A national of North Macedonia applied for international protection in Luxembourg on 1 July 2025, accompanied by his spouse, their two children, and his spouse’s daughter. A EURODAC search revealed previous asylum applications in Germany (2016 and 2024), the Netherlands (2016 and 2024), France (2017), and Belgium (2025), as well as entries in the Schengen Information System (SIS) concerning a Dutch return decision and a French entry ban.

Following an interview on 7 July 2025 under the Dublin III Regulation, Luxembourg authorities requested the Netherlands to readmit the applicant pursuant to Article 18(1)(b), which was accepted by the Dutch authorities on 15 July 2025. On 13 August 2025, the Minister of Home Affairs decided not to examine the applicant’s asylum application in Luxembourg and ordered his transfer to the Netherlands under Article 28(1) of the Law of 18 December 2015 (2015 Law) and Article 18(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.

The applicant challenged this decision before the Administrative Tribunal on 27 August 2025, seeking the reversal of the ministerial decision of 13 August 2025. He claimed a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), arguing that due to his health conditions (severe depression and memory problems), even in the absence of systemic failures in the Netherlands, his transfer should be suspended, since there were serious grounds for believing that it would lead to a serious and irreversible deterioration of his state of health, as his conditions were chronic and severe, requiring regular and specialised care, and a transfer to the Netherlands would lead to him not having adequate medical care. He cited the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment Savran v Denmark (57467/15, 7 December 2021), stressing that requesting States must ensure that when transferring applicants suffering from serious medical conditions, the transfer should not result in an irreversible health deterioration. He also argued that in the Netherlands, he would be at risk of being returned to his country of origin, thus violating the non-refoulement principle recognized by Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention. He argued that the Ministry should have applied the discretionary clause under Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, given his health situation, his family context and the risk of refoulement. He also claimed a breach of Article 3(1) of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and of Article 24 of the Charter, since the Minister’s decisions to transfer him, his wife and children had failed to consider the best interests of his children. Finally, he argued that his right to good administration under Article 41 of the Charter had been breached, given that the Ministerial decision lacked justification

The Tribunal first addressed the applicant’s procedural claims, holding that the Minister’s decision was duly reasoned in fact and law as required by Article 34(1) of the 2015 Law, and that Article 41 of the Charter applies only to EU institutions.

On the merits, regarding the alleged risks under Article 3 of the ECHR in case of being transferred to the Netherlands, the Tribunal stressed the presumption of compliance with fundamental rights by EU Member States. It referred to the ECtHR judgment Tarakhel v. Switzerland (29217/12, 4 November 2014) and the CJEU judgment C.K. and Others v Republic of Slovenia (Republika Slovenija) (C-578/16, 16 February 2017) recalling that this presumption is not irrebuttable but requires concrete evidence of real risks of inhuman or degrading treatment. The tribunal noted that the applicant had merely asserted that he suffered from depression and memory problems, without providing medical evidence which could lead to the conclusion that his state of health was particularly serious. The tribunal further highlighted that nothing in the file suggested that the applicant’s transfer would have irreparable consequences for his state of health. The court noted that the applicant submitted a certificate of follow-up from 31 July 2025 by a psychiatric nurse which mentioned that the applicant benefited from daily psychological and nursing follow-up since 3 July 2025. However, the court considered this evidence insufficient to conclude that the medical conditions from which the applicant suffered were particularly serious to lead to a risk in case of transfer. The court also noted that the applicant failed to submit any evidence relating to the nature of the medical treatment he was allegedly receiving, and the reasons why he should be taking the medication in question. Regarding the medical prescriptions in the administrative file, the court noted that they were illegible and also insufficient, since the applicant has not submitted to the court any medical certificate providing information on his alleged health problems, nor provided any detailed explanation regarding the medical treatment he was allegedly receiving. Thus, he could not be considered a “seriously ill person” in the terms of Savran v. Denmark. The applicant also failed to substantiate that adequate medical care would be unavailable in the Netherlands. The court added that the applicant had mentioned that he had spent some time in the hospital in the Netherlands, and so, contrary to his statements, it considered that he could benefit from medical care in that country.

Regarding the risk of refoulement to North Macedonia, the court underlined that the contested decision did not involve a return to his country of origin, but only his transfer to the state competent to process his asylum claim. It also noted that the eventual implementation of a final decision refusing protection and returning him to North Macedonia did not in itself violate the principle of non-refoulement.

On family unity and best interests of children, the tribunal dismissed the applicant’s claims in this regard, noting that the wife and children’s cases were subject to separate procedures. As to the applicant’s allegation that the Minister should have used the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of Dublin III Regulation, the tribunal recalled that its application was to be discretionally applied by Luxembourg authorities, and that no exceptional humanitarian grounds had been demonstrated that would compel Luxembourg to assume responsibility.

In conclusion, the tribunal rejected the appeal, confirming the Minister’s decision to transfer the applicant to the Netherlands under Article 28(1) of the 2015 Law and Article 18(1)(d) of Dublin III Regulation.