The applicant is a national of Iran. On 27 December 2023, he requested international protection in Luxembourg. In support of his application, he claimed he feared persecution, inhumane and degrading treatment or even the death penalty because of his homosexuality, his opposition to the Iranian government and his support to the “organisation of the Mujahedin of the Iranian People”.

The Ministry for Home Affairs considered that the responsible State for processing the application was Hungary because the applicant had a Hungarian residence permit. Consequently, on 19 July 2024, the Ministry decided to not examine the application and ordered the applicant's transfer to Hungary under Article 12(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.

On 1 August 2024, the applicant appealed before the Administrative Tribunal, claiming that Hungary's reception conditions were not in accordance with recast Reception Conditions Directive, which was against Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation. Moreover, he claimed that, upon being transferred to Hungary, he risked being refouled to Iran, infringing Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Articles 3 and 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, he claimed that Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation should have been applied, allowing Luxembourg to examine the application for international protection, regardless of Hungary's competence.

In defence of his position, the applicant referred to an AIDA report of 2023, which concluded that Hungary was experiencing serious problems with its asylum policy, and a judgment of the CJEU (European Commission v. Hungary, C-123/22), which condemned Hungary for failing to comply with a previous judgment (European Commission v. Hungary, C-808/18) in which the CJEU held that Hungary had infringed European law by limiting access to the international protection procedure on its territory.

The defendant claimed that the action should be dismissed as unfounded, and that the Hungarian authorities were responsible for examining the application. The defendant also claimed that the applicant had failed to demonstrate the existence of systemic deficiencies in Hungary.

The Administrative Tribunal found that the Ministry had erred in considering that there were no systemic deficiencies in Hungary's asylum procedure and reception conditions, and that further examination of the system was needed. Consequently, it annulled the contested decision and referred the case back for further examination.

The court first recalled that Hungary was required to respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in international law and had, a priori, an effective system of remedies against a violation of those rights and freedoms. It also referred to the principle of mutual trust, which is a rebuttable presumption that all Member States respect fundamental rights. Consequently, it found that it was for the applicant to provide material proof of deficiencies. 

However, the court observed that the principle of mutual trust is rebuttable and that it could not be ruled out that the system of a Member State might, in practice, encounter major operational difficulties. Consequently, the court found that, where the general situation of deficiencies is known to the authorities of the requesting Member State, there is no need to place the full burden of proof on the applicant. Consequently, it found that the sending State, if faced with reliable information that the receiving country has deficiencies in their system, must inquire about how the authorities of that country will apply asylum legislation. 

In the present case, the court was presented with documents that proved that only 3 groups of people were entitled to lodge applications on Hungarian territory, and applicants transferred under the Dublin III Regulation did not belong to one of those groups. Consequently, the court found that it could not conclude that people transferred to Hungary would not be refused access to the asylum procedure.

Furthermore, the court found that it was apparent from the AIDA report that a transfer acceptance letter, without concrete individual assurances that a person transferred under the Dublin III Regulation would be accepted in the asylum procedure, was not enough to guarantee that their right to apply for international protection would be respected. Particularly, in the present case, the Hungarian authorities provided a letter accepting the care of the applicant, but had not provided any guarantees that he would have access to both the asylum procedure and the reception conditions. In its argumentation, the court referred to the abovementioned cases (C-123/22 and C-808/18). 

The court concluded that the Ministry had erred in considering that there were no systemic deficiencies in Hungary's asylum procedure and reception conditions, and that further examination of the system was needed, particularly regarding people transferred under the Dublin III Regulation. It also considered that the Ministry had wrongly assumed that the principle of mutual trust should be applied in relation to Hungary. Consequently, it annulled the contested decision and referred the case back for further examination.