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06/05/2021
CH: The Federal Administrative Court held that although the applicant had been a member of an organisation in Sri Lanka which was responsible for human rights violations, the evidence did not establish that she had personally participated in or significantly contributed to violent or criminal acts that would constitute ‘reprehensible acts’ under Article 53 of the Swiss Asylum Act. The court found that her role was limited to lower-level administrative and documentation tasks, and neither membership in the organisation nor non-violent support activities alone justified exclusion from asylum.
06/05/2021
CH: The Federal Administrative Court held that although the applicant had been a member of an organisation in Sri Lanka which was responsible for human rights violations, the evidence did not establish that she had personally participated in or significantly contributed to violent or criminal acts that would constitute ‘reprehensible acts’ under Article 53 of the Swiss Asylum Act. The court found that her role was limited to lower-level administrative and documentation tasks, and neither membership in the organisation nor non-violent support activities alone justified exclusion from asylum.

ECLI
Input Provided By
EUAA Information and Analysis Sector (IAS)
Other Source/Information
Type
Judgment
Original Documents
Relevant Legislative Provisions
National law only (in case there is no reference to EU law/ECHR)
Reference
Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal administratif fédéral - FAC], A.,B.,C. v State Secretariat for Migration (Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM), D-2085/2018, 06 May 2021. Link redirects to the English summary in the EUAA Case Law Database.
Permanent link to the case
https://caselaw.euaa.europa.eu/pages/viewcaselaw.aspx?CaseLawID=5851
Case history
Other information
Abstract

On 8 March 2018, the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) rejected the asylum application of a Sri Lankan Tamil woman and her two children. In that decision, the SEM recognised that the applicant fulfilled the conditions for being granted refugee status as defined under Article 3(1) and (2) of the Swiss Asylum Act (AsylG) and extended this refugee status to her children. However, the SEM refused to grant asylum on the basis of Article 53 of the Law on Asylum (AsylG), concluding that she was ‘unworthy of asylum' because of alleged reprehensible acts connected with her involvement in an organisation, referred to in the judgment as G., linked to the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict. At the same time, the SEM ordered her expulsion from Switzerland but postponed its execution because removal was considered inadmissible. Instead, the applicant and her children were granted provisional admission. The applicant appealed before the Federal Administrative Court. 


The court noted that the SEM considered that the applicant contributed to the commission of reprehensible acts within the meaning of Article 53 of the AsylG and based its decision on the applicant's statement according to which she was an important member of the organisation, emphasised that her vague and inconsistent statements were surprising and assumed that the applicant's selective presentation of facts were deliberately minimising her role in the activities of the organisation. Moreover, the SEM held that she made a substantial and decisive contribution to the reprehensible acts (namely arrests and interrogation of persons) by collecting and forwarding information even if she declared that she was unaware of the purpose of the information. 


The Federal Administrative Court outlined the relevant legal framework. Under Article 2(1) of the AsylG, Switzerland generally grants asylum to refugees. Nevertheless, Article 53 provides exceptions for refugees who are deemed unworthy of asylum because they committed reprehensible acts or because they have endangered Switzerland's internal or external security.  


The court explained that Swiss asylum jurisprudence interprets ‘reprehensible acts' in reference to serious criminal offenses comparable to crimes under Swiss criminal law. Earlier case law connected this concept to the definition of a ‘crime' under the Criminal Code as it existed prior to 2007, meaning offenses punishable by imprisonment of at least one year, while later reforms defined crimes as offenses punishable by more than three years. The court emphasized that the classification depends on the maximum penalty prescribed by law rather than the sentence actually imposed. Importantly, strict proof of crimes committed abroad is not required in asylum proceedings; it is sufficient that serious grounds exist to believe the individual committed such acts. However, the authorities must examine the individual's specific role and responsibility. Mere membership in an extremist or violent organisation is not sufficient by itself to justify exclusion from asylum. Instead, decision-makers must assess the seriousness of the conduct, the individual's contribution, motives, possible justifications, and whether exclusion would be proportionate. 


The court then turned to the question of whether the applicant could be accused of reprehensible acts within this legal framework. It first addressed the nature of the organisation with which she had been involved. In previous case law, the court had determined that this organization could not simply be treated as a purely terrorist criminal group because it pursued the political objective of Tamil self-determination in Sri Lanka. At the same time, it could not be regarded solely as a conventional party to a civil war because its methods included serious human rights violations. Consequently, the court held that the acts of the organisation could not automatically be treated as acts of war, but membership alone also did  not automatically justify exclusion from asylum.  


The factual background of the applicant's involvement with the organisation was then examined. During two hearings before the SEM, the applicant stated that she joined the movement at a young age. She explained that the decision was influenced by the circumstances of the conflict and by her desire to prevent other members of her family from being forcibly recruited, since she was the eldest child. After joining, she initially performed certain tasks for the movement and later underwent a training program that mainly concerned personal safety measures. Her principal role was administrative: she worked in an office within a department of the organisation's service structure, where she handled documentation tasks. Specifically, she collected information from informants, archived it, and sometimes forwarded it to her immediate superior, who would then transmit it further up the chain of command. She indicated that she was not informed about how the information would ultimately be used and that major decisions were made by higher-ranking members of the organisation. In addition to these tasks, she wrote short stories under a pseudonym, which were later published in a book. 


The court assessed whether these activities could amount to participation in reprehensible acts. It concluded that, contrary to the SEM's findings, the evidence did not show that the applicant had been directly or indirectly involved in violent or terrorist acts. Swiss case law establishes that neither membership in the organisation nor nonviolent internal activities automatically constitute reprehensible acts within the meaning of Article 53 of the AsylG. The court also found no evidence of specific conduct or individual responsibility that could meet the threshold for such acts. 


The SEM had argued that inconsistencies in the applicant's statements suggested she held a more important role than she claimed. In earlier statements she had described herself as an ‘important member' responsible for information within the organisation's service. In later submissions her legal representative even referred to her as a former cadre and a well-known personality who had appeared at public events and written texts that attracted the attention of senior figures within the organisation. The court examined these claims and  concluded that the statements did not prove that she had held a leadership or a decision-making position. The description of herself as an ‘important member' could reflect a subjective perception rather than an objective organisational rank. The court also noted that summaries recorded during preliminary procedures often have limited evidential value and must be interpreted cautiously. Furthermore, claims that she had appeared publicly or written texts did not provide concrete evidence of an authoritative role within the organisation. 


The court also examined the fact that the applicant's name had appeared in a Sri Lankan publication listing persons suspected of terrorism. According to information from the Swiss diplomatic representation, the publication contained names of individuals sought by Sri Lankan authorities under anti-terrorism legislation, and the list was regularly updated. However, subsequent investigations revealed that neither the applicant's real name nor her pseudonym were currently known to the Sri Lankan authorities and that she was no longer listed in later editions. The court therefore held that the earlier listing might indicate some past connection with the organisation but did not demonstrate the significance of her role nor prove that she exercised decision-making authority. 


Taking all the evidence together, the court concluded that the applicant most likely worked in a documentation and information-handling capacity within the relevant department of the organisation and that this role implied a certain degree of trust. Her book and public activities might have provided some propaganda value and could have brought her recognition within certain circles. Nevertheless, these factors did not demonstrate involvement in violent acts. She did not occupy a leadership position, possessed no decision-making powers, and her responsibilities remained administrative. The court rejected the SEM's argument that her support activities amounted to complicity in acts such as killings, assaults, or unlawful detentions allegedly carried out by the organisation. According to the court, it would be purely speculative to infer that the information she handled contributed directly to violent operations. Simply archiving or forwarding information did not place her within the organisation's decision-making core or make her responsible for its actions. 


 
The court also addressed the SEM's broader argument that the applicant must share responsibility for the organisation's crimes because she had voluntarily joined and worked for it for several years, thereby identifying with its ideology. The court rejected this reasoning as well. Although she probably joined voluntarily, the circumstances she described indicated that her decision was influenced by the risk of forced recruitment within her family. Moreover, she never participated in combat operations, was never armed, and never received weapons training. The case file contained no evidence of her involvement in any specific criminal act attributable to the organization. Even applying the lower evidentiary standard applicable to crimes committed abroad where serious grounds for suspicion may suffice, the available evidence did not establish that she made a significant contribution to any act that could be classified as a serious crime under Article 53 of the AsylG. Therefore, both direct and indirect participation in reprehensible acts had to be denied. 


In addition, the court considered her conduct after leaving the conflict context and considered that she had ceased any involvement with the organisation since the end of the Sri Lankan civil war and likely even earlier, following the birth of one of her children. After arriving in Switzerland, she had not engaged in any misconduct. 


Based on this assessment, the Federal Administrative Court concluded that the applicant could not be accused of reprehensible acts within the meaning of Article 53 of the AsylG. As the exclusion ground did not apply, the question of proportionality did not need to be examined further. Thus, the court held that the applicant and her children were entitled to asylum in Switzerland. 


The court therefore upheld the appeal with respect to the issue of exclusion from asylum. It annulled the relevant parts of the SEM's decision and instructed the SEM to grant asylum to the applicant and her children. 


Country of Decision
Switzerland
Court Name
CH: Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal administratif fédéral - FAC]
Case Number
D-2085/2018
Date of Decision
06/05/2021
Country of Origin
Sri Lanka
Keywords
Assessment of applications
Exclusion
Individual responsibility
Aiding and abetting
Excludable acts attributed to a group or regime
Serious (non-political) crime
Commission of a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to admission as a refugee
Refugee status/protection