Rauf Emin Olga Ahmedbekov is the son of Mrs. Ahmedbekova and Mr. Emin Ahmedbekov. On 19 November 2014, Mr. Ahmedbekov lodged an application for international protection in Bulgaria, which was rejected on 12 May 2015 and further dismissed by the Sofia Administrative Court on 2 November 2015. On 25 November 2014, Mrs. Ahmedbekova lodged applications for international protection with the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees for herself and her son. Those applications were also rejected on 12 May 2015 on the grounds that the conditions for granting international protection were not satisfied. Mrs. Ahmedbekova brought an action against that decision before the Administrative Court in Sofia (referring court), relying on both persecution of her husband by the Azerbaijani authorities and circumstances concerning her individually, namely, risk of being persecuted because of her political opinions and being sexually harassed at her workplace in Azerbaijan. She claimed that her risk of persecution was demonstrated by her having brought a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights against Azerbaijan. The Administrative Court in Sofia harbored doubts about how an application for international protection lodged separately by family members must be processed. The court also raised the question of whether the applicant's involvement in a complaint before the ECtHR was a relevant factor in determining whether international protection must be granted. In this context, the Sofia Administrative Court decided to stay the proceedings and submitted nine questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.

The CJEU considered in the first place the fourth question - whether Article 4 of the recast Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95) must be interpreted as meaning that, in carrying out the assessment of an application for international protection on an individual basis, account must be taken of the threat of persecution and of serious harm in respect of a family member of the applicant. The question arose because Mrs. Ahmedbekova relied on threats of persecution and serious harm in respect of her husband.

The CJEU recalled that the decision on whether to grant refugee or subsidiary protection status must be based on an individual assessment that aims to determine whether, in light of the applicant's personal circumstances, the conditions for granting such status are satisfied. Thus, the court concluded that the system established by the EU legislature for granting uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status aims to determine whether the applicant, or the person on whose behalf an application is lodged, has a well-founded fear of being personally persecuted or a real risk of suffering serious harm. However, and noting recital 36 and the observations from Advocate General Mengozzi p. 32 the court ruled that account of threats of persecution or serious harm in respect of one of the applicant's family members for the purpose of determining whether the applicant is, because of his family tie to the person at risk, himself exposed to the threat of persecution or serious harm.

The fifth question concerned whether the recast Qualification Directive and the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, read with Articles 7, 18 and 47 of the EU Charter and considering the best interests of the child, must be interpreted to preclude applications for international protection lodged separately by members of a single family from being assessed in a single procedure or the assessment of one of those applications from being suspended until the conclusion of the examination procedure in respect of another of those applications.

The CJEU recognized at the outset that the said directives did not specify how to treat potential interactions between such applications, which may, in part, concern identical facts or circumstances. However, the court noted, in accordance with the requirements of an individual assessment and of an exhaustive examination of applications for international protection, applications lodged separately by members of a single family must be subject to an examination of the situation of each person concerned; they cannot be subject to a single assessment. However, such applications might be subject to measures intended to address interactions between them.

In particular, the court considered that in a case where one family member relies on threats in respect of another family member, it may be expedient to verify first, in assessing the latter's application, whether those threats are grounded; secondly, to verify, where necessary, whether the spouse and the child of that person at risk are themselves, because of the family tie, also subject to the threats of persecution or serious harm. Secondly, to meet the objective expeditious assessment and processing of applications and to facilitate maintaining family unity, the assessment of a family member's application should not lead to suspension of the assessment of another family member's application until a decision is taken on the former. Decisions on related applications from members of a single family must be adopted promptly from one another.

More specifically, the court held that, if the determining authority finds that a person has a well-founded fear of persecution or faces a real risk of serious harm, it must, in principle, be able to assess within a short period of time whether or not that person's family members are themselves also exposed to such a threat because of their family tie. That assessment should be concluded, or at least begun, before the adoption of a decision to grant international protection to that person.

In the same vein, if the determining authority finds that no family member has a well-founded fear of persecution, nor faces a real risk of serious harm, it must, in principle, be able to adopt its decisions to reject the applications for international protection on the same day. Based on this, the court held that the Deputy Chairperson of the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees could not be criticised for having adopted, on the same day, his decisions on the applications lodged by the Azeri family, provided that those applications were not subject to a single assessment.

In its sixth question, it asked whether Article 3 of the recast QD must be interpreted as allowing a Member State, when granting international protection to a family member, to extend the scope of that protection to other family members. The CJEU held that, from a joint reading of recital 14 and the recast QD, relaxing the conditions under which a third-country national can enjoy refugee or subsidiary protection status could be one of the more favorable standards that Member States may adopt under the directive. Aligning with the Opinion of the Advocate General, the court agreed that granting refugee status automatically under national law to family members of a person to whom that status was granted under the recast QD was, in principle, without connection to the rationale of international protection. Thus, in the case at hand, the possibility of granting refugee status or subsidiary protection to Mrs. Ahmedbekova's son and husband on account of her refugee status, to maintain their family unity, would be consistent with the rationale of international protection.  

Next, the court answered the second and third questions together concluding that the ground of inadmissibility set out in Article 33(2)(e) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive could not apply to the circumstances at hand.  

On the seventh question, concerning whether the involvement of the applicant on proceedings against the ECtHR could be regarded when assessing her reasons for persecution as proof of her membership to a particular social group, the CJEU held that it could not in principle be regarded as such as the applicant could not be said to meet the conditions stipulated in Article 10(1)(d) and(e) of the recast QD. In contrast, the court concluded that involvement in bringing a claim to the ECtHR could be regarded as a reason for persecution on the grounds of political opinion if there were valid grounds for fearing that such involvement would be perceived by Azerbaijan as an act of political dissent against which it might consider taking retaliatory action.

The eight question concerned whether Article 46(3) of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a court before which an action has been brought against a decision refusing international protection is required to examine grounds for granting international protection which, whilst relating to events or threats which allegedly took place before the adoption of that decision, or even before the application for international protection was lodged, have been relied on for the first time during those proceedings.

Recalling its considerations in the case of Alheto (C-585/16, 25 July 2018), the court ruled that it does not follow from Article 46(3) of the recast APD that that an applicant for international protection may, without it being subject to a further assessment by the determining authority, modify the ground for his application and, thereby, the configuration of the facts of the case by relying, in an appeal procedure, on a ground for international protection which, whilst relating to events or threats which allegedly took place before the adoption of that authority's decision, or even before the application was lodged, were not mentioned before that authority.

The court emphasized that the applicant's right to obtain a full and ex nunc examination before a court or tribunal cannot be interpreted as diminishing the obligation on the part of that applicant to cooperate with the determining authority. More specifically, the court noted that the vital stage before the determining authority would be circumvented if the applicant were, without any procedural consequences, allowed to rely, for the purposes of having a court annul or replace the decision of refusal adopted by that authority on a ground of international protection which, whilst relating to allegedly antedated events or threats, was not raised before that authority and could not therefore be examined by it. Accordingly, the court ruled, where one of the grounds for international protection is invoked for the first time in an appeal procedure and relates to alleged events or threats antedating the adoption of that decision, or even the lodging of the application for international protection, that ground must be regarded as a further representation within the meaning of Article 40 (1) of the Recast APD. To determine whether courts can assess that further representation, they must verify that the ground for international protection has not been included in a later phase of the appeal procedure and has been presented in a sufficiently specific manner for it to be duly considered. If that is ascertained, it is for the court to ask the determining authority to assess that ground within a given period and provide the result to the applicant and to the court before the court interviews the applicant and considers the case.

In the case at hand, the court noted that Mrs. Ahmedbekova had already informed the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees of a well-founded fear of persecution based on political opinion, and that during the appeal procedure she had added further evidence to support that fear. The CJEU held that it was for the referring court to ascertain whether the evidence is in support of a reason which was rejected before by the determining authority, whether such evidence, relied on for the first time, is significant and sufficiently distinct from the evidence which the determining authority was able to consider.

The CJEU concluded that in view of the answers given there was no need to provide an answer to the first and ninth questions.