The applicants are a married couple of Somali nationals. The first applicant was granted refugee status in Greece on 21 November 2019, and the second applicant was granted subsidiary protection status in Greece on 7 May 2020. On 19 September 2021, they requested international protection in the Netherlands, claiming that they had experienced problems with Al-Shabaab in South Somalia. They also argued that they could not return to Greece, as they would face a serious risk of being subjected there to inhuman or degrading treatment. On 4 July 2025, the Minister for Asylum and Migration rejected the applications as manifestly unfounded. The minister considered their claimed origin from South Somalia not credible, as a language analysis indicated that they spoke a variant of Somali associated with northern Somalia. Given the doubts regarding their origin, the minister examined the decisions of the Greek authorities and the applicants’ Greek asylum files. According to the minister, those files showed that the Greek authorities had not carried out an assessment of the applicants’ identity, nationality or origin. On that basis, the minister concluded that the applicants’ claimed identity, nationality and origin were not credible and therefore did not assess the credibility of the alleged problems with Al-Shabaab. The minister also issued return decisions. The applicants appealed before the District Court of The Hague.

At the outset, the District Court of The Hague seated in Haarlem recalled the principles established in the CJEU judgment in QY v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-753/22, 18 June 2024). It noted that following that judgment, the Council of State ruled in Applicants v The Minister for Asylum and Migration (202203031/2/V3, 2 July 2025) that the Minister was entitled to reassess the applications of persons who had requested international protection in the Netherlands while already having been granted it by the Greek authorities. However, the council held that the minister should have begun exchanging information with the Greek authorities as soon as possible and should have expressly taken the information obtained into account in his decisions. It further held that the minister cannot withdraw the protection status granted by another Member State but it must communicate the outcome of his assessment to the Greek authorities. The court considered that there were grounds to submit preliminary questions to the CJEU, and elaborated on the issues giving rise to those questions as follows.

First question

In the present case, the District Court of The Hague seated in Haarlem noted that the minister contacted the Greek authorities on 18 November 2024 and that, on 8 January 2025, the Greek authorities transmitted the decisions concerning the applicants together with the underlying case files. The court observed that the minister expressly took those files into account in the decision-making process, providing reasons why he did not follow the origin accepted as credible by the Greek authorities. In this regard, the court referred to the established case law of the Council of State, according to which asylum grounds are relevant only where the applicant’s identity, nationality and origin are considered credible. It clarified that the minister is therefore not required to assess the asylum grounds put forward in the Dutch asylum procedure if he has already concluded that the applicants’ identity, nationality and/or origin are not credible. In such circumstances, the minister may consider the asylum account as a whole not credible.

The court noted that the applicants disputed the minister’s position that the Greek authorities’ decisions had been fully taken into account. It observed that it was required to clarify the meaning of the concept of “taking full account”, as referred to in the QY judgment. More specifically, the court considered whether it was compatible with the principles of the CEAS for the minister, when deciding on the applicants’ new asylum applications, to rely solely on the fact that the granting Member State had not carried out an assessment of origin by means of a language analysis, without addressing the credibility assessment conducted by that Member State. The court also questioned whether the minister should have expressly addressed the reasoning of the Greek authorities for granting international protection to the applicants before concluding that there was no risk of refoulement, even if he considered the applicants’ origin not credible. Furthermore, the court raised the issue of whether the authorities of the responsible Member State must expressly address other elements, such as the credibility assessment carried out by the granting Member State, in their decisions, so that those elements can be subject to judicial review.

Second question

Moreover, the court noted that the minister had declared the applications manifestly unfounded and, on that basis, issued return decisions requiring the applicants to leave immediately for Somalia. The minister considered that, since the applicants’ origin was not credible, the asylum grounds did not require substantive examination and that it could therefore be assumed that there was no risk of refoulement. He had not contacted the Greek authorities regarding his decisions on the applications for international protection and was therefore unaware whether the Greek authorities had initiated, or would initiate, procedures to withdraw the refugee and subsidiary protection status they had granted. The court therefore assumed that the protection status granted to the applicants by Greece remained in force. On that basis, the applicants were lawfully residing in a Member State, which would normally mean that they should be instructed to proceed immediately to that Member State pursuant to Article 6(2) of the Return Directive. At the same time, the applicants could not be required to return to Greece, as they might then find themselves in a situation where it could not be ruled out that their living conditions would be contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter. The minister therefore took the position that Article 6(2) of the Return Directive was not applicable.

The court noted that the Administrative Court of Stuttgart in Germany had previously raised questions concerning a comparable situation in its request for a preliminary ruling of 3 May 2023 (C-288/23), which was later withdrawn. The court considered that it was faced with the same issue as that raised in the fourth question in that reference, namely whether the principle of non-refoulement precludes a Member State from issuing a return decision while the person concerned still enjoys international protection in another Member State. It also noted that, in the above-mentioned judgment of the Council of State, no clarification had been given on whether the minister may issue a return decision in such circumstances. The court therefore requested that, in answering that question, the CJEU take into account the fact that the protection status granted in the granting Member State has not been withdrawn.

Third and fourth questions

Furthermore, the court referred to the fifth question raised by the Administrative Court of Stuttgart in its request for a preliminary ruling of 3 May 2023 (C-288/23), which asks whether, where the principle of non-refoulement precludes a return decision to the applicant’s country of origin, it must already be examined at the stage of adopting the return decision whether that principle applies. This would mean either that no return decision may be issued, or that a return decision must nevertheless be adopted, with removal postponed pursuant to Article 9(1)(a) of the Return Directive.

The court noted that the Council of State also referred this issue to the CJEU in Applicants v The Minister for Asylum and Migration (202304482/1/V3 and 202304625/1/V3, 27 August 2025), concerning the compatibility with the Return Directive of return decisions imposed on persons who have no right of residence but cannot be removed because this would be contrary to the principle of non-refoulement. The court considered that the questions raised in that case regarding the possibility of issuing a return decision, in light of the CJEU judgments in BZ v Westerwaldkreis (C‑546/19 , 3 June 2021),  Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl v AA (C‑663/21, 6 July 2023) and K, L, M, N v State Secretary for Justice and Security (C-156/23, 17 October 2024), were also relevant to the present situation.

In addition, the court considered relevant to the present dispute the question raised by the District Court of The Hague seated in Roermond in Applicant v The Minister for Asylum and Migration (NL24.24991, 12 March 2025) registered before the CJEU under C-202/25 [Tadmur]. In that case, the question raised is whether, where the principle of non-refoulement precludes removal, it must be confirmed in writing that the removal of the third-country national is postponed.

The court also identified similarities between the facts of the case referred by the Council of State to the CJEU in Applicants v The Minister for Asylum and Migration (202304482/1/V3 and 202304625/1/V3, 27 August 2025), and those of the present cases. Here too, the applicants risk ending up in a “limbo” situation in which they have no right to reside in the Netherlands, cannot return to Greece, and may not be removed to their country of origin as long as the international protection status granted to them has not been withdrawn. The court therefore suggested that the CJEU consider examining the questions raised in the present case jointly with those referred by the Council of State.

The preliminary questions

For those reasons, the court requested the CJEU to give a preliminary ruling on the following questions:

1. Where a Member State cannot declare inadmissible an application for international protection lodged by an applicant to whom another Member State has already granted such protection, because the applicant would face a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the granting Member State, must Articles 10(2) and (3) and 11(2) of the recast APD and Article 4(1) and (2) of the recast QD, as interpreted in the judgment in QY, be interpreted as precluding the Member State, when examining the application — in which it must take full account of the decision of the granting Member State to grant international protection and of the elements underlying that decision — from merely referring, in its decision rejecting the application, to the outcome of an assessment of origin (e.g. language analysis), where the granting Member State did not conduct such an assessment?

2. Does the principle of non-refoulement preclude a return decision to the applicant’s country of origin under Article 6(2) of the Return Directive when the applicant has been granted international protection in another Member State, that status has not been withdrawn, but the Member State examining the new application concludes that the applicant is not entitled to protection?

3. If the answer to Question 2 is in the negative, must compliance with the principle of non-refoulement be assessed already when adopting the return decision, with the consequence that no return decision may be issued?

Or must a return decision nevertheless be adopted, with removal postponed pursuant to Article 9(1)(a) of the Return Directive until the granting Member State has withdrawn the refugee or subsidiary protection status and informed the Member State accordingly?

In that case, is there an obligation to confirm in writing that the removal of the third-country national has been postponed?

4. Must Articles 1, 4 and 7 of the EU Charter, and Articles 5, 6, 9 and 14 of the Return Directive, read in conjunction with the interpretation of those provisions in the CJEU judgments in AA and Ararat, be interpreted as precluding a return decision if it provides for the immediate postponement of removal for an indefinite period due to the risk of a breach of the principle of non-refoulement (as raised in the preliminary question referred by the Council of State on 27 August 2025)?