B.A.M., a Syrian national, applied for international protection in Cyprus. By decision of 20 May 2020, the Asylum Service rejected the applicant's request for refugee status under Article 3 of the Refugee Law, but it acknowledged that the general situation in Syria exposed civilians to indiscriminate violence. On that basis, the Asylum Service initially found that the conditions for subsidiary protection under Article 19(2)(c) of the Refugee Law were met. However, the applicant was simultaneously excluded from subsidiary protection pursuant to Article 5(2)(d) of the Refugee Law, on grounds that classified information allegedly demonstrated that he constituted a danger to Cypriot society and the security of the Republic. The exclusion was linked to his admitted short-term involvement as a tractor driver for a civil defence unit associated with the armed group Ahrar al-Sham, as well as police intelligence suggesting possible links to extremist organisations. The applicant challenged the exclusion before the International Protection Administrative Court (IPAC), which annulled the exclusion decision and held that subsidiary protection should be granted. The Republic of Cyprus, through Asylum Service and Deputy Director of the Population Registry and Immigration Department appealed the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal.
The Administrative Court of Appeal examined whether the first-instance court had correctly assessed the applicability of the exclusion clauses under Article 5(2) of the Refugee Laws. It noted that the internal report of the Asylum Service had relied on both Article 5(2)(a), relating to crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity, and Article 5(2)(d), relating to danger to society or national security. The Court of Appeal agreed that the applicant's limited activities as a tractor driver in a civil defence context in Syria were insufficient, in themselves, to establish individual criminal responsibility for war crimes under Article 5(2)(a). However, it found that the first-instance court had inadequately reasoned its rejection of the exclusion under Article 5(2)(d). In particular, the lower court had failed to engage in a detailed analysis of the classified police and intelligence material relied upon by the Asylum Service, including allegations of links to terrorist organisations, contacts found on the applicant's phone which had links to terrorist organisations, and assessments by national security authorities. The Court of Appeal held that merely stating that no evidence of danger existed was insufficient, and that the lower court was required to assess and weigh each element relied upon by the administration and to explain why, taken individually or cumulatively, they did not justify exclusion.
In conclusion, the Administrative Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, annulled the judgment of the IPAC, and referred the case back to it for reconsideration. It held that the exclusion issue under Article 5(2)(d) of the Refugee Law had not been properly examined and required a fully reasoned assessment.