Registered before the CJEU under C-1160/26 [Vansen]
Two Russian applicants, an 18-year-old woman and a 19-year-old man who were married and both identified as transgender, submitted an application for asylum on 20 October 2026 in connection with their gender identities. The male applicant had already commenced gender transition treatment in Russia. The applicants did not satisfy the entry conditions laid down in Article 6 of the Schengen Borders Code. They were therefore referred to the asylum border procedure.
On the day they submitted their asylum applications, the Dutch authorities imposed measures depriving them of their liberty. These measures were based on both the requirement to conduct screening under the Screening Regulation and the application of the asylum border procedure under the Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR).
The preliminary medical check required by Article 12 of the Screening Regulation was not carried out before referral. Under Dutch policy the Koninklijke Marechaussee (Royal Netherlands Marechaussee - KMar) does not perform it, as it is not qualified medical personnel, and the medical intake at the detention centre is not regarded as that check.
On 30 October 2026, the authorities lifted the detention measures and released the applicants, stating that their cases were not suitable for the asylum border procedure, since applications cannot be granted within it. On the same day they recognised both applicants as refugees and granted them residence permits valid until 31 October 2029.
The District Court of The Hague, seated in Roermond, still had to rule on the lawfulness of the detention. It referred five questions to the CJEU and requested for them to be dealt with under the expedited procedure. The court proposed an answer to each question.
Question 1 – Termination of screening before completion of all checks
The court asked whether Articles 3, 8(3) and 18(5) of the Screening Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 6 of the EU Charter, must be interpreted as precluding the termination of screening and detention under Article 10(4)(d) of the RCD 2024, where not all screening checks have been completed and the time limit laid down in Article 8 has not yet expired.
The court proposed an affirmative answer. It noted that under Article 18(5) of the Screening Regulation, screening may be terminated with checks incomplete only once the time limit has expired and that before then, all elements listed in Article 8(5) must be carried out, including the preliminary medical check. Hereto, it observed that screening and the appropriate procedure are successive. It stated that referral to the appropriate procedure pursuant to Article 8(5)(g) is itself the last element of screening and must take account the results of the other checks within the meaning of recitals 6, 7 and 15 of the Screening Regulation. The court cited Recital 15 which allows checks to continue in the subsequent procedure only when necessary, not as a general rule. The court noted that the EUAA Guidelines on alternatives to detention (December 2024) likewise state that screening precedes the border procedure and is not part of it. The court considered that, if the Dutch policy is incompatible with EU law, the detention may have been wrongly based on the Screening Regulation.
Question 2 – One detention measure based on two legal grounds
The court asked whether Articles 6 and 18(5) of the Screening Regulation and Article 10(1) and (4)(d) of the RCD 2024 preclude a Member State from using a single legal basis and a single detention measure to detain a third-country national simultaneously for the purpose of screening and for the purpose of deciding on the applicant's right to enter the territory.
The court noted a previous ruling from the Dutch Council of State, in its judgment of 2 September 2026, which acknowledged that screening and the asylum border procedure cannot formally take place simultaneously. Nevertheless, it considered the detention lawful because Article 6(3) of the Dutch Aliens Act 2000 provides a legal basis for detention during both procedures. It therefore found no reason to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU. However, the referring court, expressed doubts about this interpretation. It considered that detention for screening and detention during the asylum border procedure are governed by two distinct EU legal frameworks, which establish different grounds and conditions for deprivation of liberty.
The court also relied on the CJEU's judgment in Bouskoura (C-387/24, 4 October 2024), which emphasised that the power of the competent national authorities to detain a third-country national is strictly defined and that a detention measure can therefore only be ordered or extended in compliance with general and abstract rules in which the conditions and manner of application are laid down.
Question 3 – Mandatory application of the asylum border procedure
The court asked whether national legislation making the border procedure mandatory as the appropriate procedure, subject only to a few exhaustively defined exceptions, is compatible with Article 43(1)(a) and Article 45(1) of the APR, or whether applying the border procedure requires an assessment of the individual facts and circumstances of the case.
The court expressed the view that such legislation is incompatible, because the decision to apply the border procedure requires an individual assessment. It noted that under Article 43 of the APR, Member States may process applications for international protection through the asylum border procedure when applicants apply at an external border and do not satisfy the conditions for entry. However, this is a discretionary power rather than a general obligation, except in specific circumstances identified by the EU legislator. In the present case, the applicants, who are Russian nationals, applied for international protection at Schiphol Airport. Although their screening had not been completed, they were referred to the asylum border procedure. The Dutch authorities argued that the procedure was appropriate, relying partly on the relatively low overall recognition rate for Russian applicants. However, they also acknowledged that applicants belonging to certain risk profiles, including LGBTIQ+ individuals, should not necessarily be assessed by reference to the general recognition rate.
The court noted that pursuant to Article 3(3) of the Aliens Act 2000, applications submitted at the external border are, in principle, automatically processed through the asylum border procedure whenever the relevant statutory conditions are met. In its judgment of 2 September 2026, the Council of State considered this approach compatible with EU law, reasoning that national legislation could make use of the discretion granted by the EU legislator without requiring an additional individual assessment before referring applicants to the border procedure.
The referring court disagreed with this interpretation. It considered that Recitals 58 and 64 of the APR indicate that the asylum border procedure is primarily intended for applications likely to be inadmissible or unfounded, allowing such cases to be assessed quickly. It noted that the asylum border procedure is not intended to subject every applicant arriving at an external border to an accelerated procedure. In particular, Article 53(2)(a) requires Member States not to apply, or to discontinue, the border procedure when the grounds for inadmissibility or accelerated examination are not applicable. The court therefore considered that this assessment must take place before deciding which procedure is appropriate, based on the individual facts and circumstances of each case.
In the present proceedings, both applicants were Russian nationals who immediately identified as transgender, placing them within a recognised risk profile under the Dutch country-specific policy. One applicant also presented medication supporting their statement that they were undergoing gender transition. In the court's view, these circumstances indicated from the outset that their applications required a thorough substantive assessment of their protection needs, rather than examination through the asylum border procedure, while their eventual recognition as refugees confirmed this.
Question 4 – Scope of judicial review of a detention measure
The court asked whether Article 10(1) and (4)(d) of the RCD 2024, read in conjunction with Articles 6 and 47 of the EU Charter, mean that the court reviewing border detention is competent or required, if necessary ex officio to find that the asylum border procedure is not the appropriate procedure for examining the asylum application, and to take that finding into account in assessing the lawfulness of the detention.
The court proposed the answer in the affirmative, considering that the detention judge is competent and obliged to make that finding, which must be taken into account. It noted that detention is a serious interference with the right to liberty (hereto it cited Adrar (C-313/25 PPU, 4 September 2025), Bouskoura (C-387/24, 4 October 2024), C, B and X (Joined Cases C-704/20 and C-39/21, 8 November 2022) and the reviewing court must be able to rule on every relevant element of fact and law.
Question 5 – Detention as the general rule rather than the last resort
The court asked whether a national policy imposing detention as the main rule in connection with screening and the border procedure is compatible with recital 11 and Articles 3 and 6 of the Screening Regulation, recitals 26 and 33 and Articles 10 and 11 of the RCD 2024, and Article 6 of the EU Charter.
The court proposed to answer that such a policy is incompatible. The court noted that under Dutch policy, asylum applications submitted at the external border are generally processed through the asylum border procedure, which is routinely accompanied by detention. The authorities justified this approach on the basis that border control could only be effectively maintained through detention and that less restrictive measures, such as reporting obligations, would effectively amount to granting applicants access to Dutch territory.
The court considered this approach incompatible with the safeguards established under the Screening Regulation and the RCD 2024. It noted that both instruments require detention to be based on an individual assessment, to be necessary and proportionate, and to be imposed only where less coercive alternatives cannot be effectively applied. In particular, detention during screening must constitute a measure of last resort. The obligation to remain available to screening authorities does not automatically require deprivation of liberty, as this objective can be achieved through less restrictive measures.
The court found that the detention decisions in the present cases did not demonstrate that the authorities had conducted a proper individual assessment or considered whether alternative measures could effectively ensure the applicants' availability. Instead, detention appeared to have been imposed automatically because the applicants were referred to the asylum border procedure. The court also noted that the screening process had largely been completed before detention was imposed, with detention being required primarily to facilitate a preliminary medical examination conducted at the detention centre. This suggested that detention was not necessary for the screening process itself.
The court further distinguished between the authority to apply the asylum border procedure and the separate legal requirements for imposing detention. Although EU law permits detention in connection with the asylum border procedure, it does not make detention automatic or mandatory. The RCD 2024 expressly requires an individual assessment of necessity and consideration of less restrictive alternatives. The court criticised the Dutch authorities for effectively reversing this principle by treating detention as the starting point and requiring applicants to demonstrate why a less restrictive measure should apply. It also questioned whether the assessment carried out by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar) was sufficiently thorough, given its limited consideration of applicants' medical circumstances, vulnerabilities and individual protection needs.
Furthermore, the court referred to Recital 69 and Article 54 of the APR, which make clear that the asylum border procedure can be conducted without detention and even at designated locations within a Member State's territory, without this amounting to legal admission into that territory. Consequently, the court considered the argument that less restrictive measures could not be used because they would undermine border control difficult to reconcile with the EU legislator's express recognition that border procedure can operate within the territory. The court also relied on the EUAA Guidelines on alternatives to detention (December 2024). Guideline 6 indicates that systematic detention without individual assessment is incompatible with EU law and international standards, and that referral to the border procedure is not in itself a sufficient ground for detention under Article 10(4)(d). It further cites Danané (C-50/24 to C-56/24, 16 April 2026) on the need for a case-by-case assessment of necessity and proportionality.
The court stayed the proceedings pending a ruling from the CJEU.