An Afghan national applied for international protection on 5 December 2015. During his stay in Austria, he was convicted several times of criminal offences including bodily injury, damage to property, attempted theft by burglary or with weapons, drug trafficking, false testimony, and embezzlement. By decision of 18 April 2019, the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA) rejected his application for asylum and subsidiary protection, found that he was not entitled to a residence permit on humanitarian grounds, issued a return decision and a ten-year entry ban, declared his removal to Afghanistan permissible, and determined that he had lost his right to reside during the asylum procedure.
The applicant appealed against the BFA's decision. The Federal Administrative Court, in its judgment of 30 January 2025, dismissed the appeal insofar as it concerned the refusal of refugee status. However, it upheld the appeal concerning subsidiary protection and granted the applicant subsidiary protection under section 8(1) of the Asylum Act 2005, together with a one-year residence permit. It consequently annulled the remaining parts of the BFA's decision, including the return decision and entry ban. The Federal Administrative Court considered that, although the applicant would not face persecution or a general security-related risk in Afghanistan, the precarious nationwide humanitarian and socio-economic conditions created a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR upon a return. It also considered that his criminal convictions did not constitute a basis for excluding him from subsidiary protection under section 9(2)(3) of the Asylum Act.
The BFA lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Administrative Court, challenging the federal administrative court's findings concerning subsidiary protection. The BFA argued that the federal administrative court had failed to provide adequate reasons for finding a real risk of an Article 3 of the ECHR violation and had failed to properly assess the applicant's criminal convictions under section 9(2)(3) of the Asylum Act, in conjunction with Article 17(1)(b) of the Qualification Directive.
The Supreme Administrative Court firstly found that the lower court did not violate its obligation to state reasons. However, it declared the appeal admissible on the basis of the complaint that the exclusion ground was not examined in accordance with the law.
Based on the lower court's assessment that deportation would lead to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the lower court was required, pursuant to section 8(3a) of the Asylum Act 2005, to examine whether the grant of subsidiary protection should nevertheless be refused because a ground for revocation under section 9(2) of the Asylum Act 2005 applied. The court noted that the ground under section 9(2)(3), which was intended to implement Article 17(1)(b) of the recast Qualification Directive, was of particular relevance. Although the circumstances giving rise to the protection need were not attributable to actors of harm or to armed conflict, and the case therefore fell outside the scope of the Directive, the court held that the EU-law criteria and the case law of the CJEU nonetheless governed the interpretation of the domestic provision. With reference to the CJEU ruling in Shajin Ahmed v Immigration and Asylum Office (HU, Bevándorlási És Állampolgársági Hivatal) (C-369/17, 13 September 2018), the court held that Article 17(1)(b) requires an assessment of the precise factual circumstances of the individual case.
The court recalled that the purpose of the exclusion ground is to exclude persons deemed unworthy of international protection and to preserve the credibility of the Common European Asylum System. It held that section 9(2)(3) is satisfied where the person has been finally convicted of a crime, as the domestic provision expressly requires, and where a full examination of the individual circumstances shows that a serious crime within the meaning of Article 17(1)(b) has been committed. The court noted, however, that no assessment of whether the applicant poses a risk of danger is required under this provision.
The court also noted that section 9(2)(3) of the Asylum Act 2005 does not cover persons who committed criminal acts in a state of insanity, and therefore does not extend to cases in which the criminal court issues a committal order under section 21(1) of the Criminal Code. It clarified that this applies both to the revocation of subsidiary protection previously granted and to the initial assessment of whether to grant that status.
The court found that the lower court had failed to establish the precise factual circumstances of the criminal acts. It had limited itself to reproducing the dates of the judgments in the applicant's criminal record, noting the time elapsed since the last conviction and attributing the offences to a pathological addiction. The court held that, in the absence of findings on the applicant's criminal conduct, it was not possible to determine whether he was unworthy of subsidiary protection. It further found the lower court's reliance on the applicant's addiction insufficient. The lower court had made no findings that the offences were committed in a state of incapacity, or that the criminal court had solely ordered the applicant's committal under section 21(1) of the Criminal Code. The judgment data reproduced by the lower court in fact suggested the opposite.
The court then addressed the BFA's argument that the time elapsed since the last conviction was irrelevant. The BFA's reasoning was that no assessment of the applicant's dangerousness is required, so his future conduct did not matter. In response, the court referred to the CJEU's judgment in K. L. v Migration Department at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania [Galte] (C-63/24, 30 April 2025), which interprets Article 12(2)(b) of the recast Qualification Directive. According to that judgment, a person who committed a serious crime at one point in their life is not necessarily to be regarded as permanently unworthy of international protection, without account being taken of their possible rehabilitation. The assessment must therefore consider whether the person has served their sentence, the time elapsed since the offence, their conduct in the meantime and any remorse shown.
Furthermore, the court noted that although Galte concerns exclusion from refugee status under Article 12(2)(b), it had no doubt that the same circumstances must be taken into account when examining exclusion from subsidiary protection under Article 17(1)(b), as both provisions pursue the same aim. Contrary to the Federal Office's view, the court held that the fact that the applicant had served his sentence and any subsequent period of good conduct must therefore be considered in determining whether he remains unworthy of protection at the time of the decision. The court emphasised, however, that such an assessment presupposes findings establishing the underlying criminal conduct, since whether any unworthiness has ceased depends on the nature of that conduct. The court also drew the lower court's attention to the fact that the applicant had been released from prison on 4 November 2020 and had been convicted of a further criminal offence in 2023.
The court set aside the judgement of the lower court, finding its content unlawful as it failed to make the necessary findings that would allow for a lawful assessment of whether the applicant should be granted subsidiary protection. The court further held that the lower court's reversal of the BFA's finding on the loss of the right of residence under section 13(2) of the Asylum Act 2005 was independently unlawful, as that finding does not depend on a later grant of subsidiary protection. The court directed the lower court first to reassess, on the facts at the time of its new decision, whether return would still violate Article 3 of the ECHR. Only if that risk were confirmed would it need to examine whether a ground for exclusion applied.