A.B., a national of Afghanistan, applied for international protection in Slovakia on 10 April 2025 through his legal guardian from the Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, as he was an unaccompanied minor. He claimed that members of the Taliban had repeatedly taken him to their base in early 2025 and that he had been released after his family appealed to the local council of elders. He stated that Taliban members had come back after he had already left the country, threatened his parents and subsequently took his 15‑year‑old brother, who was later returned home following similar intervention with the council of elders. The applicant cited fear for his life in case of return to Afghanistan.

On 20 August 2025, the Ministry of the Interior (the Ministry) denied refugee protection but granted subsidiary protection for one year. Referring to the EUAA Afghanistan – Country Focus: Country of Origin Information Report (November 2024) and other country‑of‑origin information materials, the Ministry held that following their takeover of Afghanistan, the Taliban had taken formal steps to prevent the recruitment of minors, including issuing a 2022 decree prohibiting the practice. It held that while isolated cases of recruitment continued, these were not systemic and that the Taliban generally sought ideologically aligned supporters rather than unwilling recruits. The Ministry found the applicant’s fear not well‑founded and concluded that the attempts to recruit him did not constitute persecution motivated by a protected ground within the meaning of the Asylum Act. The applicant challenged the decision before the Administrative Court in Košice, adding that his and his family’s refusal to comply with Taliban recruitment attempts constituted an expression of his disagreement with the movement.

The Administrative Court in Košice found the applicant’s statements coherent, credible and consistent with publicly available country‑of‑origin information. It referred to the EUAA Afghanistan – Country Focus: Country of Origin Information Report (November 2024) and other sources which document serious abuses against boys recruited by the Taliban, including sexual violence, and indicate that according to some sources, forced and underage recruitment continued despite formal prohibitions.

In its reasoning, the court noted that under Article 4(5) of the recast Qualification Directive (recast QD), aspects of an applicant’s statements that are not supported by documentary or other evidence do not require confirmation when certain conditions are met. It emphasised that in situations of evidentiary uncertainty (lack of documentary evidence), it is the responsibility of the administrative authority to verify or refute the applicant’s account, and concluded that in the present case the Ministry had not refuted the credibility of the applicant’s statements. In this context, the court noted that when a violation of fundamental rights cannot be ruled out, whether it already occurred or it is plausible in the future, the benefit-of-the-doubt principle must be applied in favour of the applicant.

The court also held that the Ministry failed to duly consider that the Taliban had taken the applicant on multiple occasions, threatened his parents and had taken his younger brother. The Ministry’s conclusion that severe harm had not yet occurred and was unlikely to occur in the future did not meet the requirement to assess the asylum application prospectively, meaning that what must be examined is whether the applicant’s fear of persecution or the risk of serious harm is justified in the future. It also noted that a well‑founded fear suffices even where the applicant has not yet suffered actual harm.

Additionally, the court asserted that the Ministry had not properly assessed the threat arising from the applicant’s and his family’s refusal to comply with Taliban recruitment efforts. With reference to Article 10 of the recast QD, it noted that in assessing a well‑founded fear of persecution, it is not decisive whether the applicant had indeed been politically active, but whether political opinion may be imputed to him by the Taliban. Finally, the court referred to the CJEU judgment in A. and S. v Secretary of State for Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie) (C-550/16, 12 April 2018), which clarifies that when an applicant enters the Member State and lodges an asylum request as a minor, more favourable conditions continue to apply and the case must be assessed as if the applicant were still a minor. This was relevant in the present case, given that the Ministry had argued that as the applicant was soon to reach adulthood, the risk of persecution linked to child recruitment would become outdated.

In conclusion, the Administrative Court in Košice upheld the appeal, annulled the Ministry’s decision denying refugee protection, and returned the case for further proceedings. It instructed the Ministry to reassess the applicant’s eligibility for asylum, examining whether a risk of harm exists toward the applicant who repeatedly refused to join the Taliban, and with consideration for his status as a minor.