An Eritrean applicant entered the Netherlands on 28 September 2018 through a family reunification permit (mvv) in connection with his son. He was granted a temporary asylum residence permit by decision of 8 October 2018 by the State Secretary for Justice and Security (State Secretary). He submitted an independent asylum application on 2 April 2019. On 10 July 2020, the State Secretary rejected the applicant's asylum request as manifestly unfounded and withdrew the asylum residence permit granted on the ground of family reunification. He was also imposed an entry ban for a period of ten years.
His asylum request was based on the fact that he served in the military in his home country with the commandos in the military police, from 1996 to 2000. Following this, in the context of his military service, he was assigned to a company where he carried out construction and security work, until he deserted in 2018 during leave. The State Secretary considered that the applicant posed a danger to public order or national security. Based on information from public sources, it found serious reasons to assume that he was guilty of torture and arbitrary imprisonment during his service with the military police where he was stationed in a military camp. It characterised these acts as crimes against humanity committed during a peace situation, and as serious non-political crimes, within the meaning of Article 1(F) of the Geneva Convention. It also considered that the applicant held individual responsibly for the crimes, after applying the so-called 'personal and knowing participation test'
On appeal, the District Court of the Hague, seated in Utrecht, considered that the State Secretary had properly substantiated that there were serious reasons to assume the applicant had been guilt of crimes against humanity and serious non-political crimes.
Firstly, the court considered that the State Secretary did not act negligently by not having an additional interview related to the exclusion grounds, as this had to be cancelled due to measures related to the coronavirus. The court noted that the work instruction 2005/22 does not impose any obligation for an additional 1F interview. The court noted that the applicant was heard at the reception center both for an initial interview and a subsequent interview which covered indications under Article 1F. Thus, the court rejected the applicant's allegation that the State Secretary acted with negligence even more since the applicant consented to submit answers in written statements instead of holding an additional 1F hearing.
Furthermore, the court dismissed the applicant's argument that the State Secretary wrongly assumed an incorrect period during which the applicant carried out his military service, finding that the State Secretary had correctly based its information on the applicant's statements during the interview, where he provided dates related to his service.
Turning to an assessment of the applicable exclusion grounds, the court upheld the State Secretary's finding that the Eritrean army is guilty of crimes against humanity on a large scale, in relation to the forced recruitment of individuals into the army, and the conditions within the army and the training, which include inhumane disciplinary punishment equated with torture. Punishments for violations are severe, including re-education in designated camps, forced labour and years of imprisonment under life threatening detention conditions, as attested to by various international organisations. It noted that the oppression of the population is large scale, with permanent staff of such camps, including trainers, guards and managers, having contributed greatly to the current situation in Eritrea. The actions of the applicant included tying up people using the ‘Otto' torture method and the long-term confinement of conscripts in zinc plate cells under extreme temperatures, which the court held must be regarded as torture and crimes against humanity, as well as serious non-political crimes.
With regard to the burden of proof, the court noted that it is up to the State Secretary to demonstrate that there are serious reasons for believing that the applicant has committed an excludable act, however, the applicant must refute this with reasons to avoid the application of the exclusion clauses.
The court then examined the issue of ‘knowing participation'. It found that it was undisputed that the applicant was aware of the widespread abuses within the Eritrean military system, including torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and other serious violations against conscripts. The applicant himself acknowledged during interviews that such abuses occurred. On that basis, the court agreed with the State Secretary that the requirement of knowing participation in crimes referred to in Article 1(F)(a) and (b) was satisfied.
The court then assessed whether the applicant had personally participated in those crimes. The applicant argued that he had only spoken in general terms during his interviews and that the authorities had misinterpreted his statements. He also maintained that his role did not involve direct participation in abuses. The court rejected these arguments. It relied on the applicant's own statements during a detailed interview, in which he confirmed that he had personally tied soldiers in the so-called ‘Otto' position as a punishment and had carried out orders to place conscripts in detention cells for extended periods. Although the applicant later attempted to amend or clarify these statements, the court held that the minister was entitled to rely on the original interview record. According to the court, these actions constituted the execution of punishments that involved arbitrary detention and ill-treatment.
The court further held that the detention conditions described by the applicant amounted to arbitrary deprivation of liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law. The applicant's argument that the detention cells were not fully made of zinc plates, but had stone walls and a window, did not alter this conclusion. What mattered was that individuals were detained without any legal process and for arbitrary periods determined by superiors.
The applicant also challenged the reliance on country reports about Eritrea, arguing that many of the reports were produced years after the events in question and were based partly on witness testimony. The court rejected this argument and found that the reports, including United Nations reports covering the period from 1991 to 2016, demonstrate a long-standing and systematic pattern of human rights abuses in Eritrea, including within military training camps. These reports confirmed that torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary detention occurred during the period when the applicant served at the military camp, and they were consistent with the applicant's own descriptions of events.
In light of these findings, the court concluded that the authorities had sufficiently demonstrated both knowing and personal participation by the applicant in acts amounting to torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary detention. As a result, there were serious reasons to believe that the applicant had committed crimes against humanity.
The court then assessed whether the applicant's residence permit on the grounds of family reunification (mvv) should be revoked. It found that whether it was actually the case that the applicant withheld information or not, the minister was nevertheless correct to base the withdrawal on the finding that the applicant posed a danger to public order. It noted additionally that the application of Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention alone can be invoked to justify withdrawal of his residence permit.
As regards the imposition of the 10 year entry ban based on the finding that the applicant constituted a threat to public order, the court referred to the judgment by the CJEU in K. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (C‑331/16) and H.F. v Belgische Staat (C‑366/16). Hereto, it noted that the application of the exclusion clauses does not automatically imply that the applicant poses a current, serious and real danger to public order. To establish such a threat, the nature and seriousness of the crimes must be taken into account, as well as the extent of the applicant's individual responsibility, the existence of any factors which mitigate his criminal liability, and whether or not there is a criminal conviction. Additionally, according to the CJEU, the time that elapsed since the crime was committed may also be considered, however, depending on the crime's particular seriousness, even if a considerable length of time has passed, the applicant may still pose a present, real and serious threat to public order.
Additionally, in light of the seriousness of the crime, the applicant's personal involvement, lack of mitigating factors to preclude his criminal liability, and his lack of remorse, the court held that the minister did not have to attach decisive weight to the fact that the applicant eventually deserted from the military and the long period of time that elapsed since the crime, or his lack of a criminal record in the Netherlands. Thus, the court found that the State Secretary was correct in its assessment that the applicant posed a current, genuine and serious threat to public order.
Finally, the court held that the State Secretary was entitled to disregard whether the applicant's family members were already in the Netherlands, as this did not affect the legality of the contested decision. It found that the consequences for family life were a matter of the family's own choice. Although he could not be deported to Eritrea due to risks of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, the family since could join the applicant in a third country, and the minister was not required to specify or investigate where family life could be exercised.
The appeal was declared unfounded.