D. Ch., a national of Ukraine, applied for temporary protection in Czechia on 9 September 2025, having previously held temporary protection in Romania. The Ministry of the Interior (the Ministry) rejected his application as inadmissible under Section 5(1)(f) of Act No 65/2022, a provision in force since 3 September 2025 allowing the Ministry to consider an application for temporary protection inadmissible where the applicant is or was a holder of temporary protection in another EU Member State and where the Ministry had previously notified the European Commission of a risk of exceeding Czechia’s capacity to manage the consequences of a mass influx of displaced persons and the need to adopt measures to ensure a balance between Member States in the efforts made in relation to the reception of such persons..

The applicant challenged the rejection before the Municipal Court in Prague. On 13 November 2025, the Municipal Court in Prague found the Ministry’s action unlawful and ordered it to admit the application. The Municipal Court in Prague observed that Section 5(1)(f) of Act No 65/2022 had to be assessed in light of the CJEU judgment in A.N. (Krasiliva) v Ministerstvo vnitra (C-753/23, 27 February 2025), concerning other inadmissibility grounds in the same Act, as well as the extensive related case law of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Municipal Court in Prague concluded that Section 5(1)(f) was incompatible with EU law because the right to temporary protection stems directly from the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), which does not allow Member States to unilaterally restrict this right; eligible persons are entitled to choose the Member State in which they will exercise temporary protection‑related rights; and they may relocate to another Member State.

The Ministry lodged a cassation complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court, arguing that EU law does not grant a right to “secondary movement” for holders of temporary protection, that such movement does not amount to fleeing an armed conflict but constitutes mere “moving”, and that Section 5(1)(f) of Act No 65/2022 was compatible with EU law.

On 10 December 2025, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the cassation complaint as unfounded. Referring to its settled case law developed after the CJEU rulings in P (C‑244/24, Kaduna), AI, ZY, BG (C‑290/24, Abkez) v State Secretary for Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid) (C-244/24 and C-290/24, 19 December 2024) and A.N. (Krasiliva) v Ministerstvo vnitra (C-753/23, 27 February 2025), the court reiterated that temporary protection was granted directly by the Council of the European Union through its Implementing Decision No 2022/382, and that national authorities merely declaratorily confirm this status by conferring the associated rights, in particular the right to residence.

On the question of secondary movement, the Supreme Administrative Court referred to its own jurisprudence (No 2 Azs111/2024‑29, No 5 Azs 273/2023‑27, No 1 Azs 174/2024‑42, No 1 Azs 126/2025‑28), which had already rejected several cassation complaints by the Ministry. It recalled that point 6 of the Council Implementing Decision No 2025/1460 only clarifies that temporary protection rights cannot be enjoyed simultaneously in several Member States, but does not prevent persons from exercising these rights consecutively in a different Member State. The court added that displaced persons may have a legitimate interest in relocating to another Member State, noted that temporary protection is a protective status linked to the need to escape armed conflict, and stated that it cannot be assumed that a person’s motivation to reside in Czechia is not primarily related to this need. The court observed that the Ministry’s characterisation of the applicant’s relocation as mere “moving” represented an unacceptable downplaying of the situation of persons fleeing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. In addition, regarding the Ministry’s notification to the European Commission of a risk of capacity exhaustion, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that such notification does not allow the Ministry to reject temporary protection applications from those who are or were temporary protection holders in another EU Member State as inadmissible, given that the TPD provides no basis for such action.

In conclusion, the Supreme Administrative Court found the cassation complaint unfounded and therefore dismissed it. In agreement with the Municipal Court in Prague, it concluded that the Ministry’s rejection of the application as inadmissible was unlawful and called on the Ministry to cease repeatedly acting contrary to the court’s settled jurisprudence. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the Ministry must admit and examine applications for temporary protection even where the applicant has previously held temporary protection in another Member State. It instructed the Ministry to verify whether the earlier temporary protection had in fact been granted and whether it remained valid; if it did, the Ministry must – in line with judgment No 1 Azs 174/2024‑42 – assess whether issuing temporary protection in Czechia would cause the earlier status to lapse, and if not, provide the applicant with reasonable time to end the earlier status in the other Member State.