A Sri Lankan national applied for asylum on 22 February 2016. The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) rejected his application on 21 December 2018. However, it provisionally admitted him due to the unreasonableness of carrying out a deportation. The SEM was ordered by the Federal Administrative Court to re-examine the case, as indicators emerged on appeal that the applicant was not honest in his claim that he was not a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The SEM re-assessed his case, finding that he held a prominent position with the LTTE between 1996-2009. On 19 June 2020, it issued a decision excluding the applicant from international protection. The applicant filed another appeal before the Federal Administrative Court.
The court first dismissed the applicant's complaint that the SEM failed to adequately state reasons in its decision, as it considered that all the essential submissions were dealt with. It ruled that, in reaching a different assessment to the applicant, the SEM did not violate its obligation to state reasons.
Following this, with reference to previous Swiss case law which established the principle of ‘inclusion before exclusion', the court upheld the SEM's finding that the applicant, in principle, qualifies for refugee status due to the risk of persecution upon return in relation to his activities with the LTTE.
The court then examined whether the applicant should be excluded from refugee status. It upheld the finding of the SEM that the applicant made a significant contribution to the elimination of ‘traitors' and was thus guilty of offences such as abduction, grievous bodily harm, torture or murder or had shared responsibility for them. As an example of his activities, the court noted that, according to the applicant's statements, in his works as a trainer, he was also in active service and participated in surveillance, checked intelligence reports from other employees and forwarded them to his superiors. He linked these activities with the aim of securing areas under the LTTE's control and to attack or assassinate any threats, such as members of the army and traitors to civil society, including members of opposition movements. In light of his prominent position in the secret service and his role in actively collecting intelligence, the court dismissed the argument that he did not have any influence on the commission of attacks as his role was limited to checking and passing on information. It also considered unconvincing the statement that he never carried a weapon or engaged in hostilities. The court held that participation in excludable acts is sufficient to justify the application of exclusion grounds without requiring actual perpetration of the main offence. The court highlighted that such participation may take the form of facilitation, including the procurement and dissemination of information for the preparation of attacks. This led to the conclusion that the applicant had participated in offences including assault, homicide and deprivation of liberty, which are classified as serious crimes.
Following this, the court determined that the crimes were not of a political nature as although they had a political component, their nature was disproportionate to the pursued political interests, especially considering that they targeted persons who were not directly participating in the fighting, including ‘traitors', which is not permissible under international humanitarian law. It held that such attacks against ‘traitors' had a terrorist character.
Turning to an assessment of the individual responsibility of the applicant, the court found that the applicant encouraged a joint criminal enterprise though his prominent function in the LTTE's secret service, where he was responsible for or contributed significantly to the execution of the assassination attempts, in particular against ‘traitors'. Additionally, the court noted that based on the applicant's statements, he was aware and accepted the consequences of his activities in obtaining, verifying and transmitting information on persons classified as dangerous to the LTTE, without any evidence that he was acting under duress.
Finally, the court upheld the SEM's conclusion regarding proportionality, which found that even considering the conditions in which the applicant joined the LTTE, and the fact that his activities dated back a long time, these elements did not outweigh the reprehensibility of assassination. It held that the applicant was in any case protected from the risk of persecution in his home country as deportation was not possible in accordance with Article 3 of the ECHR. The argument that family reunification would prove more difficult for him also failed, as it was noted that this did not affect the balancing of the applicant's protection needs with the reprehensibility of his crime and his subjective guilt.
In light of the above, the court ruled that the applicant must be excluded from asylum for having committed a serious non-political crime within the meaning of Article 1F(b) of the Geneva Convention, in view of his cadre activity in the LTTE intelligence service.