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01/07/2026

NL: The Council of State found that a Syrian national committed a serious non-political crime by consummating the marriage with his wife when she was 12 years old and confirmed his exclusion from subsidiary protection. It rejected his arguments concerning consent, cultural acceptance, family involvement, lack of prosecution in Syria, the passage of time, his ongoing family life and the absence of a risk of re-offending. 

01/07/2026

NL: The Council of State found that a Syrian national committed a serious non-political crime by consummating the marriage with his wife when she was 12 years old and confirmed his exclusion from subsidiary protection. It rejected his arguments concerning consent, cultural acceptance, family involvement, lack of prosecution in Syria, the passage of time, his ongoing family life and the absence of a risk of re-offending. 

ECLI
ECLI:NL:RVS:2026:3817
Input Provided By
EUAA Information and Analysis Sector (IAS)
Type
Judgment
Original Documents
Relevant Legislative Provisions
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); UN International Covenants / UN Conventions
Reference
Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State], Applicant v The Minister for Asylum and Migration (de Minister van Asiel en Migratie), 202405898/1/V2, ECLI:NL:RVS:2026:3817, 01 July 2026. Link redirects to the English summary in the EUAA Case Law Database.
Permanent link to the case
https://caselaw.euaa.europa.eu/pages/viewcaselaw.aspx?CaseLawID=6129
Case history
Other information

European Union, Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU], K. L. v Migration Department at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania [Galte], C-63/24, ECLI:EU:C:2025:292, 30 April 2025. Link redirects to the English summary in the EUAA Case Law Database.

 

Abstract

A Syrian national applied for asylum. The Minister for Asylum and Migration excluded him from subsidiary protection because in Syria he married a girl when she was 12 years old, and immediately consummated the marriage. It noted that it was not concerned with the marriage itself, but with the fact that the applicant consummated that marriage while his wife was 12 years old. This led to the conclusion that the applicant committed a serious non-political crime, and that he therefore constituted a danger to public order and national security. However, the minister found that the applicant could not be forcibly deported as upon return he would face a real risk of torture or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR. An appeal before the District Court of the Hague was declared unfounded by decision of 22 August 2024. The applicant lodged an onward appeal before the Council of State.


The council first assessed the nature of the crime and the extent of the consequences. It rejected the argument that the district court wrongly assessed the nature of the crime by not recognising that the applicant's wife had consented to the consummation of the marriage. The council upheld the lower court's finding that sexual intercourse between an adult and a twelve year old minor is by its nature a very serious crime, taking into account the very serious violation of the physical and mental integrity of the victim and the long term adverse psychological consequences. The council also referred to a letter from UNHCR attached to the judgment, which notes that marriage with a minor and the related sexual and psychological harm can be forms of oppression of children. Furthermore, it found that a twelve year old cannot be considered capable of guarding their sexual integrity and resisting an adult, and went on to disregard the claim that the child provided consent. It thus found that this first complaint failed, and that the nature and consequences of the crime were rightly taken into account to draw the conclusion that there was a serious non-political crime.


The council held that the minister had correctly assessed the seriousness of the offence by referring to the applicable maximum statutory penalty rather than the sentences imposed in other criminal cases. The applicant argued that the district court had incorrectly relied on a later amendment to the Criminal Code, which increased the maximum sentence from eight to fifteen years after the Minister's decision, and that the actual sentencing practice in comparable Dutch cases involving ongoing emotional relationships should have been taken into account.


The council agreed that the later amendment was not applicable but held that this did not affect the outcome because the minister had correctly relied on the version of Article 245 of the Criminal Code that was in force when the offence was committed, under which the maximum penalty was eight years' imprisonment. The council further held that, as the applicant had not been criminally convicted, the minister was required to make an independent assessment of whether the conduct constituted a serious non-political crime and was not bound by sentencing practices in other cases. Since the applicant had not demonstrated that the cases he relied upon were factually comparable, the minister was not required to consider the actual sentences imposed in those cases. The council therefore concluded that the applicable maximum penalty of eight years supported the finding that the offence constituted a serious non-political crime under Article 1(F).


Following this, the court found that international judicial consensus exists that consummating a marriage with a partner under the age of 14 is a serious non-political offence. It based its consideration on the letter from UNHCR and the available country information included in the letter.


The council also held that the fact that the applicant was not prosecuted in Syria did not lessen the seriousness of the crime. It noted that for the assessment of crimes under Article 1F of the Geneva convention does not require the prosecution of the applicant. Accordingly, it ruled that it was irrelevant whether the Syrian authorities were aware of the consummation of the marriage and whether they were willing or able to prosecute the applicant for it.


Additionally, the council held that the applicant knew or should have known that he was committing a serious crime, satisfying the requirement of ‘knowing participation'. While it was undisputed that he had personally participated by consummating the marriage, the key issue was whether he was aware, or ought to have been aware, that his conduct was criminal. The council clarified that this does not require proof that the applicant understood the legal significance of Article 1(F), only that he knew or should have known he was committing a serious offence.


The applicant argued that he lacked criminal intent, believed the marriage was legitimate because both families consented, relied on his parents' supervision, had no legal knowledge, and had undergone a six-month engagement. He also contended that child marriage was culturally accepted and common in his region of Syria, pointing to examples within his own family and an article describing the prevalence of child marriage.


The council rejected these arguments. It found significant that the applicant knew his spouse was very young and had first attempted to register the marriage before a Syrian court, which refused because she was underage and instead suggested a traditional marriage. The council also relied on the applicant's own statement that he deliberately wished to marry a young girl so that he would be the first man in her life. These facts demonstrated that he was fully aware of her age. Once that awareness was established, the minister did not need to prove that the applicant also knew the minor could not legally consent to consummation, as it could be assumed that he had or should have had that knowledge. Consequently, the applicant's lack of legal knowledge, the consent of the families, parental involvement, or absence of intent were not considered relevant.


The council also dismissed the argument that child marriage was a generally accepted cultural practice in Syria. It referred to UNICEF data cited by Girls Not Brides showing that only three percent of marriages in Syria involved girls aged fifteen or younger, concluding that this did not demonstrate a widespread custom that would excuse the applicant's conduct or negate his knowledge. Finally, the council found that the article on different forms of child marriage did not explain why the applicant could not have known he was committing a serious crime. Accordingly, the appeal on this ground was dismissed.


The council held that the minister was entitled to classify the applicant's conduct as a serious non-political crime for the purposes of Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention. Referring to the CJEU's judgment in K. L. v Migration Department at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania [Galte] (C-63/24, 30 April 2025), the council noted that the seriousness of a crime must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the nature of the offence, the penalty attached to it, the time elapsed since its commission, the person's conduct since then, and whether they have demonstrated remorse.


The applicant argued that insufficient weight had been given to mitigating circumstances, including the passage of time, his continuing marriage and family life, the absence of any risk of reoffending, and his alleged self-reflection. The council rejected these arguments, holding that the gravity and consequences of the offence outweighed these factors. It found that the minister was entitled to attach little significance to the passage of time and the absence of a risk of recidivism in light of the nature and consequences of the crime.


The council also found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate responsibility or remorse. It relied on his statement during the hearing that he did not wish to apologise for something he regarded as normal, concluding that this reflected a lack of remorse for consummating a marriage with a twelve-year-old. The council emphasised that this assessment concerned his attitude towards the offence itself rather than any regret about his family life. Finally, it held that the minister was not required to hear the applicant's spouse, as any statements she might provide would have limited evidential value. The council therefore concluded that the minister had correctly maintained the classification of the offence as a serious non-political crime under Article 1(F).


Finally, as the applicant was not able to demonstrate a sense of responsible and remorse, the council ruled that the minister rightly issued an alert on SIS because the applicant poses a threat to public order or security. It also considered that the passage of time was not a decisive factor in this regard.


In light of the above, the appeal was declared unfounded.


Country of Decision
Netherlands
Court Name
NL: Council of State [Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State]
Case Number
202405898/1/V2
Date of Decision
01/07/2026
Country of Origin
Syria
Keywords
Assessment of applications
Exclusion
Grounds negating individual responsibility
Individual responsibility
Direct commission of an excludable act
Serious (non-political) crime
Commission of a serious crime prior to arriving (subsidiary protection)
Specific circumstances subsequent to an excludable act