An Iranian applicant with Kurdish ethnicity applied for international protection on 30 October 2015. His application was rejected due to serious grounds for considering that he was guilty of a serious non-political crime, in accordance with Section 31 (1)(b) of the Immigration Act, by carrying out informant assignments for a political party, which led to the death of another person, ‘B'. Subsequent appeals before the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE) were dismissed, as the board considered that the applicant has made a significant contribution to the murder through his act of complicity. The applicant made a further appeal before the Oslo District Court, which was also dismissed on 8 February 2022. The applicant appealed before the Borgarting Court of Appeal.
The court set out the applicable legal framework and the criteria which must be fulfilled for the exclusion grounds to be applied, including the subjective element of intent. It noted that international criminal law, particularly Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, requires that acts be committed with ‘intent and knowledge'. The court also referred to Norwegian criminal law which recognises three forms of intent under section 22 of the Penal Code: direct intent, where the act is committed deliberately; probable intent, where the perpetrator is aware that the act will certainly or most likely fulfil the offence; and possible intent (dolus eventualis), where the person considers the criminal consequence possible but chooses to act despite that possibility. It elaborated that probable intent exists when the perpetrator regards the criminal consequence as the most likely outcome, although it noted that courts should be cautious about finding probable intent for very serious offences when the probability is close to 50 percent. As regards possible intent, it noted that this requires more than mere awareness of risk; the person must consciously accept the potential consequence and proceed regardless. If the person only recognises the possibility without accepting it, the conduct amounts at most to conscious negligence.
The court observed that it is uncertain whether possible intent is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of intent for exclusion under section 31(1)(b), given that Article 30 of the Rome Statute requires both intent and knowledge. However, the court found it unnecessary to resolve this question in the present case because it considered that the applicant's conduct could not be proven to involve any form of intent.
Applying the legal framework to the present case, the court found that it could not be assumed that the applicant had intentionally contributed to the murder of B. The court also held that complicity in the attempt to arrest B could not be regarded as complicity in a serious crime.
The court addressed the requirement of intent under section 31(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, noting that it was uncertain whether ‘possible intent' (dolus eventualis) would satisfy the requirement. However, even if that lower threshold applied and the evidentiary standard were the ordinary balance of probabilities, the court held that such intent had not been proven. Accordingly, the court found that UNE had made an incorrect assessment of the evidence in concluding that A intentionally contributed to B's murder.
The court acknowledged that the applicant had provided information to the political party about B's whereabouts, but it determined that his purpose in doing so was not to facilitate B's killing. Therefore, direct intent to kill could not be established. The relevant question was instead whether he acted with probable intent or possible intent to murder when he provided the information. The court observed that UNE's earlier decisions seemed to rely on possible intent, whereas the final decision relied on probable intent. However, UNE's analysis focused mainly on whether the applicant considered the killing possible, rather than whether he consciously accepted that outcome when deciding to provide the information. The court stated that UNE's decision appeared to be based on a misunderstanding of the requirement of intent.
UNE had stated that the applicant “should have knowledge” of the political party's practices and reaction patterns toward alleged informants, and that he therefore should have foreseen that B might be exposed to serious abuse if arrested. However, based on this reasoning, the court stated that it was unclear whether UNE's assessment assumed that negligence could be sufficient to establish intent.
The applicant had consistently maintained that when he provided the information, he did not believe that the political party intended to kill B. Instead, he thought they would contact B to talk to him or warn him. He explained that in 2006–2007 he had previously provided similar information about suspected informants without anyone being harmed. According to the applicant, he only learned that B had been shot after the incident occurred, which surprised and frightened him. The court found it unclear whether UNE had based its conclusion on the assumption that the applicant actually knew that the political party intended to kill B. UNE had referred to statements from his asylum interviews indicating that he understood the mission against B to involve revenge and cited a transcript suggesting that the party had returned “to abduct B and kill him”. However, the applicant's counsel argued that the interpreter's translation had been incorrectly recorded in the interview minutes. The correct statement, according to the interpreter, was that the mission was to abduct B but that B resisted and was killed during the confrontation. The state did not challenge this correction.
The court considered it reasonable to interpret the applicant's statement as describing events he learned about after B's death rather than knowledge he possessed beforehand. Moreover, there was no other evidence supporting the conclusion that he knew the political party might kill B when he provided the information. Consequently, the court held that it could not be established, on the balance of probabilities, that A was positively aware that the party might kill B.
UNE and the state had nevertheless argued that the applicant possessed intent even without specific knowledge of a planned killing, pointing to his earlier cooperation with the political party and to country information indicating that the party had been responsible for attacks and assassinations of collaborators. The court examined whether this could establish possible intent. It stated that such an assessment requires considering several factors: whether the political party had previously killed collaborators before 2012 (when the applicant provided the information), whether the applicant knew about such actions, whether he regarded it as possible that B would be killed, and whether he nonetheless chose to provide the information accepting that possibility.
Based on country or origin information, the court acknowledged that the political party had occasionally killed collaborators. However, these incidents appeared limited, as the party generally sought to avoid being associated with attacks on civilians and sometimes used less severe methods such as warnings. The court therefore found that UNE had drawn far-reaching conclusions from a weak factual basis. Even if many Kurds in northern Iran might know that the party had executed collaborators, the court held that it had not been demonstrated that the applicant possessed such knowledge. Furthermore, the applicant had explained that he understood the assignment to involve B's arrest. The fact that B was ultimately killed resulted from B opening fire on the party members, which triggered a fatal response. This circumstance did not indicate that the party had intended to capture and kill B, nor did it show that the applicant considered such an outcome possible. There was also little evidence that the applicant foresaw the possibility that B might open fire and be killed in a retaliatory exchange.
As the court found that the applicant did not consider it possible that B would be killed, it concluded that he could not have had either possible intent or probable intent. As a result, it was unnecessary to consider whether the applicant had facilitated an opportunity for murder. UNE had also stated that his actions constituted complicity in murder or grievous bodily harm, but the court held that the evidence likewise failed to show that he believed it possible that the political party would arrest B in order to inflict serious bodily harm.
The state had also argued that even the arrest itself would constitute a serious crime under section 31(1)(b) of the Immigration Act. The court rejected this argument. It reasoned that an unlawful arrest would amount to deprivation of liberty under section 254 of the Norwegian Penal Code, which carries a maximum penalty of a fine or up to three years' imprisonment. Although aggravated deprivation of liberty under section 255 can carry up to ten years' imprisonment, such aggravation depends on factors such as duration, extraordinary suffering, death, or significant bodily harm. The court found no basis for assuming that the applicant considered it possible that any deprivation of liberty would be aggravated in this manner when he provided the information.
The court also emphasised that the concept of a serious crime in the Immigration Act refers to offences strongly condemned by society and normally punished with long prison sentences. Legislative materials and UNHCR guidelines cite crimes such as murder, rape, and armed robbery as examples. In the court's view, ordinary deprivation of liberty under section 254 is of a completely different level of seriousness and therefore does not meet the threshold of a serious crime for the purpose of exclusion from refugee protection.
In conclusion, the court held that UNE had erred in determining that the applicant had intentionally contributed to a serious crime. Therefore, UNE's decision was rendered invalid.