An applicant lodged an asylum application in the Netherlands on 20 January 2026. By decision of 9 April 2026, the Minister for Asylum and Migration determined that Czechia was responsible for examining the application. The applicant's appeal against that decision was dismissed by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Utrecht, on 19 June 2026. On 26 June 2026, following the applicant's absconding, the Minister extended the transfer period to a maximum of three years pursuant to Article 46(2) of the AMMR. The applicant challenged that decision.

The court first examined which legal regime governed the extension of the transfer period. The applicant argued that, pursuant to Article 84(2) of the AMMR, the Dublin III Regulation remained applicable to his case in its entirety, including the rules governing the transfer period, and that the maximum period of 18 months under Article 29(2) of the Dublin III Regulation should therefore apply. The court rejected this argument. It held that Article 84(2) of the AMMR provides only that the determination of the Member State responsible for an application lodged before 12 June 2026 is to be made according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin III Regulation. It does not preserve the procedural provisions governing the transfer period. 

The court noted that the determination of Czechia as the responsible Member State was upheld by the court on 19 June 2026. The applicant then went into hiding on 30 June 2026, after the entry into force of the AMMR on 12 June 2026. This has created a new situation (legal relationship) to which the new legal regime applies. Consequently, the court held that the applicant could not rely on the legislation in force prior to the entry into force of the AMMR and could not derive any legitimate expectation from it. The mere fact that the applicant lodged his asylum application before the entry into force of the new legislation does not change that, since the relevant circumstance which led to an extension of the transfer period (absconding) occurred only after that date. 

The court also found that the extension of the transfer period was proportionate. It held that the purpose of the AMMR was not to ensure that an applicant acquired the right to remain in the Netherlands following a period of absconding. Rather, the possibility of extending the transfer period was intended to prevent an applicant's conduct from causing responsibility for examining an application for international protection to shift to another Member State and thereby to contribute to a fair allocation of responsibility between Member States. The court consequently found no violation of the principle of proportionality. It likewise rejected the applicant's claim that the three-year transfer period constituted an unjustified interference with the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the EU Charter. The applicant had not sufficiently substantiated the alleged interference, while the uncertainty concerning his residence situation resulted from his decision to abscond.

The court also examined how the transfer deadline should be calculated in the event of an extension due to absconding or on the basis of one of the other circumstances referred to in Article 46(2) of the AMMR.

The court followed the minister's interpretation of Article 43(3) of the AMMR, that the period of an extended transfer period must be calculated from the acceptance of the take charge request or the confirmation of the take back notification by another Member State, or from the final decision on the appeal or objection against a transfer decision with suspensive effect. The reason for this is that Article 46(2) of the AMMR refers back to the transfer period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 46. The court held that the phrase beginning with ‘that time limit', in Article 46(2) of the AMMR, refers to the transfer period that has already started at the time of acceptance of the take charge request or confirmation of the take back notification. The possibility to extend this period to a maximum of three years relates only to this transfer period which has already begun. The reference to the moment at which the Member State responsible is informed of the absconding refers, in court's view, to the obligation to provide information between Member States and does not determine the starting point of the transfer period. 

The court therefore dismissed the appeal as unfounded and upheld the minister's decision to extend the transfer period to a maximum of three years. 

The judgment can be further appealed before the Council of State.