In 2021, JCMN and SNT, holding different nationalities, unsuccessfully applied for international protection in Lithuania, their appeals before the Supreme Administrative Court having also been rejected. The applicants have a son, VKN born in Lithuania, and on 9 June 2022, STN submitted an application for international protection on behalf of her child. In January 2023, both JCMN and STN submitted subsequent applications, which were rejected on 30 June 2024, in a joint decision of the Migration Department, concerning all three applicants. The negative decision concerned also the return of VKN and STN to the country of origin of JCMN and an entry ban for VKN.

On 19 July 2024, the applicants filed an appeal before the Regional Administrative Court, arguing that the grounds for asylum were not duly considered and that their child's situation, VKN, had not been properly considered in view of the fact that he is a Lithuanian-born stateless minor. The applicants argued on the statelessness that in order to register the birth both parents need to request it and the child needs travel documents which he cannot obtain, so he cannot be returned without a travel document. However, they claimed that VKN is a stateless person who resided in Lithuania for two years and could acquire citizenship by naturalization. The applicants contested the assessment of their marriage certificate which was issued after leaving the country of origin and explained that due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, they obtained the certificate through the embassy. They emphasised the significance of their son's statelessness, his right to Lithuanian nationality, the principle of family unity, and the recognition of their marriage certificate. On 21 November 2024, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the appeal, considering that the applicants did not provide reliable evidence and stated that a child could acquire Lithuanian citizenship at birth only if at least one parent is a Lithuanian citizen or if a deceased parent was a Lithuanian citizen, but these conditions were not met in this case. Moreover, the court stated that the parents' wish for their child to receive Lithuanian citizenship, and their rejection of any other nationality did not automatically make the child stateless. The court ruled that the Migration Department's decision to treat the applicants as a family and to order the mother's expulsion to the father's country of origin was not a reason to declare the decision unlawful even though the parents had different nationalities, and the mother had no connection to the designated country of expulsion. The Regional Administrative Court also assessed that the claims related to a fear of persecution due to a cumulative effect of certain circumstances, such as inability to find work or housing or anyone to take care of the mother, was not sufficient to warrant eligibility for asylum.

The applicants appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, claiming that their applications were based on a well-founded fear of persecution, and submitted extracts from individual psychological counselling client cards. Regarding their child, the applicants argued that according to the citizenship laws of the father’s country, a child can only obtain nationality through descent if at least one parent is a citizen and if both parents request it. The applicants argued that the fact that their child was eligible for citizenship did not mean he currently held that nationality. They asserted that their child was stateless and should have the right to acquire Lithuanian citizenship through naturalization. In response, the Migration Department argued that the applicants’ appeal did not introduce any new substantive arguments but merely referenced case law and legislation. The Migration Department also argued that the authenticity of the documents provided by the applicants cannot be verified, diminishing their evidentiary value. The Migration Department disputed the claim that the applicants’ child lacked citizenship, arguing that under the father country’s laws, he was automatically recognized as a citizen and that his parents were not obligated to apply for nationality on his behalf. It further argued that the applicants’ refusal to return to the father’s country of origin lacked justification since they had family ties that would allow them to reside there legally.

The Supreme Administrative Court had to determine the lawfulness of the Migration Department's decision and whether the applicants' claims, particularly regarding family unity and the child's statelessness, were properly considered. The court examined how the child’s nationality affected the return process, the mother’s nationality and her refusal to be expelled to a specific country, and the potential expulsion of the mother and the child to the father’s country of origin. The court examined the recast Qualification Directive (QD), finding that the applicants had to be regarded as a family, its unity should be respected, and that the best interests of the child should be taken into account.

The court also considered several CJEU judgments when assessing the present case, namely K and L v State Secretary for Justice and Security (C-646/21, 11 June 2024) where the CJEU interpreted the recast QD in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EU Charter) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and emphasised that the best interests of the child must be considered not only when assessing asylum applications but also throughout the decision-making process. The Supreme Administrative Court also cited the CJEU judgment Federal Republic of Germany v G.S. (C-484/22, 15 February 2023) highlighting that the best interests of the child must be protected at all stages of the return procedure. Moreover, it noted that according to the CJEU case TQ v State Secretary for Justice and Security (C-441/19, 14 January 2021), Member States should not take a return decision that is irrespective of the relevant circumstances of the family life of the third-country national concerned. The court referenced the CJEU judgment M. and others v State Secretary for Justice and Security (C-673/19, 24 February 2021) according to which,  when no suitable return destination exists under the Return Directive, a Member State cannot issue a return decision for an illegally staying third-country national who refuses to return to the state where they hold a residence permit.

Regarding the issue of granting refugee status as a derived right for the purpose of preserving family unity, the court considered the CJEU case LW v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-91/20, 9 November 2021) where the court clarified that applicants with multiple nationalities were considered deprived of protection only if they cannot or do not wish to seek protection from any of those countries due to persecution. The CJEU stated that Member States had to organise their laws to allow family members to apply for benefits such as residence permits and employment, because according to the recast QD, family members must be granted the same status as the main applicant in order to preserve family unity. The CJEU confirmed that it was irrelevant whether the child was born inside the Member State or elsewhere, and the derived refugee status could be applied even if the child had another nationality (from the non-refugee parent) and was not personally at risk of persecution in that other country.

The Supreme Administrative Court rejected both the mother and father’s asylum applications, finding that neither applicant faced a fear of persecution in their respective countries of origin. It also noted that the circumstances invoked did not constitute grounds for granting their son the citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania under the Law on Citizenship because none of the requirements related to naturalisation of a stateless person were fulfilled. However, the court found that the first instance decision failed to properly consider the potential for the child to acquire the citizenship of both parents and did not evaluate whether the child and the mother would be safe in the father's country of origin, which assessment was required under the non-refoulement principle, Article 5 of the Return Directive. Therefore, the court found that the expulsion of the mother and her child to a third country where she was not a national of, to which she did not consent and where it was not established that she would be admitted to that country, was unlawful.

Consequently, the Supreme Administrative Court considered that there was no legal basis to expel the mother and her child to a third country and that the Regional Administrative Court did not properly assess in which of the countries (provided that the child was also entitled to the nationality of the mother's country of origin) the best interests of the child would be ensured and his rights would be more favorably respected. It also stated that the fact that the Regional Administrative Court decided not to apply the ban on entry into Lithuania to a minor (unlike his parents), could not be regarded as a sufficient proportionate consideration of the best interests of the child. In light of the above, the Supreme Administrative Court partially upheld the appeal, overturned the expulsion decision, but confirmed the negative decision on the application for international protection.