The applicant, a national of Palestine*, was granted refugee status in Greece. He later entered Belgium and requested international protection there. On 10 December 2024, he was placed on the waiting register, but Fedasil did not provide him with accommodation. On 13 December 2024, the applicant’s legal representative requested that Fedasil and the Belgian State offer him a reception place within 24 hours. The same day, the Belgian State advised the legal representative to contact Fedasil. On 17 December 2024, Fedasil limited the applicant’s right to material assistance to medical aid, asserting that he had already been granted refugee status in another Member State, where he could apply to access the rights associated with that status. On 7 January 2024, the applicant then filed for interim relief against Fedasil and the Belgian State on 7 January 2025. On 20 January 2025, the Brussels Labour Tribunal ruled that the request was unfounded. The applicant appealed this decision to the Brussels Labour Court on 3 February 2025, and the Belgian State filed a cross-appeal.

Firstly, the the Brussels Labour court acknowledged that the applicant had been in a very precarious situation since entering Belgian territory. He had no financial resources to meet his basic needs and lacked stable housing at the time of the tribunal’s decision. This situation, which was contrary to human dignity, justified the urgent intervention of the judge hearing the application for interim measures. The court then noted that the Belgian State argued that the applicant’s basic needs (such as accommodation, meals, clothing, medical, social and psychological support, the granting of a daily allowance, access to legal aid, access to services such as interpretation and training, and access to a voluntary return program) could be supported by organisations or associations partly or fully subsidized by public authorities. The court emphasised that these organizations cannot accommodate all individuals entitled to reception, and in fact, a large number of applicants for international protection are left on the street or forced to live in unsanitary squats. The court confirmed that the applicant had no access to reception, even the minimum guaranteed by law, including housing. It stated that this created an emergency situation that the ordinary procedure could not address, thereby establishing the urgency required to bring proceedings for interim measures.

Regarding the fact that the applicant was granted refugee status in Greece, the court noted that Fedasil invoked the principle of mutual trust between EU Member States. The court clarified that this principle was not invoked by the asylum authorities, as the application for international protection had not been declared inadmissible within the legally prescribed timeframe. It emphasised that, with respect to the right to reception, the principle of mutual trust cannot be invoked when the applicant risks being exposed to a serious threat to his fundamental right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment during the examination of his application for international protection in Belgium. It further noted that the competent asylum authorities had not relied on this principle to declare the application inadmissible within the short time limits set by national legislation. The court ruled that an applicant for international protection, who has already been granted refugee status in another Member State, with a “well-known precarious situation requiring the utmost caution and care when examining protection applications from beneficiaries of international protection from that State,” should not be considered negligent for seeking certain rights in Belgium instead of waiting to exercise hypothetical social rights in Greece. According to the court, this choice, combined with the heightened vulnerability of Palestinian nationals, did not make the applicant responsible for the urgency of his situation. The court considered that Fedasil’s decision created the urgency. The court concluded that the factual circumstances of the case revealed extreme material deprivation, constituting a serious and present threat of inhuman or degrading treatment.

The court clarified that Belgian law distinguishes between subsequent applications following a previous Belgian procedure and first-time applications by individuals already protected in another EU Member State. The court determined that in this case, the Belgian authorities did not qualify the application for international protection as a subsequent application under Belgian law, , and no inadmissibility decision was issued within the 10 working days prescribed by law. As a result, the court ruled that Fedasil could not rely on Article 4(1)(3) of the Reception Law (which allows for the withdrawal or reduction of material aid in the case of a subsequent application) to justify limiting the aid to medical accompaniment. Moreover, even if it was considered a subsequent application, Fedasil failed to provide an individual, reasoned decision as required by Article 4(3) of the Reception Law, nor did it assess whether the applicant could maintain a dignified standard of living, as required by Article 4(4) of that Law.

The court further affirmed that Fedasil’s decision failed to consider the applicant's specific circumstances, particularly the heightened vulnerability of Palestinian nationals, as recognized by the Council for Alien Litigation (CALL). The decision, which merely referenced international protection obtained in another Member State—without specifying the State concerned or examining the effectiveness of the rights the individual could assert in that State—was not sufficient to constitute an adequate individual statement of reasons. The court held that Fedasil's decision infringed Article 4(3) of the Reception Law, which mandates that decisions on this matter be individually reasoned and to consider the applicant's particular situation, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The court also found that Fedasil failed to examine whether, despite limiting or withdrawing material reception conditions, the applicant could still enjoy a dignified standard of living.

Furthermore, the Belgian State argued that it was facing a situation of force majeure, making it impossible to provide material assistance to all applicants for international protection immediately upon submission of their application. In evaluating this plea, the Brussels Labour court referred to the CJEU judgment in Fedasil v S. Saciri and Others (C-79/13, 27 February 2014), which ruled that the saturation of reception systems cannot justify any derogation from the minimum standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. While the Brussels Labour Court acknowledged the difficulties the Belgian State faced in accommodating all applicants within the Fedasil network, it pointed out that the recast Reception Conditions Directive (recast RCD) allows for alternative forms of reception conditions. The court further noted that the Belgian State had not utilized these alternatives or demonstrated that it was impossible to do so.

The court additionally observed that the crisis situation in Belgium had been ongoing for over three years and was therefore not unpredictable, just as the increasing number of applications was also not unusual. It clarified that other factors, such as the long duration of international protection procedures and the emergency reception of Ukrainian nationals, could not justify the failure to provide reception to applicants for international protection. The court also noted that the fact the Belgian State implemented measures as of September 2023 demonstrates that steps could be taken to address the ongoing crisis. Consequently, the court held that the Belgian State failed to establish either the impossibility of providing reception to the applicant or the unpredictability and unavoidability of the difficulties it faces. Hence, it determined that the Belgian State was not prevented from providing reception due to force majeure.

The court determined that the applicant's right to reception was established, and that the recognition of refugee status in Greece did not justify depriving him of this right, given his individual situation of deprivation and his membership in a particularly vulnerable group. The court concluded that Fedasil's decision was not legally justified, either individually or in terms of ensuring a dignified standard of living. Therefore, the court ordered Fedasil and the Belgian State to accommodate the applicant in a suitable reception centre and provide him with material assistance, or at the very least, to place him in an emergency reception facility.

Palestine (*) - This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.