A Syrian national was granted subsidiary protection on 3 December 2024 and applied for family reunification on behalf of his family on 28 January 2025. On 4 August 2026, the Minister for Asylum and Migration rejected the application because the applicant did not meet the new family reunification requirements introduced on 12 June 2026, including the income requirement and two-year waiting period. The minister also considered that the applicant's adult son fell outside the definition of the nuclear family. The applicant appealed against the negative decision, arguing that the new rules should not apply because his application had been submitted before their entry into force.
The District Court of The Hague explained that, before 12 June 2026, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection enjoyed the same family reunification rights. Following the introduction of the two-status system, stricter requirements were introduced, including a restriction to nuclear family members (spouses, biological or adopted children, parents of unaccompanied minors and minor siblings of unaccompanied minors). Additional conditions were also introduced for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, including a sufficient and sustainable income, adequate housing and a two-year waiting period. The waiting period begins when the sponsor receives their residence permit. The court clarified that its judgment concerned only the requirements relevant to the case.
The court held that the new rules had immediate effect under Article 1.27(2) of the Aliens Decree. Although Article 1.27(1) generally provides that the law applicable at the time of the application should apply, Article 1.27(2) expressly excludes family reunification rules from this transitional provision. It therefore considered that the new rules also applied to pending applications.
The court found that their immediate application was not disproportionate. It accepted that the stricter requirements could reduce pressure on reception facilities and accommodation, and that applying the old rules to pending applications would delay the intended effects of the new measures. The court also rejected arguments based on legitimate expectations, legal certainty and equal treatment, noting that changes had been discussed for some time and no assurances had been given that the previous rules would continue to apply to pending applications.
The court rejected the argument that immediate application violated the Family Reunification Directive. It held that the Directive does not apply to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, notwithstanding the Netherlands' previous decision to extend its provisions to this group under national law. Article 3(5) of the directive allows Member States to introduce more favourable national provisions but does not extend the directive's scope under EU law. The court therefore found the relevant CJEU case law inapplicable. It also declined to anticipate the outcome of questions referred to the CJEU by the Belgian Constitutional Court concerning the exclusion of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Belgium, Constitutional Court, Applicants v Belgian State represented by the Minister for Asylum and Migration and Social Integration (Ministre de l'asile et de la migration, et de l'intégration sociale), Nos 8579 and 8580,26 February 2026).
The court also rejected the argument that immediate application violated Articles 8 and 13 of the ECHR because the sponsor had been unable to challenge the status granted in the previous asylum proceedings. It held that the present proceedings concerned only family reunification and that it could not assess the effectiveness of remedies in the separate asylum proceedings. Furthermore, it was not established that the applicants would suffer adverse consequences, particularly as the sponsor could submit a new asylum application.
Regarding the abolition of the young adult policy, which had applied between September 2016 and 3 June 2026, the court held that Article 8 of the ECHR does not generally presume family life between parents and adult children unless additional elements of dependency beyond normal emotional ties are demonstrated. The exception recognised by case law of the ECtHR for young adults living with their parents who have not established their own family applies specifically in the context of the expulsion of settled migrants. The minister could therefore require the applicant's 22-year-old son to demonstrate additional dependency. However, the court found that the minister should have heard the applicants, since establishing family life required an individual assessment of their circumstances.
The court further rejected the arguments that the income requirement and two-year waiting period violated Articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR. Relying on ECtHR case law, it found that refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection could not be considered sufficiently comparable in the circumstances. It also held that states may impose income requirements and waiting periods, provided they are applied flexibly and an individual assessment is conducted under Article 8 of the ECHR where the requirements are not met, as required under C5/1.2 of the Circular on Foreign Nationals. The housing requirement was not examined because the applicants already satisfied it.
However, the court held that the minister must independently consider proportionality under Article 3:4(2) of the General Administrative Law Act when exercising the discretionary powers under Articles 29c and 29d of the Aliens Act. In this case, the minister had failed to consider relevant circumstances, including the prolonged family separation, the delay in deciding the application, the fact that the applicants would have received a permit had the application been decided in time, and the sponsor's medical limitations affecting his ability to meet the income requirement. The court therefore found that the decision violated Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 3:4(2) of the General Administrative Law Act.
Finally, the court declared the appeal against the failure to decide within the prescribed time inadmissible because the minister had since issued a decision. The appeal against the rejection of the family reunification application was declared well-founded, the contested decision was annulled, and the minister was required to reassess the application and hear the applicants.