On 6 May 2015, the applicant was granted refugee status in Belgium. On 6 December 2019, the Court of First Instance of Liège sentenced the applicant to a three-year prison sentence for having, voluntarily and in full knowledge of the facts, encouraged and assisted three young people in their plan to travel to Syria to practise armed jihad and for participating in the activities of a terrorist group, in this case the Islamic State. Consequently, on 2 February 2021, the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) withdrew the refugee status on the ground that the applicant had been convicted of participating in a terrorist organisation. This decision was confirmed by the Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL) on 24 January 2022.
On 25 February 2022, the applicant filed an appeal before the Council of State seeking cassation of the judgment of the CALL. The applicant argued that being convicted for participation in a terrorist organisation was not sufficient to justify the withdrawal of his status and that, considering the consequences of exclusion and the ambiguity of the term terrorism, the grounds for his exclusion should be interpreted restrictively. In support of his appeal, he claimed a violation Articles 12 and 14 of Directive 2011/95/EU and referred to Germany v B and D (C-57/09 and C-101/09, 9 November 2010).
Moreover, the applicant argued that, according to the principle of proportionality, the CALL should have analysed the individual circumstances of his case to determine whether the acts committed met the conditions for exclusion and whether the applicant had been individually responsible for those acts. For example, he claimed that the CALL should have taken into consideration the role that the applicant had played in the organisation, the degree of his knowledge of its activities and any pressure which might have influenced his conduct. In his case, the applicant claimed that his activities had been limited to telephone contacts with three individuals to encourage them to travel to Syria and that he had not had any important role within the organisation.
For those reasons, the applicant requested that the previous decision be amended or that, in the alternative, a question be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the meaning and interpretation of Article 12(2) c and 12(3) of Directive 2011/95/EU. In particular, whether being convicted for participating in a terrorist organisation was sufficient to justify exclusion or withdrawal or if, on the contrary, it was necessary to consider all the individual aspects of the case.
First, the Council of State ruled that the application was inadmissible because the applicant had failed to demonstrate why Articles 12 and 14 of Directive 2011/95/EU had been incorrectly transposed or how the principle of proportionality was infringed by the judgment under appeal. The council highlighted that, for an appeal to be admissible, it must not only indicate the rules that have been infringed but also to explain in an intelligible manner the reasons why they have been infringed, and in this case the applicant had failed to do so.
Second, the Council of State considered that the CALL had not excluded the applicant from international protection solely because of his conviction, but that it had assessed the specific facts from which it could be concluded that that the applicant had committed acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. For example, the CALL had adequately considered the fact that the applicant had been fully aware of the activities of this terrorist group, since such assumption was supported by his long-term participation in the organisation and the content of his computer. The Council of State therefore concluded that the CALL had relied on the concrete actions of the applicant to determine his exclusion.
Third, regarding the applicant's claim that he had not been an important figure in the organisation, the State Council agreed with the CALL that, according to its previous case law, this condition was not necessary for the exclusion to apply. Neither was it necessary to prove that the applicant was the instigator of a specific terrorist act. The council therefore concluded that the CALL was not required to prove the applicant's leadership to be able to conclude that he was guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Fourth, the council noted that the arguments put forward in the application relating to the moderate nature of the sentence, the proper conduct of the applicant or the changes in the applicant's lifestyle since his conviction did not contradict the seriousness of the facts and their classification.
Finally, the Council of State concluded that even if the CALL had ruled that “in any event” the sentence imposed on the applicant constituted sufficient evidence that he was guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, it still examined the various factors put forward by the applicant and considered that those factors did not justify the conclusion that the exclusion clause should not apply.
Therefore, the Council of State held that the withdrawal of the applicant's refugee status was justified because he actively participated in a terrorist group and was aware of its activities, and that the assessment was based on concrete evidence beyond just his conviction. The council found no need to prove the applicant held a leadership role and rejected the applicant's arguments about proportionality and individual circumstances, concluding that the exclusion rules were correctly applied, and the appeal was inadmissible.