The applicant is a national from Ethiopia. On 26 January 2024, the applicant requested international protection in Luxembourg. In support of her application, she claimed that she feared persecution and rape on account of her membership of the Ahmara ethnic group.

The Ministry of Home Affairs found that the responsible State for examining the application under the Dublin III Regulation was Hungary, as the applicant had a Hungarian visa that expired less than six months before her application for international protection. Consequently, on 12 August 2024, the Ministry decided not to examine the application and ordered her transfer to Hungary, under Article 12(2) and (4) of the Dublin III Regulation. She also claimed that she would risk refoulement to her country of origin and hence was at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the Charter.

On 23 August 2024, she appealed before the Administrative Tribunal, claiming that there had been an infringement of Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, and that the Ministry had wrongly concluded that there were no systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary. She also claimed an infringement of Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation. 

In support of her plea, the applicant referred to an Appeal by the Office of the UNHCR under which Member States had to suspend transfers to Hungary. Other documents she referred to include an AIDA report on transfers to Hungary, and OSAR publication and a judgment of the CJEU of 13 June 2024 (C-123/22) which ordered Hungary to pay the lump sum of EUR 200 million for failing to fulfil its obligations under Article 260 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU and for failing to take all the measures to comply with the previous judgement (C-808/18). Finally, the applicant cited the judgement of the CJEU of 19 March 2019 (C-163/17), in order to conclude that the systemic deficiencies identified were of a particularly high degree of seriousness to justify that she should not be transferred to Hungary. 

The defendant claimed that the applicant had failed to establish that her rights would not be guaranteed in the event of her return to Hungary. It also argued that UNHCR appeal did no longer reflect the current situation in Hungary, since it was made more than 7 years ago, and that the CJEU case of 13 June 2024 was not applicable to the current situation because it referred to applicants from Serbia who were in transit zones. 

The Administrative Tribunal found that the Ministry had erred in considering that there were no systemic deficiencies in Hungary's asylum procedure and reception conditions, and that further examination of the system was needed. Consequently, it annulled the contested decision and referred the case back for further examination.

Firstly, the court found that, according to Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, a Member State must refrain from transferring the person concerned to the Member State designated as responsible if there are serious grounds for believing that there are systemic deficiencies in its asylum procedure and reception conditions.

The court then recalled that Hungary was required to respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in international law and had, a priori, an effective system of remedies against a violation of those rights and freedoms. It also referred to the principle of mutual trust, which is a rebuttable presumption that all Member States respect fundamental rights. Consequently, it found that it was for the applicant to provide material proof of deficiencies. 

However, the court observed that the principle of mutual trust is rebuttable and that it could not be ruled out that the system of a Member State might, in practice, encounter major operational difficulties. Consequently, the court found that, where the general situation of deficiencies is known to the authorities of the requesting Member State, there is no need to place the full burden of proof on the applicant. Consequently, it found that the sending State, if faced with reliable information that the receiving country has deficiencies in their system, must inquire about how the authorities of that country will apply asylum legislation.

In the present case, the court was presented with documents that proved that only 3 groups of people were entitled to lodge applications in Hungarian territory, and applicants transferred under the Dublin Regulation did not belong to one of those groups. Consequently, the court found that it could not conclude that people transferred to Hungary would not be refused access to the asylum procedure.

Furthermore, the court found that it was apparent from the AIDA report that a transfer acceptance letter, without concrete individual assurances that a person transferred under the Dublin III Regulation would be accepted in the asylum procedure, was not enough to guarantee that their right to apply for international protection would be respected. Particularly, in the present case, the Hungarian authorities provided a letter accepting the care of the applicant, but had not provided any guarantees that he would have access to both the asylum procedure and the reception conditions. In its argumentation, the court referred to the abovementioned cases (C-123/22 and C-808/18).

The court concluded that the Ministry had erred in considering that there were no systemic deficiencies in Hungary's asylum procedure and reception conditions, and that further examination of the system was needed, particularly regarding people transferred under the Dublin III Regulation. It also considered that the Ministry had wrongly assumed that the principle of mutual trust should be applied in relation to Hungary. Consequently, it annulled the contested decision and referred the case back for further examination.