A Burundian national with her three minor children, two Burundian and one Norwegian citizen, applied for international protection in Croatia. The applicant alleged persecution based on her political opinions, including participation in protests against the third presidential term in Burundi, her father's death allegedly caused by a grenade explosion in 2015, the kidnapping of her brother, and a 2-day detention during protests.  She further claimed that, as a woman and single mother, she belonged to a social group exposed to gender-based violence, and that after several years in Rwanda, she lived in hiding upon her return to Burundi. The Ministry of Interior rejected the application for international protection finding her account inconsistent and issued a return decision imposing an eight-day voluntary-departure period. The applicant appealed against this decision before the Administrative Court in Zagreb, alleging that the Ministry of the Interior did not conduct a detailed analysis of the human rights situation of women and returnees in Burundi and did not use relevant country of origin information (COI). 

The Administrative Court in Zagreb held that the applicant’s account was not sufficiently consistent or supported by evidence to establish a well-founded fear of persecution under Article 20 of the Law on International and Temporary Protection (LITP). It also held that there was no individualised link between alleged harm and the grounds for persecution set out in Article 22 of the LITP. It held that contradictions regarding key elements—such as the timing of the father’s death, the brother’s disappearance, and the length of time spent in Rwanda—undermined the credibility of her account. It considered her statements general, partially inconsistent, and unsupported by evidence. The court also recalled that being a single mother or woman did not in itself constitute a sufficient basis for international protection without demonstrating and individualised risk of gender-based violence. It pointed out that according to COI, while Burundi was facing gender inequality and occasional gender-based violence, there was no systematic pattern of persecution of women as a social group that would render every woman at risk. Specifically, it found that the applicant did not prove that in her particular case there was an individualised threat, either from state authorities or from non-state actors. 

The court held that she did not prove that by returning she would be exposed to torture, inhumane and degrading treatment or a serious individual threat to her life due to general violence under Article 21 of the LITPT he court stated that according to reports of UNHCR, EUAA and Human Rights Watch, to which the Ministry of the Interior referred, although there were authoritarian practices in Burundi and individual cases of repression against political opposition, there was no armed conflict or general state of violence that would in itself justify the granting of subsidiary protection.  

Concerning the return measure, the court disagreed with the Ministry’s assessment that the applicant was “an adult in good health who is not considered a vulnerable person,” noting that the case file indicated clear vulnerability factors such as pregnancy, minor children, and the husband and father of the third child living and working in Sweden. The court emphasised that Article 182(1) of the Aliens Act requires authorities to assess the best interests of the child and family circumstances through an individualized and reasoned proportionality assessment when deciding on a return measure. It held that the eight-day deadline—set at the legal minimum—was inadequately reasoned and failed to demonstrate that the Ministry had considered the applicant’s situation as a pregnant woman with three minor children and without personal documents. The court found this contrary to the proportionality principle in Article 5 of the General Administrative Procedure Act and to the purpose of Article 184(3) of the Aliens Act. The court also found that the return order could not apply to the child holding Norwegian citizenship, since the relevant Aliens Act provisions concern third-country nationals and therefore do not apply to citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA), rendering that part of the order unlawful 

The court upheld the decision of the Ministry of the Interior confirming that the applicant did not meet the criteria for refugee status or subsidiary protection. However, it partially annulled the decision regarding the return order.