A., a Colombian national, applied for international protection in Luxembourg on 27 June 2025 on behalf of herself and her two minor children. A EURODAC search revealed that she had previously sought asylum in France on 23 October 2024, and held a valid asylum seeker’s certificate there. France initially rejected Luxembourg’s take-back request under Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation but accepted responsibility on 12 August 2025 following clarification that the request concerned only the applicant and her children. On 30 September 2025, the Minister for Home Affairs issued a transfer decision to France pursuant to Article 28(1) of the 2015 Asylum Law and Article 18(1)(d) Dublin III, accompanied by an order assigning the family to a return facility. The applicant challenged the transfer before the Administrative Tribunal, alleging lack of motivation, misapplication of the Dublin III Regulation as the French National Court of Asylum had issued a final decision rejecting her application, systemic deficiencies in France, violation of the best interests of the child, and failure to consider humanitarian grounds linked to her psychological state and interrupted treatment.

The tribunal first addressed the claims on the formal legality of the decision, confirming that the Minister had provided sufficient reasoning. It held that the Minister identified France as the responsible State and addressed the applicant’s health allegations, procedural history, and the principle of mutual trust. It rejected the applicant’s argument that France could not be responsible because her asylum application there had been definitively rejected, holding that Article 18(1)(d) applies precisely where a prior application has been rejected and that the Dublin III Regulation prevents multiple, successive claims in different Member States. The tribunal also dismissed reliance on Article 19(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, as the applicant had not demonstrated that she had left EU territory for more than three months, which might otherwise have terminated France’s responsibility.

Regarding the existence of systemic deficiencies under Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, the applicant held that reception conditions for rejected applicants in France were deficient, since they were deprived of accommodation, financial assistance and medical care. Citing CJEU jurisprudence in C.K. and Others v Republic of Slovenia (Republika Slovenija) (C-578/16 PPU, 16 February 2017) and Abubacarr Jawo v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C‑163/17, 19 March 2019), the tribunal noted that deficiencies must reach a particularly high level of seriousness amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The tribunal found no evidence that conditions in France amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 4 of the EU Charter or Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). General assertions about inadequate reception conditions and NGO reports, were deemed insufficient, particularly since the applicant herself had previously been accommodated in a French reception centre and had accessed psychological care there. As regards health concerns, the tribunal considered that the medical documents submitted showed only that the applicant had received psychological support, without indicating a risk of a serious and irreversible deterioration of health that could, under Article 4 of the EU Charter, prevent her transfer. The tribunal held that any continuity of care could be ensured in France.

Claims relating to the best interests of the children under Article 6 of the Dublin III Regulation, Article 24 of the EU Charter and Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child were also rejected, as nothing indicated that the transfer would expose the children to harm or prevent them from continuing schooling or receiving psychological follow-up.

Finally, the tribunal found that the Minister had not erred in declining to apply the discretionary sovereignty clause under Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, noting that its use is optional and that no exceptional circumstances justified its application.

In conclusion, the Administrative Tribunal dismissed the appeal and upheld the transfer to France, finding no procedural, legal, or humanitarian grounds to justify the application of Article 18(1)(d) Dublin III.