A Comorian national submitted an asylum application on 3 February 2025. He claimed that he served voluntarily in the Comorian army since 2021, during which time he witnessed unpleasant things, such as the killing of civilians, and was aware of mass graves in the forest. He stated that he had personally never committed such crimes as he would hide himself. However, he asserted that he was involved in the arrest of demonstrators several times and that he handed these arrestees to the police, with the awareness that they would be mistreated. He claimed further that he was promoted to the rank of sergeant, and on one occasion, he was ordered to kill two people, but he did not carry out the mission. This caused him to be wanted by the army and triggered him to flee his country. He expressed fear that upon return he would be arrested and murdered for deserting the army. The Minister of Asylum and Migration rejected his request as manifestly unfounded by decision of 2 March 2025. It considered that he had committed a serious non-political crime within the meaning of Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention for his involvement in the arrests. The applicant appealed this decision before the District Court of the Hague.
The court first considered that the minister prepared the decision with sufficient care, rejecting all of the applicant's procedural objections. It found that the applicant was properly given a further hearing after new questions arose, and that no legal rule required the minister to disclose the purpose of an additional interview in advance. It also considered that the minister was entitled to doubt the applicant's claimed communication difficulties and illiteracy, given inconsistent statements about schooling, a self-declared fluency in French at registration, the military rank he attained, training with the French Foreign Legion, and the applicant's own confirmation during interviews that he understood the interpreter. As regards medical considerations, the court found that the minister adequately accommodated medical advice which stated that the applicant suffers from a delayed ability to understand questions, by repeating and clarifying questions where needed, and noting at the outset of the additional interview that exact dates were not required. Neither the benign tumour nor the subsequent institutional admission demonstrated that the applicant was unable to give accurate statements at the time of the interviews. Finally, it noted that the absence of authoritative sources on the Comorian army did not make the decision careless. Where country information is unavailable, the court ruled that the minister may base its assessment primarily on the applicant' own statements and their credibility.
Following this, the court assessed whether the minister was correct to invoke Article 1F of the Refugee Convention against him. The court answered this question in the affirmative, upholding the minister's finding. In accordance with case law from the Dutch Council of State, the court found that the burden of proof falls on the minister to demonstrate serious reasons to believe the applicant committed a relevant crime, although this does not require a criminal conviction or proof to the criminal standard. According to Dutch legislation, ‘knowing participation' is required, meaning the applicant knew or should have known that the acts in question were crimes within the meaning of Article 1F. Additionally, ‘personal participation' is required, which includes facilitation.
The court noted that public sources confirmed that the Comorian army suppressed demonstrations following a constitutional amendment in 2018 and again after the 2024 elections. The applicant admitted to arresting protesters on approximately fifteen occasions and handing them over to the police. Crucially, the applicant stated in his own words that he knew the police would mistreat and beat those he transferred, because he had witnessed this himself. The court held that the minister was not required to accept the applicant's subsequent attempt to minimise his statements by suggesting he had merely meant that detainees would be ‘badly treated' or sent to prison, as the applicant had also explicitly said the police would beat them, which went beyond any ambiguity in the translation of the word ‘maltraité'.
The court therefore agreed with the minister that both personal participation, in the form of facilitation through the arrest and handover of detainees, and knowing participation, given the applicant's awareness that mistreatment would follow, had been established on the basis of the applicant's own statements.
Nevertheless, the court found that the minister had not sufficiently substantiated that the conduct facilitated by the applicant reached the threshold required under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention. On the question of torture, the court noted that the minister relied solely on the applicant's own statements to conclude that the persons handed over to the police were subjected to torture and/or aggravated ill-treatment. Measured against the definition of torture under the UN Convention against Torture (which requires the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, for purposes such as extracting information, punishment, intimidation, or discrimination, carried out by or with the involvement of a person acting in an official capacity), the court held that the applicant's statements did not sufficiently demonstrate that the persons transferred to the police were victims of torture within that definition.
On the question of serious ill-treatment, the court similarly found the minister's position insufficiently substantiated. While the applicant's statements did support the conclusion that the persons handed over were subjected to ill-treatment, the court held that not every assault automatically qualifies as a serious non-political crime within the meaning of Article 1F(b).
The court also noted that it remained unclear whether the minister was accusing the applicant merely of having been aware of other crimes he witnessed during his military service such as extrajudicial killings and mass graves, or whether he was also alleging some form of personal participation in them by reason of his long service and increasingly higher rank in the army. The court found that the contested decision addressed personal participation only in the context of the arrest and handover of demonstrators, and the minister's attempt at the hearing to link those handovers to the mass graves was not supported by the interviews or the reasoning in the decision itself.
The court considered that since Article 1F had not been sufficiently established, the minister was not entitled to reject the application as manifestly unfounded. It directed the minister to issue a new decision, in which the question of refugee status would also need to be assessed.
Finally, the court ruled that the applicant had not made it plausible that a return to Comoros because of his alleged desertion from the army would entail a risk of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, as it found his asylum claim to be lacking in plausibility.
In light of the above, the appeal was declared well founded.