The applicants are a single pregnant mother from Ethiopia and her child, born in Greece. On 3 May 2024, they requested international protection in Luxembourg. On occasion of an EURODAC search conducted the same day, the Ministry for Home Affairs found that they had previously been granted international protection status in Greece on 25 August 2023. Consequently, by decision of the same date, the Ministry informed the applicants that their application was rejected as inadmissible and ordered them to return to Greece.

On 21 May 2024, the applicant lodged an action for annulment of the contested decision before the Administrative Tribunal. By judgment of 10 July 2024, the Administrative Tribunal declared the appeal justified, annulled the contested decision and referred the case back to the Ministry for re-examination.

By a new decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs of 24 January 2025, the applicants were informed that their application was rejected as inadmissible on the ground that they were beneficiaries of international protection in Greece and that they had failed to prove in a credible manner that they would not have access to social protection or medical care or that they were at risk of inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR, upon return.

On 7 February 2025 the applicant appealed again the decision before the Administrative Tribunal and argued that while in Greece she was deprived of housing, food, employment, social and financial assistance, and that her child did not have access to adequate medical care there. Citing the CJEU judgment in Abubacarr Jawo v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C‑163/17, 19 March 2019), she claimed that she and her child would be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment upon return to Greece, in breach of Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) and Article 3 of the ECHR. Finally, she referred to MSS v Belgium and Greece, as well as to reports by Amnesty International and the Swiss Organisation for the Assistance of Refugees (OSAR).

The Ministry contended that the action should be dismissed as unfounded. He argued that several of the statements made by the applicant during the second interview were not credible or “deliberately false”, and that the applicant's assertion that she did not receive support from the authorities in housing or social protection was unlikely. 

Regarding the credibility of the applicant's claims, the tribunal referred to the OSAR report, which mentioned that Greek authorities do not offer specific housing assistance, leaving many beneficiaries homeless and unable to access benefits like healthcare, which requires a social security number linked to an address. Given these facts, the tribunal determined that the arguments presented by the Ministry did not undermine the credibility of the applicant's account, whose statements were deemed credible overall.

As to the alleged breach of Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter, the tribunal found that, despite the principle of mutual trust, it could not be ruled out that a system may encounter major operational difficulties that result in a risk of treatment that is incompatible with fundamental rights. Thus, the tribunal found that when there is evidence of such a risk, the tribunal is required to assess, based on objective, reliable, precise and duly updated evidence, the reality of the deficiencies. The tribunal also pointed out that the deficiencies in question must reach a particularly high threshold, which is reached when the indifference of the authorities would result in a person who is entirely dependent on public aid being in a situation of extreme material deprivation. Such material deprivation would not enable them to meet their most basic needs, and which would adversely affect their physical or mental health or place them in a state of degradation incompatible with dignity, a situation of great precariousness or severe deterioration in living conditions.

As regards the lack of access to employment and housing, the tribunal noted that the difficulties encountered in finding housing or paid employment respectively, could not be regarded as being contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 4 of the EU Charter, since no country has an obligation to provide employment for its residents or to guarantee access to housing.

On the lack of access to financial assistance, social protection and medical care, the tribunal referred to the report by OSAR, from which it was apparent that the access of beneficiaries of international protection to social protection is conditional on the allocation of a social security number, which in turn is conditional on the provision of an address. Moreover, it referred to the report by Amnesty International which found that the right of applicants to housing automatically expires after 30 days following the grant of international protection. Consequently, the tribunal found that, although beneficiaries of international protection did not have a total and systematic lack of access to healthcare or accommodation in Greece, since they are in the same situation as Greek nationals, it was necessary to analyse whether the personal situation of the applicants was such that, if they were to return to Greece, they would be in danger of facing living conditions which amounted to an infringement of Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter.

In that regard, the tribunal referred to the best interests of the child, as established in Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this case, the applicant's minor son was considered a young child who required frequent medical examinations due to his normal development and the fragility of his immune system. Moreover, the applicant was also in her fourth month of her second pregnancy at the time. As a result, the tribunal noted that this state of vulnerability made it necessary for them to access to medical care to guarantee the child's full development and physical integrity. It also considered necessary for the Ministry to contact the Greek authorities and receive from them individual guarantees that the applicants would not find themselves in a precarious situation upon return. However, to establish that the applicant and her son could have access to medical supervision, the Ministry had confined itself to referring to the Greek website, which contained information of an abstract nature on the situation, or to referring to NGOs which are active in a medical context. Instead, the tribunal considered it necessary for the Ministry to contact the Greek authorities and determine whether they would actually have the capacity to receive the pregnant applicant and her young son and treat them upon arrival. 

Therefore, even though the tribunal held that it was not apparent from the information available that the situation in Greece would be such that any beneficiary of international protection would risk being exposed to a total lack of access to health care and accommodation, having regard to the situation of particular vulnerability of the applicant and her son, there was a need for the guarantee of immediate and regular care. 

The Administrative Tribunal concluded that, although the available information did not show that all beneficiaries of international protection in Greece would face a complete lack of access to healthcare and accommodation, in this case, the applicant's particular vulnerability—being pregnant and accompanied by her young son—meant that they needed immediate and regular care. Moreover, the tribunal found that the Ministry failed to prove that the applicants would receive medical supervision upon arrival in Greece or that they will be able to continue their treatment there regularly. Consequently, the decision was annulled, and the case was returned to the Ministry for re-examination.