A Guinean national applied for international protection in Luxembourg on 14 April 2025. A EURODAC search showed previous asylum applications under different identities in Italy (2016), France (2018 and 2022) and Germany (2020). On 5 May 2025, Luxembourg requested France to take charge of the applicant under Article 18(1)(b) of the Dublin III Regulation, and France accepted on 18 May 2025 under Article 18(1)(d).
On 3 June 2025, the Minister of Home Affairs (the Minister) decided not to examine the applicant's asylum claim and ordered his transfer to France on the basis of Article 28(1) of Law of 18 December 2015, on international protection and temporary protection (Law of 18 December 2015) and Article 18(1)(d) of the Dublin III Regulation. On the same day, the Minister ordered the applicant to be placed under house arrest in a return centre for three months, with the obligation to report twice daily to the staff of the centre.
On 20 June 2025, the applicant appealed this decision before the Administrative Tribunal, seeking its reversal. He claimed that this placement in the return centre unjustifiably breached his freedom of movement and would cause him moral and physical harm, due to the need to comply with the internal rules of the facility, which only allowed residents to leave the premises between 8 a.m. and 11 p.m. He held that the Minister was only allowed to place an applicant for international protection in detention if the cumulative conditions of Article 22(2)(d) of the Law of 18 December 2015 were met, which was not the case since there was no significant risk of absconding within the meaning of Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation. He also argued the return house was not a lawful reception structure under the Reception Act of 18 December 2015, since it was a semi-closed centre managed by the detention administration, not a reception facility run by the reception authorities. In consequence, he stated that the systematic placement of applicants subject to Dublin transfers under house arrest was contrary to Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter). Therefore, he requested the reversion of the ministerial order placing him under house arrest and to be granted “normal” reception conditions.
The Tribunal held that Article 22(2)(d) of the Law of 18 December 2015 allows detention during Dublin transfers if there is a significant risk of absconding, and Article 22(3) allows assignment to residence as a less coercive measure where detention is not necessary. Because the applicant had applied for asylum in different EU Member States under several identities and his application was previously rejected in France, the Minister could presume a risk of absconding, but the applicant had also provided sufficient guarantees of representation not to be placed in detention, and to benefit from less coercive measures under Article 22(3), namely house arrest in the return centre. The tribunal held that the applicant had failed to submit concrete evidence rebutting the presumption that he was at risk of absconding. Additionally, in the tribunal's view, the applicant's general statement that house arrest was systematically imposed on applicants who are subject to Dublin transfers was unfounded since the conditions for the use of house arrest were clearly set out in the law.
The Tribunal found that the conditions at the return centre, such as night-time presence or twice-daily check-ins, did not amount to deprivation of liberty and were proportionate with the aim of ensuring the applicant's availability for transfer. Therefore, the tribunal dismissed the applicant's assertions that the contested decision violated his rights under Article 6 of the Charter, since the control measures imposed on him in the return centre did not constitute serious interferences with his privacy or freedom of movement, and were justified by the risk of absconding.
It also found that the contested measure fell outside the scope of the Reception Act, as it served to ensure the applicant's presence for the Dublin transfer rather than to regulate reception conditions.
In conclusion, the Administrative Tribunal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Minister's order of 3 June 2025. The assignment to residence in the return centre was found to be lawful, proportionate, and necessary to prevent absconding during Dublin III transfer proceedings.