The application for international protection of a Tunisian national was processed under the accelerated procedure pursuant to Article 42(1)(j) of the Asylum Procedure Regulation (APR), which applies, subject to certain exceptions, where the average recognition rate for applicants from the third country concerned is 20% or lower, according to the latest available yearly Union-wide average Eurostat data. The application was rejected as manifestly unfounded. On 4 August 2026, the applicant challenged the decision and requested the suspension of its enforceability.

The Tribunal of Palermo first noted that the court must review of its own motion the lawfulness of the accelerated procedure applied. It clarified that the accelerated procedure must, in any event, ensure an adequate and complete examination of the application, despite its faster nature. The tribunal recalled that Article 42(1)(j) of the APR does not allow the accelerated procedure to be applied automatically solely on the basis of a recognition rate of 20% or lower, but requires its application to be excluded when the situation in the third country has changed significantly or when the applicant belongs to a category of persons for whom that percentage is not representative of their actual protection needs. It clarified that the statistical data has merely indicative value and cannot replace the individual assessment required by the provision. The tribunal ruled that the competent authority must explain, in concrete terms, why the applicant did not fall within categories exposed to specific protection risks and why the Eurostat percentage may be regarded as genuinely significant in the case under examination. Additionally, the tribunal specified that such an assessment must necessarily precede the classification of the application as eligible for the accelerated procedure, since that classification entails a restriction of the applicant's procedural safeguards. Consequently, the reasoning cannot be limited to referring to the 20% recognition-rate criterion, but must take into account the information already available in the case file and the applicant's relevant individual circumstances.

In the present case, the tribunal found that such an assessment was not carried out. The contested decision initiated the accelerated procedure solely on the basis of the statistical indicator, without explaining why the applicant's individual circumstances and the protection needs invoked did not render the recognition rate below 20% unrepresentative in the specific case.

The tribunal ruled that, since the requirements of Article 42(1)(j) and Article 42(3)(e) of the APR had not been properly and adequately assessed, the accelerated procedure had not been validly initiated. Consequently, the procedural rules specific to that procedure could not apply, including the absence of automatic suspensive effect, shorter time limits for the proceedings and the possibility of rejecting the application as manifestly unfounded under Article 28-ter of Legislative Decree No 25/2008. The case therefore had to proceed under the regular procedure pursuant to Article 35-bis of Legislative Decree No 25/2008. The tribunal referred to the principle established by the Joint Sections of the Court of Cassation in A.A. v Territorial Commission of Bologna (R.G. 11399/2024, 30 January 2024), according to which procedural safeguards may legitimately be restricted only where the accelerated procedure has been correctly applied and properly conducted; otherwise, the ordinary procedure must be regarded as restored, with all the consequences arising therefrom. According to the tribunal, this principle, although established in relation to time limits, could be transposed to cases where the procedural safeguards protecting the applicant have not been respected, since the automatic suspension of the enforceable effects of the Commission's decision is an expression of the principle of effective judicial protection.

Conclusively, the tribunal ruled that the ordinary procedure under Article 35-bis of Legislative Decree No 25/2008 applied and that the appeal automatically suspended the enforceability of the contested decision.