A Turkish national of Kurdish origin was arrested in 2004 together with two fellow nationals by border guards in Drama (Greece) for irregular entry into the country. On 1 April 2004 he applied for protection arguing that he fled his country due to opposition to the current political regime fearing to be prosecuted upon return due to his participation in the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C) for almost a decade. On 22 April 2004, his application was rejected. On 10 May 2004, the applicant lodged an appeal and, by decision of 18 June 2004, his appeal was dismissed. An expulsion order was then issued to him, but he was allowed to stay temporarily in Greece on humanitarian grounds i.e. suffering from serious health problems and being a victim of torture. In October 2004, the applicant brought an action for annulment before the Council of State, which annulled the decision of the Minister of 1 April 2004 as unlawful, referring the case to the administration for a new decision to be issued.
On 23 April 2020, the Ministry of Justice received a letter requesting the applicant's extradition. The Athens Court of Appeal issued an opinion against the extradition as the minimum of his rights would be compromised.
The applicant lodged a subsequent application for international protection on 2 October 2015. In addition to his former arguments, he submitted that since 2013 his targeting by the Turkish authorities has intensified, putting his life, freedom and physical integrity at risk. To support his claim, he submitted newspaper articles showing the applicant as having gone illegally to Türkiye, ready to carry out bomb attacks in the name of DHKP/C. His subsequent application was considered admissible, but it was rejected in April 2020 on exclusion grounds. On 27 July 2020, the applicant lodged an administrative appeal submitting that even if he was considered to be a member of the DHKP-C, according to the case law of the CJEU, membership is not sufficient for the application of the exclusion clause, and it is necessary to establish personal involvement or responsibility. He added that classifying an organisation as terrorist is as well not sufficient. In October 2020, the 18th Independent Appeals Committee rejected the appeal, concluding that the applicant participated and assisted in the commission of a series of terrorist acts, as they are defined in the Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism.
In March 2022, the applicant filed an application for annulment to the Athens First Instance Administrative Court.
When revisiting the general principles to consider the participation in serious non-political crimes, the court referred to the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons v Mostafa Lounani (31 May 2016, para 55). It reminded that although the acts of an organisation listed in the Annex to Council Common Position 2001/931 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, by reason of its involvement in terrorist acts, may be linked to each of the grounds for exclusion set out in points (b) and (c) of Article 12(2) of recast QD, the mere fact that the applicant has been a member of such an organisation cannot automatically lead to exclusion from refugee status under those provisions, but it is necessary to assess the nature of the acts committed. In particular, there is no direct link between the Common Position 2001/931 and the Directive, as far as the objectives pursued are relevant, and there is no justification for the competent authority, when it decided to exclude a person from refugee status on the basis of Article 12(2) of the recast QD, to rely heavily on his membership of an organisation on a list drawn up outside the framework established by the Directive. This is because the Common Position 2001/931 of the Council of the European Union was adopted in a different context from that of the Directive, which is essentially humanitarian.
Citing the CJEU judgment in Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons v Mostafa Lounani (C-573/14, 31 January 2017), the court noted that to exclude a person from refugee status, it must be possible to attribute to the applicant part of the responsibility for the acts committed by the organisation during the period when he was a member, following an individual assessment, based on an examination of specific facts and circumstances and considering strong credible evidence, irrespective of any criminal conviction for alleged intentional involvement. Furthermore, referring to the decision of the Council of State No 1694/2018, it noted that Article 12(2) of recast QD when referring to ‘serious reasons' requires for its application high standards of proof, different from those applied in criminal proceedings, since the objective of the Directive is essentially humanitarian, with the presumption of doubt operating in favour of the applicant. Against this context, the court noted, cases of collective responsibility for criminal acts are not sufficient to establish the applicant's involvement in terrorist acts, but it is necessary to have clear, robust evidence after a full examination of the specific circumstances of each case by the decision maker. In concluding this, the court referred to EASO's Judicial analysis Exclusion: Articles 12 and 17 of the Qualification Directive (2020).
The court noted that the Appeals Committee had based its decision solely on the grounds that the applicant's main claim that he was not a member of DHKP-C (but instead of TAYAD) was found to be not credible. It concluded that the assessment was not based on strong and reliable evidence and an individual assessment of the circumstances of the case, but on inferences and to a large extent, hypotheses. The court noted that the committee failed to consider specifically, the fact that nowhere in the statements of the applicant did it appear that the applicant participated in the armed struggle of the organisation DHKP-C, that the political activities which the applicant participated according to his statements are actually attributed to the members of TAYAD, and that the applicant's name is referred to activities in the Turkish press relating to TAYAD's activities, that TAYAD members repeatedly claim to be regularly harassed by security forces and sometimes arrested without justification and security authorities often ‘set up' indictments against them, that the content of a publication of 2013 which includes references of the applicant as a terrorist ‘living-bomb' were at a time when the applicant was in Greece, and that similar actions had taken place against him in 2003 by other newspapers.
The court also noted that neither the evidence in the case file, nor the authority had claimed that the applicant posed a danger to the Greek legal order, and that in 20 years in Greece his behaviour did not raise any suspicion with the authorities that he might have a connection with a terrorist group, nor did it appear that he has been charged or convicted, of any offense. It furthermore noted that the attribution to the applicant of the acts for which he was found guilty in Istanbul was not definitive to conclude that a serious non-political crime was committed by him, without assessing:
- the actual nature of his participation in the commission of the offences in question and, in particular, if there was active assistance from the applicant, and if that participation, even if proven, was, on the one hand, conscious and, on the other hand, substantial,
- the rules of evidence applied in the criminal proceedings, based on which his criminal guilt was established,
- his position within the organisation,
- the degree of knowledge he had or should have had of its activities,
- that the applicant was arrested from 5 June 1998 to 25 June 2001 and has therefore served part of the sentence imposed on him,
- his minor status at the time when he committed the offences in question, as well as the very long period, more than 20 years that has elapsed since then, and
- the treatment ordered by the Turkish authorities since his arrest in 1998, even before criminal proceedings were brought against him, until his release from prison.
The court concluded that in the absence of the assessment of these facts, the decision was unlawful. It annulled the decision and referred the case to the administration for a fresh legal assessment especially considering the points highlighted and whether, after a potential negative assessment of refugee status, the applicant would qualify for subsidiary protection.