According to the summary provided by the EUAA Courts and Tribunals Network:
"The applicant is an Egyptian national who challenged the decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) excluding him from eligibility for subsidiary protection due to his conviction in absentia in Egypt in September 2020 for assault and consequent 5 years' imprisonment, which constituted a serious reason for considering that he had committed a serious crime. The serious crime was said to be that the applicant (then aged 21) was convicted for having hit a 16 year old boy in the face, causing him to fall to the ground and suffer a gash to his head requiring 12 stiches. The applicant had “given a hand” to his cousin by engaging in a fight with two 16 year old boys. The applicant's cousin was armed during the attack. The applicant arrived in the State in May 2022, and made a claim for International Protection on the basis that if he was returned to Egypt, he would face persecution (via revenge attack from the boys' families) and a real risk of suffering serious harm because he had been sentenced to imprisonment for assault.
The applicant challenged this decision on the grounds that the Tribunal failed to take relevant considerations into account and to consider the significance of its own finding that the imprisonment of the applicant in Egypt would constitute degrading and inhuman punishment and/or that the applicant would be at risk of serious harm by reason of his imprisonment. The International Protection Office (IPO) recommended that the applicant be refused refugee status and subsidiary declaration. The Tribunal affirmed this recommendation.
The Tribunal decided that the applicant's assault was a serious crime, which excluded the applicant from eligibility for subsidiary protection under section 12(1) (b) of the 2015 Act. Bradley J. explored these “exclusions” provisions and their provenance from Article 1F of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and Chapter V of the Qualification Directive. Article 17 of the Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) prescribes the four circumstances where a person is excluded from being eligible for subsidiary protection, including where a person “has committed a serious crime”. Bradley J. referenced the CJEU's findings in Case C-369/17 Shajin Ahmed that these exception provisions in the Qualification Directive must be interpreted strictly and narrowly.
The applicant posited that he had a well-founded fear of returning to his country of origin, namely fearing a revenge attack and going to prison. The Tribunal had found that the conviction and sentence of the applicant could not be considered to be either discriminatory or disproportionate. The Tribunal also found that the Egyptian police are willing to investigate and prosecute cases of assault, while also recognising the generally poor level of prison conditions throughout Egypt.
Bradley J. found that a decision-making body, before applying exclusion provisions, must undertake an individual assessment of the specific facts within its knowledge, with a view to determining whether there are serious reasons for considering that the acts committed by the person in question, who otherwise satisfies the conditions for refugee status or subsidiary protection, was covered by the grounds for exclusion.
The Court found that the Tribunal's decision met the required standard of proof and had appropriately strictly interpreted the exclusion provisions. In reviewing whether there were serious reasons for considering whether an applicant had committed a serious crime, the Court referenced the CJEU's rationale of factors to examine: the nature of the act at issue, the consequences of that act, the form of procedure used to prosecute the crime, the nature of the penalty provided and the taking into account of whether most jurisdictions also classify the act at issue as a serious crime. The Tribunal had appropriately addressed and assessed each of these factors in their decision.
Ultimately the Court found that the applicant had failed to establish any grounds upon which the Tribunal's decision should be quashed, and relief was refused."