vague and speculative consequence which she has associated with making a request to be allowed to resign, leave or transfer. It is equally untenable on the basis of the appellant's own evidence of having made no effort of any description to extricate herself from her duties at the prison over a period of many years. The harm which the appellant knew she was causing was out of all proportion to the risk to herself which she has identified as befalling her if she had made efforts to leave short of desertion. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the necessary evidential burden has not been discharged by the appellant and she has advanced no valid answer to the serious reasons for considering that she has committed a crime against humanity as identified by the Secretary of State. Since we were otherwise satisfied that the Secretary of State was well entitled to arrive at the conclusion which she did, the appellant's appeal against the Secretary of State's decision of 2 October 2012 must fail. If we ask ourselves whether the Secretary of State has shown that there are serious reasons for considering that the appellant did not act under duress, then the answer is that she has. We therefore uphold the Secretary of State's certificate under Section 55 of the Immigration Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. The appellant's claims under the Refugee Convention and the QD are excluded by reason of Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention and Article 12.2 of the QD and therefore cannot succeed.


Country of Decision
United Kingdom
Court Name
UK: Upper Tribunal - Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Case Number
[2016] UKUT 00376 (IAC)
Date of Decision
22/07/2016
Country of Origin
Iran
Keywords
Exclusion
Crimes against humanity
Grounds negating individual responsibility
Duress
Individual responsibility
Torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment