On 24 December 2019, the State Secretary for Participation and Integration fined a status holder €1250 euro for failing to comply with the integration requirements under the Civic Integration Act by the stipulated deadline. She was ordered to repay the loan she had taken out in full in relation to the integration costs. Subsequent requests by the status holder for the state secretary to reconsider the decision were rejected. On appeal, the District Court of Gelderland upheld the decision of the state secretary not to reconsider its decision of 24 December 2019, as there were no newly discovered facts or changes in the circumstances to justify a reconsideration. The status holder lodged a further appeal before the Council of State.

The council first considered the required for the status holder to repay the loan in full. With reference to the CJEU ruling in T.G. v Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid [Keren] (C-158/23, 4 February 2025​​), the council noted that the Dutch system necessitating asylum status holders to bear the full costs of integration courses and examination, whether or not by means of a loan, is contrary to Article 34 of the recast Qualification Directive (QD). It noted that such mandatory integration measures must be free of charge and therefore, the repayment of loans violates EU law. In according with previous case law of the council, it noted that the Civic Integration Act is not binding in so far as it concerns status holders, therefore, the state secretary cannot issue decisions to this affect. Thus, the council ruled that there was no obligation for the status holder to repay the loan.

Additionally, the council found that the state secretary’s refusal to reconsider the part of the decision that dealt with the loan repayment was manifestly unreasonable, as it fell contrary to EU law. It rejected the argument that the decision did not concern primary EU law, remarking that the decision was clearly incompatible with Article 34 of the recast Qualification Directive (QD) which is considered ‘higher law’. It noted that the fact that decision was taken prior to the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in Keren did not lead to a different finding, as preliminary rulings in principle reflect the law as it has always been. While the state secretary held that it cannot reverse the decision due to the principle of legal certainty, the council ruled that this principle cannot be invoked for the state secretary to protect itself, as the objective of the principle is to protect citizens against arbitrariness on the part of the government. It emphasised that the fact that the repayment obligation is not enforceable entails that there is no interest in upholding this incorrect decision, as it would create a highly undesirable legal and factual situation where the status holder would feel obliged to repay a debt that the authority cannot actually cash in on.

In addition, the council reviewed the imposition of a fine on the status holder, reaching the same conclusion as regards the loan, finding the measure contrary to Article 34 of the recast QD and the Keren judgment.

In light of the above, the council declared the appeal well founded and set aside the judgment of the district court. It annulled the decision of the state secretary, concluding that the status holder was not obliged to repay the loan or to pay the fine. The council held that it remained primarily up to the State Secretary to determine how to proceed in similar cases.