On 9 July 2025, the Department of Family, Youth and Social Affairs of the Regional Administration of Madrid requested that the State Administration assume responsibility for asylum-seeking unaccompanied minors who were under the care of the regional child protection services. Following the State Administration’s failure to respond, the regional government petitioned the Supreme Court to adopt interim measures ordering the State Administration to comply, referencing the court’s interim decisions of 25 March 2025 and 4 June 2025. Those earlier decisions, both adopted in proceedings number 22/2025, which were still ongoing, provisionally ordered the State Administration to take charge of asylum-seeking unaccompanied minors then under the care of the Canary Islands’ Regional Administration.

The State Attorney opposed the adoption of interim measures, arguing that the overcrowding situation in the Canary Islands child protection system could not be equated with the situation in Madrid. The State Attorney further contended that the interim request sought to prevent the practical application of recently adopted legislation, namely Royal Decree-Law 2/2025, implemented by Royal Decree 658/2025, which provides for the reallocation of unaccompanied minors from overburdened regional child protection systems to less pressured regions as an exceptional contingency measure.

The Supreme Court recalled its reasoning in the above-mentioned interim measures, noting their relevance to the present case. Referring to the 25 March 2025 decision, the court observed that while the regional government based its request on the State Administration’s exclusive competence in asylum matters under Article 149(1)(2) of the Spanish Constitution, the State Administration relied on the regional governments’ exclusive competence in child protection and the care of unaccompanied minors under Article 148(1)(20). The court emphasized that interim measures are provisional and based on limited findings. Citing the Spanish Constitutional Court in judgment 43/2025, it concluded that neither position was strong enough to exclude the other and that there was an apparent concurrence of competence between the State and the regional administrations.

The Supreme Court further noted that, under EU and national law, including the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, the recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD), the Asylum Act, and the Asylum Reception System Ordinance, applicants for international protection are entitled to social benefits and reception services necessary to ensure that their basic needs are met with dignity. The court highlighted that the Spanish reception system is structured in three phases: initial referral, reception, and a final stage aimed at ensuring the applicant’s autonomy, with a duration of up to eighteen months, crucially extending even after the applicant reaches the age of majority. It noted that vulnerable asylum applicants are entitled to specialized attention for their specific needs, with particular focus on the individualized treatment of children and adolescents. The Supreme Court emphasized that, under the current circumstances, unaccompanied minors were under the exclusive care of the regional child protection services, while the State Administration had not provided resources to ensure their reception rights. Drawing on recital 29 of the recast RCD, the court noted that protection must extend not only to minors who had already submitted asylum applications but also to those who had expressed their intention to apply.

Referring to the 4 June 2025 interim decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that the rights under the RCD and the Asylum Act apply exclusively to asylum-seeking unaccompanied minors. While responsibility in this area overlaps between the State and regional administrations, the court observed that reception conditions were being provided solely by the regional government and that the State Administration, insofar as it bears responsibility, was not assuming its corresponding share. It had neither actively ensured access to reception services under its competence nor implemented effective measures to address deficiencies in the processing of asylum applications, which constitutes a prerequisite for entitlement to reception conditions for asylum applicants.

Finally, the Supreme Court distinguished between the Canary Islands case, involving thousands of unaccompanied minors facing severe overcrowding, and the current Madrid case, concerning 38 to 50 minors, as contended by the parties. It reasoned that the number of minors or the conditions of overcrowding did not affect their entitlement to their rights under EU and domestic law. Invoking the best interests of the child principle, the Supreme Court granted the requested interim measure, requiring the State Administration, within thirty days, to guarantee access to the Asylum Reception System for all minors currently under the care of the child protection services in the Madrid Region who have applied for international protection or have expressed their intention to do so.