The case concerned an application for international protection that was processed through an accelerated procedure and subsequently rejected as manifestly unfounded, based on the safe country of origin concept pursuant to Article 28-ter, first comma, letter b) of Legislative Decree No. 25/2008. The applicant challenged the decision before the Bologna Tribunal, asserting that the appeal in question should have been automatically suspended, because the applicable time limits for an accelerated procedure were not adhered to. Specifically, the applicant pointed out that the time limits for the hearing and the issuance of the decision were exceeded. The Bologna Tribunal acknowledged the temporal irregularity, as well as the failure to issue and timely communicate the decision of the President of the Territorial Commission. The tribunal requested a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of Cassation, posing the question of whether a negative decision as manifestly unfounded on grounds of safe country of origin gives rise to an automatic suspension effect if the accelerated procedure was not correctly adopted.

The Supreme Court of Cassation (Sezioni Unite) affirmed that the Asylum Procedures Directive establishes a general principle according to which the filing of legal proceedings automatically suspends the enforcement of the contested measure, except in specific cases. Among the exceptions to this principle is the application of the safe country of origin concept. The court specified that this principle is also reflected in domestic law, specifically in Legislative Decree No. 25/2008, which provides that the general principle of automatic suspensive effect of the appeal  can be derogated if the applicant comes from a safe country for which an accelerated procedure has been applied by the Territorial Commission.

The court noted that the existence of a general principle of suspension necessitates strict adherence to the possibility of exceptions. Consequently, the exceeding of the timeframes cannot be tolerated, even if they stem from the necessity for further analysis. The Court of Cassation clarified that the application of the safe country of origin concept and of the accelerated procedure as to reject an application as manifestly unfounded may only occur if the determination of the country of origin as safe country is immediately ascertainable. Otherwise, if the fact is disputed by the applicant or if further assessment is needed, the ordinary procedure shall be applied. The court clarified that in order to derogate from the general principle of suspensive effect of appeal, the accelerated procedure must have been carried out and strictly observed, by respecting with the applicable own deadlines expressly provided for cases of manifest unfoundedness (or inadmissibility). If the accelerated procedure is not observed (even if originally applied), the application must be processed in the in the regular procedure with the restoration of all effects, including the suspension of the decision of the Territorial Commission.

Finally, the court affirmed the following principle: in the event of a judicial appeal against a manifestly unfounded decision regarding an applicant from a safe country of origin, the general principle of automatic suspensive effect of the contested decision is derogated only if the Territorial Commission has correctly followed the accelerated procedure, applicable when the request for protection is deemed manifestly unfounded. If the accelerated procedure was not duly observed in its procedural aspects, the ordinary procedure is reinstated, and the general principle of automatic suspension of the decision of the Territorial Commission applies.