A female applicant for international protection from Senegal claimed that her father had subjected her to domestic violence, abuse, and pressured her to undergo female genital mutilation (FGM) and enter into a forced marriage when she was a child. She then lived abroad for several years, but her father forcibly brough her back to Senegal and again intended to force her into FGM and marriage. The applicant fled to the European Union and applied for international protection, citing a fear of persecution in the form of FGM and forced marriage due to her gender, corresponding to persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group.

By decision of 13 September 2024, the Ministry of the Interior (the Ministry) rejected the application as manifestly unfounded. After examination on the merits, the Ministry relied on Czechia's designation of Senegal as a safe country of origin and found that the applicant had not justified why the concept of safe country of origin was not applicable to her. By judgment of 28 February 2025, the Regional Court in Brno upheld the Ministry's decision. The applicant lodged a cassation complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court.

By judgment of 31 August 2026, the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the applicant's cassation complaint and annulled the judgment of the Regional Court in Brno and the Ministry's decision.

First, the Supreme Administrative Court recalled its case law, according to which the Asylum Act inaccurately and incompletely transposed the criteria for designating safe countries of origin, set out in Article 37 and Annex I of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (recast APD). In particular, the Asylum Act omitted that the actual application of the relevant laws and regulations of the country of origin is essential for such designation, as well as what information sources should be used for such designation. Those deficiencies made it necessary to apply the recast APD directly (10 Azs 161/2022 56).

Second, the Supreme Administrative Court held that Senegal had been wrongly designated as a safe country of origin solely on the basis of the Ministry's country of origin information (COI) report of 17 October 2023, as this report did not address the practical application of relevant laws and acknowledged that the situation concerning children's rights remained concerning. The regional court should have examined this safe country of origin designation – as required by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in CV v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky (C-406/22, 4 October 2024) – and should have annulled the Ministry's decision in the present case. The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to a conclusion of a first instance court in another judgment (35 Az 8/2025 26), according to which a more recent Ministry's COI report on Senegal of 9 October 2025 was not compliant with the recast APD criteria, as it used old sources, and the situation in Senegal is at least potentially problematic for women and LGBTIQ community.

Third, the Supreme Administrative Court held that both the Ministry and the regional court committed serious procedural errors when they insufficiently disclosed the information based on which they determined that Senegal was a safe country of origin for the applicant in the present case. The court then referred to other sources, according to which FGM is common in Senegal. Additionally, the court referred to UNHCR's Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/02/01) (7 May 2002), according to which the mere existence of legislation prohibiting FGM is insufficient to rebut a well-founded fear of persecution, as the state may be unable to stop the practice effectively. What is decisive is the situation in practice.

Fourth, regarding effective protection in Senegal, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the Ministry and the regional court failed to assess whether Senegal takes reasonable steps to prevent persecution in the form of FGM and forced marriage, inter alia, by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of those acts, and whether the applicant has access to such protection, as required by Article 7(2) of the recast Qualification Directive (recast QD). Instead, they relied only on the fact that FGM had been abolished in Senegal since 1999 and that marriage requires mutual consent, failing to address what protection the state provides in practice or whether the applicant could access it. In addition, the Supreme Administrative Court recalled its case law, according to which an applicant cannot be required to exhaust internal protection when COI supports the applicant's distrust of the national authorities (5 Azs 66/2008 70). In this regard, the Ministry and the regional court should have assessed, in light of the relevant COI, the applicant's explanations of why she had not approached the police in Senegal: that FGM and forced marriage are deeply rooted in rural Senegalese traditions, the police often fails to intervene, and the community opposes the prosecution of perpetrators.

Fifth, regarding internal protection alternative, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the Ministry and the regional court erred in suggesting that the applicant should relocate to another part of Senegal, without assessing whether it would practically prevent her father from reaching her and whether it would be realistic in her individual circumstances as a young, single woman from a rural background who belonged to an ethnic minority. In relation to this, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the Asylum Act did not transpose Article 8(2) of the recast QD, which requires Member States to take into account, when assessing the possibility of internal relocation, the general circumstances in that part of the country and the personal circumstances of the applicant.

Sixth, the Supreme Administrative Court considered several other conclusions of the Ministry and the regional court unsubstantiated, including that as an adult she cannot be forced into FGM and marriage. The Supreme Administrative Court noted that it is unclear what could practically prevent the applicant's father from forcing her into those acts through violence, threats, or psychological pressure.

Seventh, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the applicant's vulnerability had not been assessed at all, despite her account of domestic violence and abuse as a child, pressure to undergo FGM and forced marriage, and depression. Referring to Article 24 of the recast APD and its case law (5 Azs 156/2023-32, 5 Azs 332/2024-48, 1 Azs 218/2021-71), the court recalled that applicants in need of special procedural guarantees must receive adequate support, including where such need is identified only later or when the applicant does not claim to be vulnerable. In relation to the special procedural guarantees, the court referred to Recital 32 of the recast APD, according to which interviews should be organised in a way that enables applicants to discuss experiences of gender-based persecution, and complexity of gender-related claims should be taken into account in safe country of origin-related procedures. The court therefore held that the interview should have been conducted and interpreted by persons of the same sex as the applicant, unless the applicant wished otherwise. Nevertheless, the applicant was interviewed by male staff. The court also referred to the UNHCR Guidelines, which add that merely allowing applicants to request this arrangement is insufficient, as they often do not wish to cause difficulties or jeopardise the outcome. It therefore needs to be provided by the authorities of their own motion.

Eight, the Supreme Administrative Court addressed the applicant's homosexual orientation, which she disclosed only during the proceedings before the regional court and which this court considered abusive. The Supreme Administrative Court stated that LGBTIQ applicants cannot be expected to speak freely about their sexual orientation and may suppress their identity expression, especially when it is not tolerated in their country of origin. The court referred to the CJEU's judgment in A., B., C. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (C‑148/13, C149/13 and C‑150/13, 2 December 2014), according to which applicant's statements cannot be considered not credible merely because the applicant did not disclose their sexual orientation at the first opportunity. The court further referred to the Czech Constitutional Court's judgment in I. ÚS 425/16, according to which trauma, shame, or the sex of the interviewer or interpreter are reasons to justify the later disclosure of an asylum ground, especially in cases of survivors of torture, sexual violence, or persecution related to sexual orientation. The Supreme Administrative Court also rejected the regional court's reasoning that the applicant was lying because sexual orientation could lead to a successful claim, and noted that her Muslim faith had no impact on her sexual orientation and could only affect its expression. The fact that she had discussed domestic violence, FGM and forced marriage in the presence of male staff did not mean that she would also have been able to disclose her sexual orientation. Therefore, the regional court could not reject the applicant's statement regarding her sexual orientation as not credible without at least examining it.

In conclusion, the Supreme Administrative Court annulled both the judgment of the Regional Court in Brno and the Ministry's decision, ordering a re-examination of the application in alignment with the court's binding legal opinion.