A Syrian national applied for asylum on 4 March 2022, claiming that he worked for the police in Syria from 1988 until 2009, and he feared problems with the Free Syrian Army on the basis of his work. He reported that he felt pressure to join them and fight against the regime, which led him to flee Syria in 2012. He remained in Türkiye until 2021 before travelling to the Netherlands. He expressed fears that upon return to Syria, he would be wanted by the Syrian regime because he left his work without permission and he did not comply with an order to transfer. The Minister for Asylum and Migration considered that his account regarding his work for the Syrian police was credible. It noted that the Syrian security authorities, including the police, have been guilty of crimes against humanity in a widespread and systematic manner since 1963. It considered that the exclusion provisions under Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention were applicable in the applicant's case due to his involvement in torture and serious ill-treatment. Therefore, his application was rejected as manifestly unfounded on 17 January 2024, and he was registered in the E&S (execution and alert) and the SIS (Schengen Information System). A return decision was not issued due to a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The applicant appealed this decision before the District Court of the Hague, seated in Arnhem.
The court set out the applicable legal framework. It referred to Article 1(F) of the Geneva Convention as well as Article 3.107(1) of the Aliens Decree 2000 which prescribes that applicants who instigated or otherwise participated in excludable acts may also be excluded, and paragraph C2/7.10.2 of the Aliens Circular 2000 (Vc 2000) which lays out the assessment framework to establish individual responsibility by determining whether the applicant knowingly and personally participated in the crime. It noted that according to established case law by the Council of State, the burden of proof rests on the minister and strict requirements are imposed on the evidence and the motivation of the minister. However, if the minister has established that the applicant has committed an excludable act, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant to prove that he did not commit the crimes.
The applicant did not dispute the qualification of the crimes committed by the police and other security services in Syria as crimes against humanity. Rather, he contested his individual responsibility linked to these crimes.
The court rejected the applicant's argument that the minister should have not relied on statements from the additional interview. Although the applicant later said he was distracted due to concern for his children after the earthquake in Türkiye, this was not supported by the interview record. The court noted that the interview occurred two months after the earthquake, his children's situation was discussed, and he agreed to proceed. He later acknowledged being emotional but still said the interview went well, and he raised no objections afterward. The court also noted that the minister's assessment mainly relied on statements made even before the earthquake.
The court examined whether the applicant, who had worked for the Syrian police, should be considered responsible for crimes against humanity under Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention. First, the court addressed whether the applicant knew or should have known that the Syrian police were involved in torture and severe ill-treatment of prisoners. The applicant argued that he was not truly part of the police and was unaware of how information from his department was used, also claiming that Syria was a closed country where little information about such abuses circulated. The court rejected this argument. It found, based on the applicant's own repeated statements during interviews, that he had indeed been a member of the Syrian police, holding the rank of sergeant and working as an assistant officer. Although he claimed later that he was merely a civilian performing administrative tasks and wearing civilian clothes, this contradicted his earlier statements. The court also determined that the minister had sufficiently demonstrated, through general country of origin information and the applicant's own admissions that he had heard about torture by the police, that he knew or should have known about the systematic crimes committed by the Syrian police.
The court then considered whether the applicant personally participated in these crimes. According to the minister, the applicant's administrative work facilitated the arrest and punishment of wanted persons. The applicant worked in a department responsible for background checks, where he examined personal data of citizens applying for certificates or stopped by the police, and cross-checked names against lists of wanted persons supplied by various security services. If a person appeared on such a list, the information was passed on and the person was arrested by other authorities. The applicant argued that he never personally caused an arrest and had only described procedures in general terms, claiming that he had never actually encountered a wanted person. The court did not find this credible. It relied on the applicant's own detailed statements describing how individuals with criminal records were identified, reported to other authorities, placed in a waiting room, and then taken away for detention. The court concluded that these statements showed practical involvement rather than hypothetical descriptions. Given the widespread and arbitrary arrests documented in country of origin reports, the court also found it implausible that the applicant would never have encountered wanted individuals, in view of the large number of applications the applicant checked.in view of the large number of applications the applicant checked. As a result, the court determined that the applicant's actions formed an important link in the system leading to arrests that exposed individuals to a significant risk of torture and ill-treatment. The court therefore held that the applicant had personally participated, through facilitation, in acts connected to these crimes.
Finally, the applicant argued that serious personal circumstances- such as poor health, family hardship in Türkiye, and close relatives in Germany -made the rejection of his asylum application and the alerts disproportionate. He also claimed he posed no threat and could not leave the Netherlands due to legal barriers.
The minister acknowledged that deportation to the applicant's country of origin was not possible under Article 3 of the ECHR but maintained that the situation was not disproportionate. The applicant was not being forced to leave, had not shown that relocation elsewhere was impossible, and his circumstances were not considered exceptional.
The court agreed with the minister that the circumstances described by the applicant were not so exceptional and distressing as to constitute a decision with disproportionate consequences. It found that the applicant had not sufficiently substantiated his health issues or the severity of his family's situation. His inability to return to his country of origin and the withholding of a residence permit in the Netherlands were not considered special circumstances, especially since such situations only qualified if deportation was permanently impossible in light of Article 3 of the ECHR. The court concluded that the consequences were not disproportionate and rejected the argument.
In light of the above, the appeal was declared unfounded.