A Tunisian national entered Belgium in 2022 and requested international protection on 2 April 2025, after the Belgian authorities had attempted to return him to Tunisia on 7 March and 1 April 2025. On 30 April 2025, the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless (CGRS) informed him that his personal interview would be conducted by videoconference, including information on the system used and the security measures ensuring appropriate confidentiality. On 7 May 2025, the applicant’s lawyer submitted a written objection to the holding of the interview remotely. The lawyer referred to the pending constitutional review initiated following a preliminary ruling of the Council of State in Applicants v Belgian State represented by the State Secretary for Asylum and Migration (No 262 637, 18 March 2025) concerning the constitutionality of videoconference interviews regulated by the Royal Decree of 26 November 2021 amending the Royal Decree of 11 July 2003.  On 8 May 2025, the CGRS responded in writing to the objection and proceeded with the personal interview by videoconference. During the interview, the applicant’s lawyer reiterated the objection to the holding of the interview remotely. The applicant claimed that, if returned to Tunisia, he would have problems with his father because of his own alcohol consumption. On 15 May 2025, the CGRS rejected the application, noting that the applicant had previously resided in Italy and France without seeking international protection and that there were serious indications of abuse of the asylum procedure with a view to delaying removal. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision before the Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL) on 26 May 2025.

The CALL agreed with the CGRS that, where a question has been referred to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling, the provision concerned may continue to be applied until a judgment is delivered. It held that a purely theoretical argument, such as that advanced by the applicant, is insufficient and that the applicant must demonstrate his specific interest and the concrete disadvantage allegedly arising from the conduct of a remote interview. The CALL further clarified that the principle of remote interviews as such is not under review before the Constitutional Court and noted that the substantive regulatory framework established by Royal Decree had received a positive opinion from both the Council of State and the Data Protection Authority.

The CALL held that the CGRS had sufficiently addressed the applicant’s objections by explaining the appropriate technical and organisational measures in place to ensure that remote interviews conducted via Microsoft Teams guarantee confidentiality in accordance with the GDPR and Article 13(1) of the Royal Decree of 11 July 2003. In particular, the CALL noted the CGRS’s detailed explanations that the Teams accounts used cannot be traced back to an applicant, that data transmitted during the interview are illegible to third parties not involved in the procedure, and that personal data exchanged are therefore not accessible to Microsoft. It further observed that the CGRS explained how end-to-end encryption (E2EE) secures the audiovisual connection between the protection officer and the interpreter, on the one hand, and the applicant and legal counsel, on the other, making access to the content of communications by any external body or person impossible and thus ensuring compliance with GDPR requirements. The CGRS also clarified that, since E2EE does not conceal metadata, additional safeguards are applied through the use of depersonalised and anonymous Teams accounts that cannot be traced back to the applicant, and that interviews are conducted on laptops specifically dedicated to remote interviews and used exclusively for that purpose. The CALL further noted that the CGRS had carried out a data protection impact assessment in accordance with Article 35 of the GDPR, concluding that no high risk to applicants’ rights existed provided that additional measures, such as E2EE with key management by the CGRS, were implemented. The CALL reiterated that the applicant could lodge a complaint with the Data Protection Authority if he considered that his data-protection rights had been infringed, and that the CGRS had correctly informed him of this possibility. On this basis, it concluded that the applicant’s objections had been adequately answered and that sufficient reasons had been provided to demonstrate that videoconferencing constituted an appropriate and secure method of communication.

Moreover, the CALL considered that the remote interview complied with the requirements of Articles 13 and 15 of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive and was procedurally fair. It noted that the applicant was assisted by a lawyer and by an interpreter in Arabic, as requested, who was present at the CGRS office with the protection officer. At the outset of the interview, the protection officer clearly explained how it would be conducted, informed the applicant that appropriate additional data-protection measures were in place, and instructed him to immediately report any technical problems; the applicant confirmed that there were no technical issues and raised no comments or questions regarding the videoconference. The CALL further observed that no technical interruptions occurred during the interview and that the applicant generally understood the questions; where he did not, they were reformulated.  In this context, it held that the applicant failed to demonstrate that he was unable to make certain statements, that his personal circumstances or the specificity of his asylum claim rendered a remote interview inappropriate, or that the videoconference format undermined the correct understanding of non-verbal communication, emotional content, or nuance.  The CALL also rejected the claim that the remote interview weakened the applicant’s reliability or personal character, as these allegations were based on general assertions and were not supported by concrete examples.

The CALL also dismissed as unsubstantiated the claim that the applicant had a vulnerability rendering a videoconference interview inappropriate. It observed that the appeal contained no clear or specific explanation of the alleged vulnerability, nor any concrete or objective evidence showing why such a vulnerability would prevent the interview from being conducted remotely. The CALL further clarified that the mere fact that the applicant was held in a closed centre was not, in itself, sufficient to establish a vulnerability making a videoconference interview unsuitable. It found no indication that the applicant was unable to participate effectively in the procedure, including in the personal interview conducted by videoconference.

The CALL then addressed the applicant’s complaint that the personal interview had been conducted in English as an intermediate language, which was neither the language of the proceedings nor his mother tongue. It noted that, pursuant to Article 51/4 of the Aliens Act, the applicant had been formally informed that the asylum procedure would be conducted in Dutch and that all official documents were drafted in Dutch. The CALL clarified that Article 51/4 governs the language of the procedure and of the decisions, not the spoken language used during the personal interview. Referring to the case law of the Council of State, the CALL recalled that the law does not require interpretation to be provided directly into the procedural language, nor that the examination of the application be conducted exclusively in Dutch. A protection officer may use another language during the interview and may act as interpreter if proficient in that language, without having to prove such proficiency. The CALL therefore concluded that the use of another language during the personal interview does not in itself constitute a breach of Article 51/4. The CALL acknowledged that the use of an intermediate language may entail structural interpretation difficulties. However, it found that the applicant had not demonstrated in concrete terms whether or how his statements had been misunderstood as a result of double translation, nor how any such shortcomings could have negatively affected the assessment of his application. It further noted that, during the interview, the applicant did not raise objections regarding the interpreter or the manner of interpretation. In conclusion, the CALL held that, in the circumstances of the case, the combined use of videoconferencing, multiple languages, and the absence of physical presence did not amount to a serious impediment to the applicant’s right to a fair, comprehensive, and individually conducted interview

As regards the substance of the asylum claim, CALL concurred with the CGRS that the applicant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution. It found that the CGRS had duly taken into account the applicant’s alleged fears and his individual circumstances in the assessment of the application. The CALL also rejected the applicant’s assertion of a “personal and social vulnerability,” finding that he had provided no elements capable of substantiating such a vulnerability or of showing that it could justify the grant of international protection. It observed that the applicant is a middle-aged man with no serious documented health problems, who is educated, has worked both in Tunisia and in Europe, and has travelled within Europe, demonstrating a sufficient degree of self-reliance. The CALL further noted that, beyond the general claim of being “socially uprooted,” the applicant had produced no concrete evidence that he would be unable to rebuild his life in Tunisia, even in the absence of contact with or support from his father, family, or any other social network. It held that he had not shown whether, or why, a return to Tunisia would expose him to such serious adjustment difficulties that he could no longer re-establish himself there.

Conclusively the CALL found no reasons to annul the contested decision, confirmed the refusal of international protection and dismissed the appeal.