Mr. A.C., a Georgian national born in 1971, entered France legally on 19 March 2023 with his two sons and applied for asylum. Both the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) and the National Court of Asylum (CNDA) rejected his international protection application on 11 October 2023 and 6 February 2024 respectively. Meanwhile, on 24 October 2023 he had applied for a temporary residence permit under Article L. 425-10 of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right to Asylum (CESEDA), invoking the serious medical condition of his minor son B., who suffered from lead poisoning, obesity, hyperinsulinemia, and severe autism. The Prefect of Finistère denied the residence permit and ordered removal on 12 March 2024, also imposing a 1-year entry ban. The applicant appealed to the Rennes Administrative Court, which annulled only the re-entry ban but upheld the rest of the prefect’s decision. Mr. A.C. appealed, arguing a violation of his right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the risk to his son’s health, for whom the interruption of the treatment received in France would have serious consequences and who was also benefitting from educational support.
The court applied Articles L. 425-9 and L. 425-10 CESEDA, which provide for the issuance of residence permits for foreigners whose health or that of a dependent required medical care unavailable in their country. The court noted that these legal articles provide that the decision to issue this residence permit is made by the administrative authority after consultation with a panel of doctors from the medical service of the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII). The court noted that where medical opinions issued by the French OFII indicated that an individual’s state of health did not justify residence on medical grounds, this merely established a presumption. It was thus for the applicants to rebut that presumption, by presenting sufficiently convincing evidence to prove that the absence of treatment in Georgia would result in exceptionally serious health consequences.
The OFII medical board had found that the child required ongoing treatment but that lack of care would not have exceptionally serious effects. The court noted that the medication administered in France was aimed at behavioural regulation, not curative therapy. It observed that B. had obtained disabled status and some medical and educational support in Georgia, and Mr. A.C. had not demonstrated deficiencies in the Georgian healthcare or educational monitoring system. Therefore, the argument of total absence of care or educational support in Georgia was dismissed.
In addition, the court noted that the fact that the son was entirely dependent on his father was not sufficient to establish that the lack of medical care would have exceptionally serious consequences.
Regarding Article 8 of the ECHR, the court acknowledged the applicant’s family ties in France but emphasized his short residence and ongoing links with relatives in Georgia, including two daughters residing there. As his adult son’s removal had also been confirmed in a parallel case, the family unit’s removal would not violate Article 8 of the ECHR.
In conclusion, the Nantes Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upheld the prefect’s refusal of residence and the obligation to leave France, confirming that the conditions under Article L. 425-9 of CESEDA were not met. It found no breach of the right to private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.