On 28 November 2025, the Territorial Commission for the Recognition of International Protection of Caserta declared inadmissible, for lack of new elements, a subsequent application for international protection lodged by a Nigerian national. On 13 December 2025, he appealed, alleging that the accelerated procedure had been unlawfully applied in breach of the mandatory time limits, with the result that the ordinary procedure and its automatic suspensive effect should have applied. He further complained of the failure to assess the current security situation in Nigeria and the deterioration of conditions in Edo State, his area of origin, as reflected in country of origin information (COI) updated to November 2025, which he submitted in support of his claim. On 19 December 2025, the Tribunal of Naples rejected his request to suspend the enforceability of the inadmissibility decision.

On 23 December 2025, the applicant filed an appeal against that decision, raising two grounds. First, he argued that the administration had failed to comply with the time limits laid down in Article 26 of Legislative Decree No. 25/2008, which provides that the period between the lodging of an application for international protection and its formalisation must not exceed three days, extendable to ten days. He maintained that the time elapsed between the expression of his intention to seek protection and the completion of the C3 form could not be regarded as irrelevant, since from that moment it would already have been possible to assess, in abstract terms, whether the conditions for applying the accelerated procedure were met. Second, he contended that the Tribunal of Naples had relied on outdated information (covering the period 2019–2022) regarding the security situation in Nigeria.

The Court of Appeal of Naples found that the first ground of appeal was unfounded. It noted that the accelerated procedure applied in the present case because it fell within Article 29(1)(b) of Legislative Decree No. 25/2008, namely the inadmissibility of a subsequent application for lack of new elements. The court clarified that compliance with the time limits applicable to that accelerated procedure must be assessed with reference to the conduct of the Territorial Commission, which is required to examine the application once it has received the documentation from the Police Headquarters. With regard to the application formalised on 24 November 2025, the Territorial Commission proceeded within a total of five days to both interview the applicant (27 November 2025) and adopt its decision (28 November 2025, including the formal determination applying the accelerated procedure). Accordingly, the court found no breach of the applicable time limits. The court further held that, even assuming the period preceding the formalisation of the application should be taken into account, as argued by the applicant, the time elapsed was not sufficiently significant to affect the lawfulness of the procedure conducted within the statutory time limits. The intention to lodge the subsequent application had been communicated by the applicant’s counsel via certified email to the Police Headquarters of Taranto on 10 June 2025, while the interview leading to the completion of the C3 form was scheduled for 24 November 2025.

The court upheld the second ground of appeal as well founded. It noted that Nigeria was not included among the safe countries of origin at the time of the judgment. The court considered the most recent COI, including that submitted by the applicant, which showed that, following the election of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in 2023, Nigeria in 2024 was characterised not only by an economic crisis but also by threats to freedom of expression and persistent insecurity. This included renewed clashes between herders and farmers in the first half of 2025, an increase in criminal activity in the Niger Delta, the presence of violent gangs in the South-South and South-West regions, and continuing Biafran secessionist activity in the South-East, as well as shortcomings in the protection of fundamental rights. Moreover, the court affirmed that, in matters of international protection, once the applicant has discharged his duty of substantiation, the duty of investigative cooperation requires the judge to assess the actual risk of serious harm upon return, even in the case of a subsequent application. A relevant new element may consist of a supervening situation of conflict in the country of origin which, irrespective of the existence of an individualised risk, may expose the applicant to danger upon return. The court clarified that this assessment must be carried out even where the applicant’s account has been found not credible. It also specified that such assessment must be conducted in light of the current situation, it being irrelevant that the risk arose after the applicant’s departure.

The court therefore upheld the appeal and, setting aside the decree of the Tribunal of Naples, suspended the enforceability of the refusal decision adopted by the Territorial Commission of Caserta.

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