A Russian national requested international protection in the Czech Republic on 9 October 2023. He alleged fear of conscription into the Russian army and of being forced to participate in the war against Ukraine. He also alleged a risk of criminal prosecution for evading military service and fear of persecution based on his sexual orientation. The applicant had participated in anti-regime political activities in Russia, including participation in protests in 2018 in support of Alexei Navalny. The applicant stated that his father had discovered his sexual orientation and threatened to report him to the police, which, in his view, were hostile towards sexual minorities. He also expressed fear of being sent to the front lines if conscripted, which would be against his political beliefs.

On 31 January 2025, the Ministry of the Interior rejected his application for international protection. It argued that military service was a basic duty of citizenship recognised by international treaties and therefore did not automatically justified international protection, that the applicant had not participated in activities that would make him a target of the Russian authorities, and that the applicant’s sexual orientation and fear of discrimination were not sufficiently substantiated. The applicant challenged this decision before the Municipal Court in Prague.

The court acknowledged that, in principle, compulsory military service is not a ground for international protection. However, the court noted that there were exceptions, particularly when the military service may involve participation in armed conflict where war crimes or crimes against humanity could be committed. Relying on CJEU judgment EZ v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) (C-238/19), of 19 November 2020, and on Czech case law, the court held that it was not decisive which units or tasks  the applicant would be assigned to perform within the Russian military. Rather, what was essential was whether this activity would be at least indirectly related to the commission of war crimes. The court held that if conscription was connected, even indirectly, with participation in an armed conflict, it may be a reason for granting international protection under Section 12(a) of the Asylum Act.

The court, based on the Information of the OAMP report of 8 July 2024, ‘Security and political situation in the country, Selected issues in the field of civil liberties and human rights’, noted that the Russian army was involved in actions that met the threshold of international crimes, that there was a reasonable likelihood that the applicant would be called up and would be directly or indirectly involved in these acts. Criminal penalties for refusing to serve (including prison terms) were likely in cases of repeated refusal, which applied in this case. The Ministry of the Interior failed to assess the risk of the applicant being deployed to conflict zones, including the so-called "new territories" in Ukraine (e.g. Donetsk, Luhansk), where conscripts, even in support roles, may be exposed to life-threatening danger.

The court found that the Ministry of the Interior downplayed the coercive environment in which Russian conscripts were often pressured or deceived into signing professional contracts. The court referred to additional sources, including the Information of the Finnish Immigration Service ‘Situation of conscripts and mobilization’ of 22 August 2024 and the Information of the OAMP, ‘Basic military service, Participation of conscription soldiers in the war in Ukraine’, of 21 March 2024. According to these reports, threats of imprisonment occurred in cases where conscripts did not wish to deploy to combat zones, and conscripts were unaware of what they were signing with regard to their professional military contracts. The court found that the ministry relied on selective information and failed to determine the specific actions that conscripts may be exposed to when they are forced to sign. It stated that upon further proceedings, the Ministry of the Interior must take into consideration the available country of origin information reports, and must reassess whether the actions of the Russian army qualified as persecution or serious harm under the Czech Asylum Act and EU law.

Additionally, the court noted that the applicant claimed he could face punishment in Russia due to his anti-regime views, which stemmed from his reaction to the detention of the Governor of Region X and his support for opposition leader Alexei Navalny. It held that the applicant had already raised this issue during the administrative proceedings, thereby fulfilling his duty to present relevant facts. The court emphasized that an asylum seeker is not required to prove persecution through evidence beyond his own credible testimony. It held that the ministry was therefore obliged to examine these claims and determine whether they were relevant under the Asylum Act. As the ministry failed to make any factual findings or conduct this assessment, the court found the contested decision to be non- reviewable.

Regarding sexual orientation, the court noted that where a group of people whose members share the same sexual orientation was perceived by the surrounding society as being different, it could constitute a ground for protection as membership of a particular social group under Section 12(b) of the Asylum Act and Article 10 of the recast Qualification Directive (recast QD). The court based its reasoning on the Information of the OAMP, ‘Sexual minorities, Law prohibiting the promotion of X, X. and X., position of state authorities, non-profit organizations, current situation with the exception of the North Caucasus region’ dated 11 September 2024. The court noted that Russia’s legislation was amended in 2022, significantly broadening the scope of repression and criminalizing public expression of sexual identity. It also noted that violence exercised by non-state actors against people because of their sexual orientation was increasing. The court found that the Russian state was unwilling or unable to offer effective protection. It stated that the Ministry of the Interior wrongly dismissed these concerns based on low numbers of prosecutions, which did not reflect the overall climate of societal hostility.

The court criticized the Ministry of the Interior for treating the applicant’s fears in isolation, instead of analysing the intersection of his political beliefs, sexual orientation, and military conscription. It emphasised the need for an intersectional assessment of risk, particularly in light of the absence of specific COI on the treatment of LGBTIQ conscripts. The Ministry was obliged to actively seek and evaluate such information before determining the applicant’s claim.

In conclusion, the court annulled the Ministry of the Interior’s decision for being inadequately reasoned and for failing to assess crucial elements of the applicant’s situation and referred the case back to the Ministry of the Interior for further proceedings.