A.S. applied for international protection on 31 July 2023, stating that he feared returning to his home country because of the ongoing war which he did not want to participate in. His request was refused by the Office for Foreigners. It considered that although the applicant was eligible for subsidiary protection on the basis of the level of indiscriminate violence in Ukraine, there were serious grounds for considering that he constituted a threat to the security of the state or society. The office took into account A.S.'s criminal and traffic-related history in Poland. In 2016, he had committed a road-traffic offence. In 2019, he had driven while under the influence of alcohol and had intentionally violated traffic-safety rules while intoxicated, causing an accident in which another person sustained an injury lasting more than seven days. A district court convicted him of two traffic-related crimes and one traffic offence. A sentence of one year's imprisonment, suspended for three years, was imposed, together with a seven-year prohibition on driving, a monetary payment and costs.
The Refugee Council upheld that decision and an appeal by the applicant before the Warsaw Voivodship Administrative Court was also dismissed. The court found that the evidence had been properly gathered and assessed. It agreed that the difficult situation resulting from the war did not establish the existence of grounds for refugee status. It further stated that mobilisation or military service, where lawful, does not in itself constitute persecution, and that the fear of being called up or of punishment for evading military service does not, by itself, establish persecution. The court accepted that the conditions under Article 15(3) of the of the Act on Granting Protection to Foreigners within the Territory of the Republic of Poland for subsidiary protection were otherwise met, given the serious and individual threat to life or health arising from widespread violence in an international armed conflict. However, it considered that subsidiary protection had to be refused because Article 20(1)(2)(c) applied.
In assessing the latter provision, the Warsaw Administrative Court noted that Article 20(1)(2)(c) concerns a present or future threat and that the mere fact of past criminal conduct is not, in itself, sufficient to establish such a threat. It nevertheless considered that, in the circumstances of the case, the seriousness and non-incidental nature of A.S.'s road-traffic violations supported the finding that he constituted a threat to society. The court also held that the expungement of the 2016 offence did not mean that the offence had not been committed and that the authorities could take account of offences even where the relevant conviction had been expunged, referring in this regard to an earlier judgment by the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC).
The applicant lodged an onward cassation appeal before the SAC, challenging the application of Article 20(1)(2)(c). He argued that his conviction could not, by itself, establish that he constituted a threat to society and that the authorities should have taken into account the nature of the offences, the sentence imposed, the subsequent period without further offences, the expiry of the probation period and the expungement of the earlier offence. He also argued that he had lived a law-abiding life since 2019 and referred to his work and family life in Poland. In addition, he raised procedural complaints concerning the assessment of the evidence and the reasoning of the administrative decisions, and challenged the assessment concerning Article 15(3).
The SAC dismissed the cassation appeal. It first rejected the procedural complaints. It found that the reasoning of the first-instance judgment satisfied the requirements of Article 141 (4) of the Law on Proceedings before Administrative Courts and addressed the disputed issues. It further considered that the evidence had been adequately gathered and assessed. According to the SAC, A.S.'s complaints in this respect essentially challenged the assessment of the evidence rather than the failure to gather relevant evidence. The SAC recalled that, under Article 80 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, the authorities are entitled to freely assess the evidence, subject to the requirement that the assessment is not arbitrary. The applicant had not demonstrated that the assessment was illogical or contrary to the principles of life experience. The SAC likewise found no material defect in the reasoning of the administrative authorities under Article 107 (3) of the Code of Administrative Procedure.
As regards the substance, the SAC confirmed that the authorities and the first-instance court had found that the circumstances relied upon by A.S., including the difficult situation resulting from the war, did not establish grounds for refugee status. At the same time, those circumstances were considered sufficient to establish the conditions for subsidiary protection under Article 15(3), on the basis of a serious and individual threat to life or health resulting from widespread violence in an international armed conflict. The SAC confirmed, however, that subsidiary protection was refused because the exclusion ground pursuant to Article 20(1)(2)(c) was applicable (threat to the security of the society).
The court observed that the concept of a threat to the security of society is not precisely defined in the legislation and is a vague concept. It stated that it is generally accepted in legal scholarship that the concept encompasses the full range of legal and organisational measures undertaken by governmental (national and international), local-government and non-governmental bodies, as well as by citizens themselves, aimed at providing members of society with broadly understood assistance, support and security against various types of threats, both to their livelihoods and to their physical safety. The latter category includes threats arising from offences against health, homicide, violence and terrorism. In the circumstances of the case, the SAC considered that the finding of the authorities that A.S. had committed not merely an offence but an intentional crime which it considered to have a high degree of harmfulness (in particular, while intoxicated, he had intentionally breached road-safety rules and thereby created a real danger to the life and health of other road users), supported the finding that he had difficulty adapting to legal rules and that future violations could not be excluded.
The SAC did not consider A.S.'s arguments that he had committed no further offence after 2019, that the earlier offence had been expunged, and that he had subsequently sought to lead an exemplary life to be sufficient to alter that assessment. It noted, in particular, that the absence of further offences could also be connected with the risk of imprisonment and the seven-year prohibition on driving. The court expressly stated that a conviction does not necessarily, in itself, establish that a person constitutes a threat to society. In the circumstances of this case, however, it considered that A.S.'s conduct had been properly assessed as not excluding a continuing future threat. The SAC referred to the circumstances as indicating disregard for the Polish legal order and stated that persistent and deliberate violations of legal provisions, particularly criminal-law provisions, threaten public order and security.
Finally, the SAC stated that, for Article 20(1)(2)(c) to apply, the threat must be genuine, present and sufficiently serious so as to affect one of the fundamental interests of the state. It upheld the assessment of the first-instance court that this standard was satisfied in the circumstances of A.S.'s case. The SAC therefore dismissed the cassation appeal.