The applicant is a minor from Syria. Following the appointment of an ad hoc administrator by order of the Family Court of 19 June 2024, he requested international protection on 29 November 2024. The comparison of the fingerprints with the EURODAC database revealed that the applicant he had been granted international protection in Greece on 20 February 2024. Hence, his application was declared inadmissible on 2 December 2024 on the basis of Article 28(2)(a) of the amended Law of 18 December 2015 on international protection and temporary protection. The applicant appealed to the Administrative Tribunal on 16 December 2024. He argued that the Minister failed to consider the case law of the CJEU regarding the situation of unaccompanied minors in Greece, as well as the best interests of the child and the right to respect for private and family life. To support his claims, the applicant referenced the summary of the judgment of the Federal Administrative Court of Switzerland in A, B, C, D, E and F v State Secretary for Migration (E-3427/2021, E-3431/2021).

The court held that the contested decision was reasoned both in fact and in law, as it referenced Article 28(2)(a) of the Law of 18 December 2015. It outlined the reasons for the Minister’s decision to declare the application inadmissible: the applicant had been granted international protection in Greece, and there was no indication in the administrative file that the applicant would face a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter in Greece. The court also noted that the Minister had pointed out that the applicant’s statement that conditions in Greece were 'miserable,' that people lived in tents, and that the applicant had not attended school, was not sufficient to contradict the contested decision. This was especially so since the applicant left Greece only a month after being granted international protection and had not mentioned requesting assistance from the Greek authorities.

The court also noted that the applicant was interviewed by the Ministry on 29 November 2024, with his representative present. Neither the conduct nor the content of the interview prompted any remarks from the representative, particularly regarding the applicant's situation of particular vulnerability or his best interests.

Regarding the legality of the contested decision, the court highlighted that, under Article 28(2)(a) of the Law of 18 December 2015, the Minister may issue a decision of inadmissibility without verifying whether the conditions for granting international protection are met when international protection has been granted by another EU Member State. The court specified that, since the applicant was granted refugee status in Greece, the Minister was a priori entitled to declare the application inadmissible on the basis of that article.

Concerning the plea based on a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter, the court noted that the CEAS was conceived in a context that allows for the assumption that all participating States respect fundamental rights, including those under the Geneva Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the ECHR, and that States can trust each other in this regard. The court referenced the CJEU judgment in Abubacarr Jawo v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C‑163/17 , 19 March 2019), which affirmed that Article 33(2)(a) of the recast Qualification Directive (recast QD) is an expression of the principle of mutual trust. At the same time, the court acknowledged that some Member States may face practical difficulties, leading to a serious risk that applicants for or beneficiaries of international protection may be treated in a manner incompatible with their fundamental rights. The court cited the CJEU judgment in Bashar Ibrahim (C‑297/17), Mahmud Ibrahim, Fadwa Ibrahim, Bushra Ibrahim, Mohammad Ibrahim, Ahmad Ibrahim (C‑318/17), Nisreen Sharqawi, Yazan Fattayrji, Hosam Fattayrji v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, and Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Taus Magamadov (Joined Cases C‑297/17, C‑318/17, C‑319/17 and C‑438/17, 19 March 2019), where it was established that if a court hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting a new application for international protection as inadmissible has evidence provided by the applicant to establish the existence of such a risk in the Member State that has already granted international protection, that court must assess the reality of deficiencies, whether systemic, generalized, or affecting specific groups of persons. The CJEU also clarified that the deficiencies in question must meet a particularly high threshold of seriousness, which depends on the specific facts of the case. Such a high threshold is met when a Member State’s authorities cause a person dependent on public aid to face extreme material deprivation, inability to meet basic needs like food, hygiene, and housing, which adversely affects their physical or mental health, or a state of degradation incompatible with human dignity. The court affirmed that, since the applicant challenged the presumption that the Greek authorities would respect his fundamental rights, particularly by claiming a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment in Greece, it was his responsibility to provide concrete evidence to support this claim. However, the court determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate that, upon return to Greece, he would face any risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, which requires acts of certain gravity and causes intense physical or psychological suffering. The court acknowledged that upon return to Greece, beneficiaries of international protection are likely to be faced with difficulties in terms of accommodation and access to health care and employment. At the same time, the court did not find that the situation of beneficiaries of international protection in Greece was such that it could conclude, from the outset, that there were sufficiently real and concrete risks of them being systematically exposed to extreme material deprivation as defined by the CJEU, to the extent that their return to Greece would, as a general rule, constitute treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter. For instance, regarding the potential housing difficulties claimed by the applicant, the court highlighted that there is no obligation for any State to guarantee housing access to its residents, and by extension, to beneficiaries of international protection. It also held that it could not be inferred from Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter that there is a general duty to provide refugees with financial assistance to maintain a certain standard of living. Although the applicant explained during his interview with the Ministry that he would not have had access to housing, financial aid, or education in Greece, the court found that he had not provided any details about the steps he had taken with the Greek authorities after being granted refugee status to access accommodation, financial aid, or education, nor had he explained why those steps had been unsuccessful. It was also not apparent from his account that the Greek authorities had specifically refused him such access, especially since he had left Greece only about one month after being granted international protection. The court also pointed out that a person cannot choose the country in which to request international protection based on the quality of social benefits or financial assistance available in that country compared to others. The court concluded that the applicant did not provide evidence that his rights under Articles 3 ECHR and 4 of the EU Charter would not be upheld upon return to Greece, nor that, in general, the rights of beneficiaries of international protection in Greece would not be automatically and systematically respected, or that they would have no right or opportunity to assert them before the Greek authorities through appropriate legal remedies. Hence, the court rejected the plea alleging infringement of Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3 of the ECHR.

Moreover, regarding the ‘particular situation of vulnerability’ claimed by the applicant due to his age as a minor, the court affirmed that while unaccompanied minors are indeed a particularly vulnerable group, this status alone cannot, in the abstract, be sufficient to conclude that any unaccompanied minor is at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter in the Member State where they have international protection. The court also considered the document submitted by the applicant supporting his claim of a "state of stress and uncertainty regarding his administrative situation." It noted that these documents were produced after the contested decision had been made. The court ruled that the administrative authority could not be criticized for not considering matters that were not submitted in a timely manner, as the court could not take into account facts or legislative or regulatory changes that occurred after the decision was made. It also noted that neither the applicant nor his representative mentioned any health issues during the interview with the Ministry.

As regards the applicant’s plea alleging infringement of his right to private and family life, the court found that that the applicant did not refer to a personal and close relationship with his uncle, who is a beneficiary of international protection in Luxembourg, which may fall within the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR. The court noted that the applicant’s uncle had submitted a family reunification application for his sister and her six children, including the applicant. This application was first rejected by a ministerial decision on 27 October 2020, and later, following an appeal, by another ministerial decision on 5 February 2021. It also observed that when the applicant arrived in Luxembourg in March 2024, his uncle refused to take responsibility for him. The court further noted that the applicant did not mention his uncle or provide any information about their relationship during the interview with the Ministry. His ad hoc administrator merely stated at the end of the hearing that the applicant had come to Luxembourg because his uncle resided there. The court noted that the applicant stated that, although his uncle had refused to take responsibility for him, he still maintained a relationship of trust with him. However, the court found that the applicant did not provide any supporting evidence, such as a testimonial certificate from his uncle. Hence, it concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate sufficiently real and close links with his uncle that would fall under the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR. As a result, it found no violation of that article.

Finally, regarding the applicant’s plea alleging infringement of the best interests of the child, the court confirmed the assessment that it was in the applicant’s best interests to return to Greece, where he already held international protection. This conclusion was based on several factors: first, no disproportionate harm was caused to the applicant's private and family life, as established in the previous findings regarding Article 8 ECHR; second, it had been concluded that there was no risk of the applicant facing extreme material deprivation of such gravity that it could be equated with inhuman or degrading treatment upon return to Greece; and third, there was no specific evidence submitted to suggest that the applicant could not continue his education in Greece. Thus, the court concluded that it had not been established that the applicant’s best interests would not be safeguarded upon return to Greece, and therefore rejected his plea on this matter as well. Conclusively, the appeal was dismissed as unfounded.