G., a Senegalese national, arrived in Spain on 29 January 2024 and was accommodated in an Emergency Reception, Assistance and Referral Centre for vulnerable migrants (“CAED”, or “Centro de Atención, Emergencia y Derivación”), falling under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Assistance of the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, and managed by a civil society organisation (CSO). He applied for international protection on 12 February 2024.

On 15 April, the applicant was expelled from the centre and issued with a written warning for failing to comply with the centre's house rules, which was signed by the centre manager of the CSO, but not by the applicant himself. On the same date, the applicant and two other third-country nationals were detained by National Police officers for public disorder and threats. The ensuing criminal proceedings were provisionally dismissed shortly thereafter, on 26 April 2024, by the investigating court.

On 16 April, the applicant requested that the Ministry of Inclusion annul his expulsion from the reception centre, alleging that it had been carried out in complete disregard of the disciplinary procedure and therefore constituted administrative action taken without legal authority.

On 24 June 2024, the applicant requested admission to the International Protection Reception System (“SAPI”, or “Sistema de Acogida de Protección Internacional”), which also falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Inclusion and is likewise implemented through CSOs. On 21 August 2024, the Red Cross informed the applicant that he had been placed on the waiting list for admission to the international protection reception system but was not entitled to temporary accommodation pending the availability of a placement.

In parallel, the applicant appealed his expulsion from the CAED before the High Court of Justice of Madrid, which dismissed his appeal on 5 May 2025. He subsequently lodged a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court, which found that the appeal raised an issue of cassational interest and upheld it.

The Supreme Court noted that the legal regime governing CAED centres was fragmented and complex, since they had been established as emergency reception centres for migrants in 2018 but had since become a permanent component of the Humanitarian Assistance Programme (“PAH”, or “Programa de Atención Humanitaria”), financed by the Ministry of Inclusion, and were thus fully governed by administrative law. With regard to the “PAH” reception system, the court noted that any removal from the system that actually entails the loss of accommodation, meals or other reception benefits (as opposed to purely organisational measures such as referral or transfer to another appropriate facility) is fully subject to the general procedural safeguards laid down in the Administrative Procedure Act (Law 39/2015). The court held that such decisions fall outside the ordinary management powers of CSOs overseeing a centre and that the third-country national concerned must be given the opportunity to challenge any such decision.

Nonetheless, the court noted that the “SAPI”, or International Protection Reception System, was a separate reception track under a different framework, namely the Reception Conditions Directive (RCD), Law 12/2009 (the Asylum Act), Royal Decree 220/2022 (the Spanish Reception System Regulation), and Orders ISM/680/2022 (concerning management through concerted action) and ISM/922/2023 (concerning the disciplinary regime). The court highlighted that the disciplinary regime ordinance expressly vests disciplinary powers in the competent Directorate-General, requires disciplinary proceedings to be conducted in accordance with Law 39/2015, and provides that, in indirectly managed facilities, the person in charge of the centre may report incidents, but it is the Administration that is responsible for initiating, conducting and determining the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.

Based on the above, the Supreme Court concluded that CSOs and other entities managing reception centres under either the “PAH” or the “SAPI” reception systems cannot independently impose disciplinary measures entailing the loss of accommodation and meals.

Furthermore, drawing on its case law in case No. 5568/2024 (6 November 2024), the Supreme Court reiterated that an individual must be recognised as an applicant for international protection and afforded the corresponding rights, including reception conditions, from the moment they express their intention to apply for international protection before the competent authorities. Such an expression of intent is legally equivalent to the formal submission of an application. From that moment onwards, the individual becomes entitled to the rights conferred upon applicants for international protection, including reception conditions and the legal framework governing them, even where applicants are accommodated in a centre operating under the “PAH” reception framework.

On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the decision to expel the applicant should have been adopted in accordance with the regime established in Article 20(5) of the 2013 Reception Conditions Directive (RCD), which was applicable at the time and is now reflected in Article 23 of the current RCD. The court held that this provision requires decisions to reduce or withdraw reception conditions to be objective, impartial, individualised, reasoned and proportionate, and provides that material reception conditions must not be reduced or withdrawn before the corresponding decision has been taken.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the expulsion of the applicant from the reception centre constituted material action lacking a sufficient administrative legal basis, since it had been carried out exclusively by the managing CSO, without an administrative decision, which was required because the measure resulted in the applicant being deprived of the reception conditions to which he was entitled.

Note: The Supreme Court issued substantially identical decisions in judgments STS 4224/2026 (7 October 2026, ECLI:ES:TS:2026:4224) and STS 4234/2026 (13 October 2026, ECLI:ES:TS:2026:4234). In those cases, two other applicants of the same nationality challenged their expulsion from the same reception centre on the same date and on the same grounds, and the court reached the same conclusions.