O.K., a national from Ukraine, applied for temporary protection in the Czech Republic on 29 September 2022 in accordance with the national legislation adopted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Act No. 65/2022 Coll., also known as ‘Lex Ukraine'). The applicant's request was deemed inadmissible by the Ministry of the Interior under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act No. 65/2022 Coll.), on the grounds that O.K. had already been granted temporary protection in Poland. The applicant challenged this decision before the Municipal Court in Prague, arguing that the Ministry of the Interior's interpretation was unlawfully interfering with his rights.  

The Municipal Court in Prague declared the Ministry of the Interior's decision unlawful, finding that Council Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary protection (Temporary Protection Directive) does not exclude the possibility of submitting an application for temporary protection after the applicant has already been granted temporary protection in another member state. The Municipal Court in Prague noted that the Temporary Protection Directive merely states that an applicant could not enjoy temporary protection in more than one EU Member State at the same time. It added that the TPD establishes a minimum standard level of protection toward displaced persons, thus member states cannot set less favorable conditions for them. Furthermore, the court held that the applicant has the right, even repeatedly, to choose the Member State in which he will benefit from temporary protection. Conclusively, the court found that Section 5(1)(c) and (d) of the Lex Ukraine extended the scope of inadmissibility beyond what is permitted under EU law, thus breaching both the Temporary Protection Directive and the Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382. The court ordered the Ministry of the Interior to rectify its decision and allow the applicant's request to proceed.  

The Ministry of the Interior filed a cassation appeal before the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC), arguing that temporary protection could not be enjoyed in more than one EU Member State. The Ministry of the Interior also argued that allowing multiple applications undermined the intention of preventing secondary movement of persons under the temporary protection regime across the EU and constituted an abuse of rights. The Ministry of the Interior argued that the Municipal Court in Prague should have referred the case as a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) because in the Krasiliva judgment the provision dealt with was Section 5(1)(c) of the Lex Ukraine (application submitted but not yet decided) and not Section 5(1)(d) which concerned the case at hand (temporary protection already been granted in another member state). 

SAC dismissed these arguments. Firstly, it confirmed that lower (regional or municipal) courts had no obligation to refer preliminary questions under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) unless they were the final court of instance, a status held by SAC itself. Moreover, SAC had already referred a similar question in a parallel case (A.N. v Ministerstvo vnitra -C-753/23), and the CJEU issued its judgment on 27 February 2025 (Krasiliva). The CJEU judgment in Krasiliva had a critical influence on SAC's reasoning since it held that provisions excluding judicial review, such as Section 5(2) Lex Ukraine, violated EU law, specifically the right to an effective remedy. The CJEU clarified that the temporary protection status granted by one Member State did not block an individual's right to apply for temporary protection in another Member State, provided they do not enjoy protection in both simultaneously. Authorities must give applicants a reasonable opportunity to end protection in the previous state before rejecting a new application. Automatic inadmissibility without this procedural step breaches EU law. 

SAC highlighted a number of national judgments (1 Azs 174/2024, 9 Azs 98/2024, 2 Azs 270/2024, 10 Azs 4/2025, 7 Azs 3/2024) which consistently reinforced this standard: the inadmissibility of an application based solely on prior temporary protection was incompatible with EU law. 

The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the cassation appeal filed by the Ministry of the Interior, and reaffirmed that Section 5(1)(d) of Lex Ukraine, as applied in the case, was contrary to EU law.