The applicants are Afghan nationals, unaccompanied minors who sought international protection in Greece and were accommodated at the Samos Reception and Identification Centre (“the Samos RIC”) during various periods between February 2019 and May 2020.

They claimed a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of their reception conditions either in a makeshift camp or in the safe zone, as unaccompanied minors in overcrowded conditions, with inadequate sanitation, without age appropriate accommodation, also after the ECtHR indicated interim measures to the Greek Government to transfer them to suitable accommodation for unaccompanied minors, to secure access to medical treatment, to appoint a guardian and to prioritise the assessment of their vulnerability.

The court reminded that the general principles concerning the burden and standard of proof in asylum-related proceedings, including for vulnerable applicants and allegations of ill-treatment were already summarised in N.D. and N.T. v Spain [GC] (Nos 8675/15 and 8697/15, 13 February 2020, par 85). The court noted that the initial burden of proof rests with the party which makes that allegation (affirmanti incumbit probatio), although a strict application of this principle is not always appropriate. The court stressed that when “the State alone has access to information capable of corroborating or refuting the applicant’s allegations, but fails to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation in respect of events lying wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of its authorities, the court may draw inferences that are unfavourable to that Government. Before doing so, there must nonetheless be sufficiently concordant elements supporting the applicant’s account”.

Furthermore, it also noted that the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegations made and the Convention right at stake.

The court also added that, in asylum cases, when the core of an applicant’s complaint is about the absence of individual identification or personalised treatment by the authorities, the court must verify whether the applicant has provided prima facie evidence supporting their version of events and once this is shown, the burden of proof shifts to the Government (N.D. and N.T. v. Spain; Shahzad v. Hungary, No 12625/17, 8 July 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, Nos 15670/18 and 43115/18, 18 November 2021; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, Nos 55798/16 and 4 others, 5 April 2022; and M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, No 39090/20, 8 October 2024). In general however, applicants must provide a detailed, specific and consistent account of the relevant events, and evidence reasonably expected from them in the circumstances, or they must give a satisfactory explanation for not being able to provide such evidence. The court recognised that such particular evidential difficulties may arise in cases concerning alleged ill-treatment, conditions of detention or deficiencies in reception facilities as the events take place under the exclusive control of the authorities.

Moreover, the standard of proof applied is “proof beyond reasonable doubt”, which may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.

The court noted that the factual disagreement between the parties in the present case concerned the adequacy and timeliness of the measures taken by the authorities to provide appropriate reception conditions, and the applicants’ living situation in and around the RIC prior to their transfer. Furthermore, the applicants had provided a coherent, detailed and mutually consistent account of their situation in Samos, which was corroborated by documents, the authorities’ records, by numerous independent reports from international and national bodies describing similar conditions at the Samos RIC during the relevant period. The Government did not contest the applicants’ identity, age or presence in the RIC but claimed that shortcomings in accommodation were due to temporary overcrowding and logistical constraints, not to administrative inaction. Thus, the court considered that the burden shifted to the Government, since the applicants had provided prima facie evidence of prolonged exposure to conditions incompatible with their age and vulnerability as unaccompanied minors. In the absence of evidence from the Government showing that it had adopted timely and adequate measures to ensure living conditions compatible with Article 3 of the Convention, the court accepted the applicants’ account.

The court then emphasised that vulnerable persons, particularly unaccompanied minors, require special protection, so that for instance the extreme vulnerability of a child takes precedence over considerations of the child’s status under immigration law. The court reminded that any failure to provide for their basic needs, material, physical or emotional, may in itself constitute degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 and that given Article’s 3 absolute nature, an increasing influx of migrants and asylum seekers does not absolve a state from its obligations under Article 3.

The court cited its previous case law (T.A. and Others v. Greece [Committee], No 15293/20, 3 October 2024; A.D. v. Greece [Committee], No 55363/19, 4 April 2023; and A.R. and Others v. Greece [Committee], No 59841/19, 18 April 2024) in which it had concluded that “the material conditions in and around the Samos RIC were characterised by persistent overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and exposure to health and safety risks.” Thus, the court concluded that in the present case the situation was the same as described in its previous judgments.

The court further observed that the applicants remained in or around the Samos RIC (the makeshift camp or the safe zone) from 4 to 11 months after being identified or recognised as unaccompanied minors in overcrowded conditions, with inadequate sanitation and in the absence of age appropriate accommodation, also after the interim measures indicated by the ECtHR to transfer them to suitable accommodation for unaccompanied minors, to secure access to medical treatment, to appoint a guardian and to prioritise the assessment of the vulnerability. It also noted that the government indeed took measures to decrease overcrowding and improve the overall system, but it did not immediately address the situation of minors in the overcrowded island facilities and the material conditions in the Samos RIC remained substantially unchanged below the standards required by Article 3 of the Convention.

The court confirmed that the facilities in and around the Samos RIC at the time of the facts in this case “were manifestly insufficient to meet the basic needs of unaccompanied minors, including access to hygiene, nutrition, medical and psychosocial care, effective guardianship, and protection from violence or exploitation”. Thus, the court concluded that the reception conditions amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.